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Abstract 
This thesis explores the legal rationale and political considerations for nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth. Only 
one can destroy a city, with the potentiality of killing millions and affecting the lives of a whole 
generation through its lasting calamitous consequences and jeopardising the natural environment. 
Nuclear weapons are normally classified alongside with chemical and biological weapons as Weapons 
of Mass Destruction (WMD) and their danger surrounds their very existence.  Disarmament has been 
axiomatically accepted as the best safeguard against their threat, but achieving the aim of 
disarmament has a tremendously difficult international, socio-legal and political challenge. There are 
about 22,000 nuclear weapons allegedly remaining in our world today and over 2,000 nuclear tests 
have been conducted to date. This is to check their functionality by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 
and to demonstrate to real and potential enemies the potency of their nuclear forces. 
Consequently, International Law provides the framework within which States conduct their 
international affairs, usually accepting certain reciprocal constraints and regulating exceptions raised 
on nuclear weapons disarmament and for ensuring global peace. However, in as much as the NWS 
and their allies rely on nuclear weapons as legitimate security protective hedge for self-defence, 
efforts to ensure nuclear disarmament will invariably suffer from a fundamental contradiction and 
credibility deficit. This research, which unravels contemporary discourse on nuclear weapons 
disarmament, is burdened by the globally entrenched nuclear hegemony by the NWS and the looming 
danger of nuclear crisis across the world such as North Korea and other “rogue States” unbridled 
nuclear ambitions. The doctrinal legal research methodology is being used in analysing, synthesising 
and critiquing the legal and political issues associated with the research.   
The possession of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear deterrence are tangible evidence of 
nuclear proliferation. The more the world realises the global humanitarian consequences associated 
with nuclear weapons, the stronger the case and urgent steps needed against them. The nuclear 
technological threshold is rapidly growing, for political rather than technological purposes. This thesis 
therefore argues for more effective monitoring and compliance, together with greater enforcement 
of nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament commitments and obligations, especially in accordance 
with the provisions of the newly emerged Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) for 
the realisation of the desired objective of a nuclear free world.  
As part of the research findings, it is clear that any use of nuclear weapons would violate all the 
principles of International Humanitarian Law including jus ad bellum (when States are compelled to 
engage in warfare) and jus in bello (rules of engagement in war).This is as a result of the unthinkable 
humanitarian emergencies, catastrophic global consequences on the environment, climate, health, 
social order, human development and economic impacts nuclear weapons would potentially cause. 
According to the 2002 Rome Statute of International Criminal Court provisions, any use of nuclear 
weapons would amount to genocide (Article 6), crime against humanity (Article 7) and war crime 
(Article 8). Still from the research findings, both nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are arguably 
described as illegitimate instruments of State policies and they constitute instrumentalities of 
international lawlessness in the midst of earliest and contemporaneous legal instruments on nuclear 
disarmament.  
The fundamental recommendation arising from this research is that all States at all times need to 
comply with applicable international law on nuclear disarmament in conformity with the International 
Court of Justice Advisory Opinions on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and on the 
legality of use of nuclear weapons by a State in armed conflict. Significantly, all the Nuclear Weapon 
States should fulfil their commitments on the 13 practical steps towards disarmament outlined at the 
2000 Non-proliferation Treaty Review and Extesion Confenece (NPTREC), for the actualisation of 
general and complete nuclear disarmament. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
BACKGROUND TO THE THESIS PROBLEM 
1.1 General Introduction: Contextualising the Nuclear Weapons Problem  
This chapter examines the background of this doctoral research. It contextualises the 
nuclear weapons problem and review the early efforts to nuclear disarmament together 
with international law as a framework of State practice. As an introductory chapter of 
this research, it features the research aim and objectives as well as the research 
questions. Also included in this chapter are the research rationale, thesis statement, 
and the research key concepts, which are nuclear weapons, disarmament, 
multilateralism and international treaties in the light of nuclear disarmament. The 
conclusion of this chapter sythensises the theme and structural analysis of the thesis. 
According to United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA): “Nuclear 
weapons are the most dangerous weapons on earth.”1 Only a single nuclear weapons 
can utterly destroy a city, with the possibility of killing millions and wasting the lives of 
an entire generation through its longstanding calamitous effects and endangering the 
natural environment. Nuclear weapons are usually classified together with chemical 
and biological weapons as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)2 and their 
endangerment emanates from their existing presence in the world. Nuclear 
disarmament has been generally accepted as the best safeguard against their potential 
threat, but achieving the goal of disarmament is enormously fraught with difficult 
ideological, legal and political challenges.3   
Moreover, serious challenges of fresh and imminent dangers concerning nuclear 
weapons are confronting the international community, as the world is at the crossways 
of technological advancement, global terrorism, socio-political and geo-political 
hegemony, as well as further uncertainty surrounding the strategies relating of 
anticipation. Despite the foreclosure of the nuclear impasse of the Cold War epoch, 
nuclear weapons remain a colossal threat to the people and the governments of the 
whole world as result of their destructive capabilities.4  
The greatest substantial danger to global peace and security today originates exactly 
from the development – or prospective emergence – of new nuclear arm race.5 For 
example, in the most recent past, the world experienced and currently still experiencing 
the North Korean ambitious and unbridled actions of various nuclear weapons reality 
and the ballistic missiles capability, intended to threaten other countries especially its 
                                                          
1 UNODA – United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Nuclear Weapons Home) 
www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear accessed 6 June 2016 
2 Elli Louka, Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011) 12 
3 Ibid  
4 NAPF - Nuclear Age Peace Foundation (Nuclear Weapons Issues) www.wagingpeace.org/disarmament   
5 Christopher A. Ford, Debating Disarmament: The Non-proliferation Review [2007] 14:3, 401 -428 < 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700701611720 > accessed 7 June 2016 
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South Korean neighbour and to exhibit its nuclear weapons capabilities to the Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS).6    
In the same vein, Iran has been targeting uranium enrichment and ballistic missile 
capabilities, as its government has the intention of dutiful and apocalyptic considerable 
rage of wiping Israel – a regional nuclear power “off the map.”7  
Saliently, it is noteworthy to mention that up to the time of this thesis, nuclear weapons 
have only been used twice in warfare in the world. First, is the atomic bombing of the 
city of Hiroshima and secondly, the catastrophic bombing of the city of Nagasaki both 
in Japan, executed by the United States of America (USA) during the final phase of the 
Second World War in 1945. The bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have forced 
humanity to examine its self-destructive capabilities; by interpretation, how to change 
conventional conflict from blood-spattered and devastating affairs it assumed to high-
precision destruction and killing.8 An illustration of weapons target precision was the 
1991 Gulf War usher in Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA).9 
All through the era of the Cold War, the whole of humanity lived with the eminent 
danger of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). It could be argued that, after about 
three decades of the Cold War, humanity is still living in another dimension of MAD – 
Mutually Assured Delusions,10 that is, the delusions of deterrence theory that nuclear 
weapons provide defence against nuclear attacks and the reliance on nuclear 
armaments for protection in the 21st century. 
Obviously, nuclear deterrence would not be effective for the Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS) and the rest of the world against terrorist organisations that could possess 
nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are not only illegal, they are also unethical, costly, 
and undermine global security as their usage would violate the rules regulating the 
conduct of war. The United States as the militarily and economically the most powerful 
country in the world as well as the first nation that manufactured nuclear weapons and 
the only country that have used them, has the special task to lead the world in 
achieving its aspirations for nuclear disarmament in line with international law.11 
Numerically, there approximately are about 22,000 nuclear weapons in our world 
presently and over 2,000 nuclear tests and detonations have been carried out to date 
by both the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and other nuclear possessing countries.12 
This is to ascertain their functionality and to prove to real and potential State enemies, 
the strength of their nuclear capabilities.13 Noticeably, States are progressively 
interested in developing nuclear power as a dependable supply in ensuring their 
                                                          
6 Ibid  
7 Christopher A. Ford, Debating Disarmament: The Non-proliferation Review [2007] 14:3, 401 -428 < 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10736700701611720 > accessed 7 June 2016 
8 Elli Louka, Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011) 2  
9 Ibid 
10 David Krierger, The Challenge of Abolishing Nuclear Weapons (Transaction Publisher, 2011) 13 
11 Ibid 
12 UNODA – United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Nuclear Weapons Home) 
www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear accessed 6 June 2016 
13 UNODA – United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Nuclear Weapons Home) 
www.un.org/disarmament/WMD/Nuclear accessed 6 June 2016 
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energy security.14 All NWS including Non-Nuclear Weapons States (NNWS) such as 
India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, have tested and exploded nuclear devices.15 
Reportedly, there are about 12,000 nuclear weapons deployed across the globe, and 
3,500 are on hair-trigger alert ready to be launched.16 
Perceptibly, as long as nuclear weapons remain in the world, our future dependents 
on the ongoing restraint of the NWS. This is real as our reasoning expanses; we can 
never effectuate complete and general disarmament of nuclear weapons. For instance, 
if all the nuclear weapons remaining in the world were to be dismantled and completely 
destroyed today, new nuclear armaments can quickly be produced in the event of 
global nuclear crisis most especially by States that have perfectly mastered the front-
end and the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle. This is not a theoretical but a real 
threat.17 The knowledge of how to build improved nuclear weapons is increasing in the 
world, undermining the persuasions that total and complete nuclear disarmament is 
possible. 
The tables below show the Status of World Nuclear Forces in the year 2017 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Daniel H Joyner, Recent Development in International Law Regarding Nuclear Weapons [2011] ICLQ 60(1,) 
209 - 224 
15 Elli Louka, Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011) 13 
16 Ibid 26 
17 Ibid 15 
18 Federation of America Scientists: Status of World Nuclear Forces < https://fas.org/issues/ Elli Louka, Nuclear 
Weapons, Justice and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011) 13nuclear-weapons/status-world-nuclear-
force> accessed 17 January 2017 
Status of World Nuclear Forces 2017* 
 Country 
Deployed 
Strategic 
Deployed 
Nonstrategic 
Reserve/ 
Nondeployed 
Military 
Stockpile 
Total 
Inventory 
 Russia  1,790a 0b  2,700c 4,490 7,000d 
 United States  1,590e 150f  2,260g 4,000h 6,800i 
 France  280j n.a. 10j 300 300 
 China  0k ?k 260 260 260k 
 United Kingdom 120l n.a. 95 215 215l 
 Israel  0 n.a. 80 80 80m 
 Pakistan  0 n.a. 120-130 120-130 120-130n 
 India  0 n.a. 110-120 110-120 110-120o 
 North Korea  0 n.a. ? ? ?p 
Total:q  ~3,780 ~150 ~5,645 ~9,585  ~14,90018 
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1.1.1 Review of Early Efforts of Nuclear Disarmament 
From its very inception, the United Nations has enthusiastically pursued the de-
legitimisation of nuclear weapons. The very first resolution adopted by the United 
Nations General Assembly in 1946 created a commission to address problems 
associated with the discovery of atomic energy amongst others.19 The resolution 
authorised the commission to present a proposal for “the elimination from national 
armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass 
destruction.”20 The mandate of the United Nations Disarmament Commission is on the 
full range of disarmament matters, most especially nuclear disarmament. The United 
Nations Disarmament Commission is functionally serviced by the United Nation Office 
for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and officially supervised by the Department of the 
United Nations General Assembly Affairs and conferences service.21 
Substantially, the United Nations has facilitated various international and multilateral 
treaties aiming at stopping nuclear proliferation and detonation as well as 
simultaneously encouraging improvement in nuclear disarmament efforts. Notable 
amongst these treaties are the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons 
(NPT), the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Test In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space 
And Under Water, also known as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBN), and the 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) which was open for signature in 
                                                          
19 The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) adopted by consensus its very first resolution Resolution 1, 
Establishment of a Commission to deal with the problem raised by the discovering of Atomic Energy, 24 
January 1946s 
20 UNODA – United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (Nuclear Weapons) www.un.org/disarmament 
accessed 11 January 2017  
21 Ibid UNODA   
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1996 but yet to be ratified by all member States to come into force, apparently for 
superficial political discrepancies among member States.22  
Nevertheless, there are also previous several bilateral treaties and reciprocal 
agreements designed to extensively deescalate or eradicate certain kinds of nuclear 
weapons and to stop the proliferation of nuclear weapons and their delivery vehicles. 
Nuclear weapons can be delivered successfully by specially designed and deployable 
military aircraft bombers as it was the case at the end of the Second World War. 
Currently, different means of corresponding delivery systems like: MIRVs (Multiple 
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles); SLCMs (Sea Launched Cruise 
Missiles); SLBMs (Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles) and ICBMs (Intercontinental 
Ballistic Missiles), are all possibly available to Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) and 
other nuclear weapons possessing States.23 
Besides, there are a number of treaties that hitherto existed between the United States 
of America (USA) and the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) and at 
the same time a couple of other mutual initiatives within the Nuclear Suppliers Group 
such as the Missile Technology Control Regime, the Hague Code of Conduct against 
Ballistic Missile Proliferation, Wassenaar Arrangement.24 Also to be  mentioned is the 
Control and Verification of Multilateral Treaties on Disarmament and Non-proliferation 
of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2011.25 
The Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) of July 1 1968 unequivocally requires all 
States to pursue nuclear disarmament and to share information on nuclear technology 
for peaceful purposes, while concomitantly upholding the rights of these five States: 
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States known as the 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) to possess nuclear weapons. Consequently, some 
nations with nuclear ambition and capabilities like Pakistan, Israel, and India have 
never not joined the NPT.26 Based on political reservations against NWS, North Korea 
withdrew its membership from the NPT in January 10, 2003.27 
Essentially, these above-mentioned treaties and the entire legal discourse on nuclear 
weapons disarmament fall under the scope of International Law. Therefore, the 
proficient knowledge of the law of treaties articulately codified in the 1969 Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is fundamental to the proper understanding 
of nuclear disarmament process which in itself is embedded in the international law of 
treaties and how international law works.28 The VCLT Article 2(2) defines a treaty thus: 
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“[a]n international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related instrument 
and whatever its particular designation.”29 
The provisions of the 1969 VCLT apply to State parties in respect of treaties to which 
other forms of subjects of international law like international organisations are also 
parties in line with Article 3(c).30 Though, the VCLT is not retroactive; as it only applies 
to treaties concluded upon its entry into force, it has applicable residual capacity, 
unless a particular treaty provides or parties agree otherwise.31 However, those binding 
treaties which deal with nuclear weapons such as the NPT, the Comprehensive 
Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and regional agreements such as the Nuclear 
Weapons Free Zones should be guided by the spirit and letter of the 1969 VCLT for 
strict compliance.32 
The term ‘treaty’ is inter-changeably used as a standard word to mean various 
international agreements and contractual arrangements concluded amongst States for 
reciprocal benefits. These international mutual agreements are also known by several 
names raging from the word treaties itself to, protocols, concordats, conventions, 
covenants, pacts, charters, and declarations,  Irrespective of these terminologies, what 
is paramount is that the mechanism in question has the effectiveness of the law and 
the parties’ concerned have the commitment to form a legally binding and enforceable 
agreement.33 
1.1.2 International Law as a Framework of State Practice 
International law offers the framework within which States transact their international 
affairs, generally accepting certain mutual constraints and modifying exceptions 
raised34 on nuclear weapons disarmament and for ensuring international peace and 
security. As opined by Oppenheim: “international law has grown into the most effective 
weapon for preserving global peace and security.”35                 
There is a resilient normative procedure, highly considered by its advocates as 
mandatory and possessing a range of sanctions that are not always effective or 
enforceable but existing; that States affairs is openly founded on international law, with 
the exception of the cases of morality or political considerations.36 Nonetheless, ethical 
questions and politics are profoundly involved in any analysis of nuclear weapons and 
any attempt to deal solely with the legal is subject to justifiable claims of unbalanced 
consideration of the dilemma that is faced.37 Consequently, this research goes beyond 
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the legal framework to include the ethical and political dimensions to the discourse of 
nuclear disarmament. 
Can a State use its own national law as a justification for avoiding its disarmament 
obligations under international law? International law takes pre-eminence over any 
internal law of a State, and national law on the international sphere cannot take 
precedence over international law.38 The rights and obligations a State has under 
international law, on the international plane, supersedes any rights or duties it may 
have under its national law.39 A State party that is a signatory to a treaty that is binding 
under international law, its non-compliance cannot be excused as a matter of 
international law on the ground that the treaty was or has been declared invalid under 
national law by such State’s supreme court.40  
Exceptionally, national law has superseded international law on the national plane in 
the case of Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v United States of America)41 
where the International Court of Justice (ICJ) held that as a matter of international law, 
the United States of America cannot invoke national law procedural default rules to 
preclude giving full effect to rights for certain individuals arising under the Vienna 
Convention on Consular Relations.42 International law regulates not only how States 
behave towards one and another, but also how States deal with their own subjects and 
foreigners.43 
International law is influenced by any or all of these three unanimously acceptable 
apparatuses: international treaties; international custom approved as the universal 
practice and principles of law by States judicial applicable decisions; and teachings 
and writings of most highly qualified publicists or internationalists as veritable 
resources of subsidiary determination of the law.44 These sources especially 
international treaties will be explored in the course of this research, 
In the course of making law through the medium of State practice, it is pertinent to 
emphasise that the impact of States mainly concerned in the subject-matter in question 
will be correspondingly higher45 than States with little or no interest, such that “doctrinal 
elaboration of old classical international principles and rules to meet the new societal 
problems presented by emergence of nuclear weapons” will be disregarded.46 Hence, 
conceptual enquiry implies that there is much of philosophical and theoretical rationale 
in the phenomenon of law47 and it is therefore true in the interest of public conscience 
that the law should be necessarily coercive as it pertains to nuclear disarmament.  
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Conceptually, there have been argument by some internationalists and publicists, that 
the use of nuclear weapons is not controlled by previous customary international law.48 
This argument is based upon the conclusion of the permanent Court of International 
Justice in the Lotus Case,49 that “the rule of law binding upon States . . . emanate from 
their own free will as expressed in conventions or by usage generally accepted as 
expressing principle of law”.50  
In the opinion of Falk in response to the aforementioned case, this argument is weak 
and not persuasively resounding. He argued that it is “facile and unpersuasive” to 
extend the Lotus reasoning to the considerably dissimilar circumstances surrounding 
the question of the legal status of nuclear weapons.51 Evidently, a weak argument does 
not get stronger when more weak claims and premises are added to it.52 Unmistakably, 
the use of nuclear weapons is already prohibited by certain rules of customary 
international law, as well as by certain conventional rules which apply to such weapons 
analogously or interpretatively.53 Hence, the United Kingdom Manual of Military Law 
acknowledges that: 
“[i]n the absence of any rule of international law dealing expressly with it, the use which may 
be made of particular weapon will be governed by the ordinary rules and the question of the 
legality of its use in any particular case will, therefore, involve merely the application of the 
recognised principles of international law.”54 
1.1.3 The World Court Project  
Due to the existing apprehension emanating from the very existence of nuclear 
weapons, there is an extensive feeling that the nuclear arms race had become 
uncontrolled and uncontrollable, thus casting aspersion on the Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS) commitments to curtail the upward escalation in numbers and the sophistication 
of the their devastating nuclear armouries.55   
Based on the above perception, the International Peace Bureau (IPB), the International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW), and the International 
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) collectively founded the World 
Court Project in 1992. Indicatively, peace activists across the globe, international 
medical doctors and health workers, and ultimately, international lawyers forged a 
common cause of advocating for nuclear weapons disarmament through the 
instrument of international law.56  
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56 George Farebrother, ‘The Law and Nuclear Weapons’ [2005]  http://www.abolition2000europe.org accessed 
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The World Court Project had invoked the concept of The Public Conscience, which is 
highly esteemed in international law. 3.6 million Declarations of Public Conscience, 
stating the belief of ordinary citizens that nuclear weapons are immoral and unethical, 
were sampled globally in 36 languages, 110,000 of the sampled declaration collected 
were from the United Kingdom. This Declarations of Public Conscience was officially 
received by the Registrar of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) with the presence 
of all the judges.57 
The trilateral agreement (tripartite pact) of the Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of 
August 5 1963 was concluded amongst the U.S., U.S.S.R., and the U.K. prohibiting all 
nuclear explosions with the exception of underground tests.58 The United States as 
well as few other nuclear weapon States currently practice self-imposed moratorium 
on any underground nuclear tests, while India and Pakistan respectively conducted 
such tests openly in 1998.59 
Following the LTBT, the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 adopted the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that bans all States from conducting any 
nuclear tests irrespective of the purposes of such nuclear development. The UNGA 
also established a surveillance system of seismic incidents and on-site inspections.60  
Indisputably, the treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM Treaty) 
of May 26 1972, which was amended in 1973, is one of the most important nuclear 
arms control agreements. The treaty which was between the United States and the 
defunct Soviet Union provides that each State could have only one very restricted ABM 
deployment area, thereby precluding either State from developing a nationwide ABM 
defence. Logically, since each party would have the ability to retaliate against the other 
party, the ABM Treaty was fractioned to make it unlikely that both parties would resort 
to a nuclear first strike.61  
Practically, this was the reason why the former U.S. President, George W. Bush 
declared in December 2001 that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM 
Treaty, to allow America have the autonomy to develop and deploy a its own national 
missile defence system capable of preventing ballistic missiles that could be launched 
by “rogue” States or “Axis of Evil” with nuclear weapons capabilities.62 
Other kinds of reciprocal agreements such as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks 
(SALT) agreement that snowballed into the ABM Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction 
Talks (START) agreement, and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, were all 
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intended to restrict, reduce, and feasibly to get rid all types of nuclear weapons during 
the Cold War period.63 
Evidently, some of these treaties did not come into force, while others have been 
disputed after the Cold War period as no longer contemporaneous and conventional 
with the 21st century. The United States of America and the Russian Federation 
consolidated upon these treaties in May 2002 by concluding a Strategic Offensive 
Reduction Treaty (SORT), which stipulated the reduction of their nuclear warheads. In 
signing this treaty former U.S. President George W. Bush said: “[t]his treaty liquidates 
the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility between our countries.”64 
The joint declaration of the United States of America and the Russian Federation in 
several documents on set of issues such as arms control on the provisions of 
confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reduction has 
passed the test of time and have become a prelude to global efforts and multilateral 
negotiations on nuclear disarmament. 
On 27 October 2016, The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) First Committee, 
for the first time adopted Resolution A/C.1/71/L/41 – “Taking Forward Multilateral 
Nuclear Disarmament Negotiations” thereby calling for the negotiations for the Nuclear 
Weapons Convention (NWC). The NWC will outlaw the use, possession, development, 
testing, deployment and transfer of nuclear weapons with the mandate of 
internationally verifiable dismantlement of all nuclear arsenals. The negotiations for the 
realisation of this resolution would be held twice in 2017. The First phase of the 
negotiations would be from March 27 – 31 and the second phase would run from June 
15 to July 7. One hundred and thirteen (113) countries supported this resolution, 35 
States including the United States, United Kingdom, Russia, France and Japan voted 
against and thirteen (13) nations including China abstained.65 
In conjunction and in consolidation of the aforementioned Resolution, the United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in December 3 2016 adopted a landmark 
Resolution 71/71 backed by more than 140 States, calling for the earnest start of 
negotiations on an international treaty to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons and 
affirming its decision to hold a “High Level Conference” on Nuclear Disarmament not 
later than 2018 to review progress made.66 
The emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) in July 
2017 which underlying tenet is that nuclear weapons are legally uncacceptable is both 
a landmark and remarkable achievement of the multilateral disarmament efforts. The 
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TPNW will enter into force 90 days after the 50th instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession has been deposited.67 
1.2 Research Aim and Objectives  
0.1 Aim  
  The aim of this research is to stand the test of time as a consequential legal 
and academic contribution to the argument and rationale for nuclear weapons 
disarmament.   
0.2 Objectives  
 To examine the criticism against nuclear weapons disarmament, which 
expresses that disarmament, would undermine deterrence if nuclear weapons 
were eliminated on unilateral basis.   
 To analytically assess the framework of applicable International Humanitarian 
Law to respond to the danger posed by the horrifically destructive force of 
nuclear weapons in the world. 
 To critically analyse and assess the multilateral and international legal 
frameworks on nuclear weapons disarmament, including: changes in 
organisational and international approach; nuclear security approach; summits 
and conferences on nuclear weapons non-proliferation and disarmament; and 
the implementations and enforcement of nuclear weapons treaties.68  
  
1.3 Research Questions 
Essentially, in order to achieve the aforementioned aim and objectives, this research 
pose some fundamental questions and seek for satisfactory answers. The questions 
are:  
Q.1 What is the sovereign equality rationale behind the designation of the five 
permanent United Nations Security Council memberships of China, France, Russia, 
United Kingdom and the United States as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) in 
contradistinction, to the rest of world as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in view 
of multilateral and international legal frame work on nuclear weapons disarmament?   
Q.2 Conceptually, would it be possible to use nuclear weapons, bearing in mind their 
indiscriminate destructiveness without violating the laws of armed conflicts also known 
as International Humanitarian Law (IHL)? .  
Q.3 Is the doctrine of nuclear deterrence which is the rationale used by the Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) to justify their possession and maintenance of their nuclear 
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armaments and nuclear warheads in the midst of  legally binding effects of the various 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) recognised by the United Nations and the  
international treaties on nuclear weapons a military illusion, or a political solution to the 
discourse of nuclear disarmament?    
The Links of the Research Objectives to the Research Questions in 
the Thesis  
Research 
Objectives 
Research 
Questions  
Chapters 
and 
Sections 
R.O 1,To examine the  
criticism against nuclear  
weapons disarmament  
which expresses  
that disarmament  
would  
undermine  
deterrence  
if nuclear  
weapons were  
eliminated on  
unilateral basis.   
 
R.Q.3 Is the doctrine of nuclear 
deterrence which is the rationale 
used by the Nuclear Weapon 
States (NWS) to justify their 
possession and maintenance of 
their nuclear armaments and 
warheads in the midst of legally 
binding effects of the various 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone 
(NWFZs) recognised by the 
United Nations and the 
international treaties on nuclear 
weapons a military illusion or 
political solution to the discourse 
on nuclear disarmament. 
Chapter 4 
Section 4.4 
Page 164 
 
The Doctrine of 
Nuclear deterrence: 
Military Illusion or 
political Solution? 
Rationale for 
disarmament 
R.O 2, To analytically 
assess the framework of 
applicable International 
Humanitarian Law to 
respond to the danger 
posed by the horrically 
destructive force of nuclear 
weapons in the world. 
R.Q.2 Conceptually, would it be 
possible to use nuclear weapons, 
bearing in mind their 
indiscriminate destructiveness 
without violating the laws of armed 
conflicts also known as 
International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL)?  
Chapter 3 
Section 3.4 
Page 113 
The Use of Nuclear 
Weapons in Warfare 
and the Principles of 
International 
Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) 
 
 
R.O.3, To critically analyse 
and assess the multilateral 
and international legal 
frameworks on nuclear 
weapons disarmament, 
including: changes in 
organisational and 
international approach; 
nuclear security approach; 
summits and conferences 
R.Q.1 What is the sovereign 
equality rationale behind the 
designation of the five permanent 
United Nations Security Council 
membership of China, France, 
Russia, United Kingdom and the 
United States as Nuclear Weapon 
States (NWS) in contradistinction, 
to the rest of the world as Non-
Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) 
Chapter 3 
Section 3.13 
Page 149 
The Legal and 
Humanitarian 
Imperatives for Nuclear 
Disarmament 
 
Chapter 4 
Section 4.11 
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on nuclear weapons non-
proliferation and 
disarmament; and the 
implementations and 
enforcement of nuclear 
weapons treaties 
in view of multilateral and 
international legal frame work on 
nuclear weapons disarmament 
Page 199 
Strategies for Nuclear 
Disarmament and 
Enforcement of 
Nuclear Non-
Proliferation 
 
 
1.4 Research Rationale 
The rationale behind the choice of this topic is the obvious failure of the Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) to eliminate their nuclear armaments. The NWS have solemnly 
promised the international community to “negotiate in good faith” to achieve nuclear 
disarmament by NPT. Furthermore, they extended their obligations to abolish their 
nuclear weapons at the 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapon Treaty (NPT) Review and Extension Conferences.69 Notably, the progress of 
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty is evaluated every five years at an 
international Review Conference.70 
The States recognised by the NPT as NWS are the Permament Five Members (P5) 
United Nations Security Council (United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China); 
while other States with nuclear capabilities who are signatories to the Treaty are 
classified as parties to the Treaty. Categorically, the provision of Article VI of the NPT 
expresses thus: 
“Each of the parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective 
international control”.71 
However, the seemly reluntance or the slow pace and nonchalant attitude of the NWS 
to eliminate their nuclear warheads in line with the aforementioned provision of the 
NPT, do not only result in the proliferation of nuclear weapons to other nations and 
potentially or possibly terrorist to groups. This provides the justification for Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States (NNWS) especially States with less nuclear and military forces to 
maintain their nuclear arsenal on the ground on Nuclear Deterrence which is obviously 
counter-productive to the process of nuclear disarmament. 
Based on this backdrop, this research argues that the very existence of nuclear 
weapons and their annihilating capabilities on earth invariably opens the possibility that 
nuclear exchange or war might happen either advertently or inadvertently. This 
possibility is illustrated in the Cuba Missile crisis, when the United States and the 
defunct Soviet Union engaged in a 13-day tense political and military standoff in 
October 1962 over the installation of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba just 90 
                                                          
69 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968, 
(2-27 May 2005, New York)  
70 The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), July 1 1968, art VIII, para 3 
71 Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), July 1 1968, art VI 
14 
 
miles from the shore of US. This was discovered by a US surveillance aircraft on 16 
October 1962 and this brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.72   
Similarly, on 9 October 1979 a war game simulation was erroneously sent into a North 
American Air Defence (NORAD) computer The immediate response was that 
interceptor jets were scrambled and nuclear bombers were placed on war alert before 
the error was discovered.73  
Secondly, this research also aims to disprove the claim by critics of nuclear weapons 
disarmament that Nuclear Deterrence serve to prevent war and it is the best way to 
bring about peace, adding that no State with nuclear weapons has been attacked by 
another State with nuclear warheads for the fear of nuclear retaliation. However, the 
aforementioned Cuba missile episode of 1962 and the 1979 war game simulation 
erroneously sent to a North America Air Defence (NORAD) computer show the 
inherent danger which the very existence nuclear weapons pose.  
1.5 Thesis Statement 
This research which unravels contemporary discourse on nuclear weapons 
disarmament is motivated by international negotiations and globally entrenched 
nuclear hegemony by the NWS and the looming danger of nuclear crisis across the 
world such as North Korea and other “rogue” States unbridled nuclear ambitions.  It is 
clear that nuclear weapons disarmament is a commonly known controversy in the 
international community. Different scholars, political, professional and academic 
commentators have given opinions to the debate associated with nuclear 
disarmament. Nevertheless, the approach and the method adopted by this research is 
contribution to academic knowledge and legal research.   
This doctoral thesis stands as an academic legal contribution to the campaign for 
nuclear weapons disarmament. The research looks beyond the size and power of the 
NWS, their nuclear capabilities, and their ideological positions; and advocate for total 
and general disarmament through the framework of international treaties as an 
absolute commitment and obligation. 
Moreover, this study is contemporaneous with current international legal efforts by the 
United Nations and its resolutions in addressing international security concerns like 
nuclear terrorism and the unbridled predisposition for nuclear crisis and superiority 
amongst the NWS and their diplomatic efforts to circumvent the campaign for nuclear 
weapons disarmament, which is vital for ensuring substantial compliance on nuclear 
disarmament commitments.  
Meanwhile, since the topical issue of nuclear weapons disarmament in international 
law is  a rare academic research area, there is no gainsaying that this thesis is 
consequential to the larger society: States governments, the international community, 
international organisations, academic community, Non-Governmental Organisations 
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(NGO), civil society groups, Military R&D (Research and Development) and all and 
sundry. 
Following an articulated proposal detailing measures the NWS should adopt to 
actualise the recommendations of the action plan that calls for periodic reporting on 
the status of their nuclear forces in the 2010 Non-nuclear Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
Review Conference, by a group of Non-nuclear Weapons States (NNWS).74 It is the 
aim of this research therefore to endorse the NNWS proposal and to explore ways of 
effectively contributing to process of nuclear disarmament. 
Consequently, it is essential to indicate that this research does not stand as an 
epistemic privacy, dogmatic empiricism, or infallible ex cathedral that forecloses the 
international legal approach to ensure complete and general nuclear disarmament. 
Rather, this thesis is ready for further research, constructive criticism and 
professionally scrutinising commendations and recommendations.  
1.6 Key Concepts  
The key concepts of this research are essential to its analysis. These include nuclear 
weapons, disarmament, international law, international treaties, multilateralism and 
jurisprudence. The jurisprudential approach explores the conceptual and controversial 
positions on nuclear weapons disarmament through analytical rationale of legal 
determinacy of the theory of legal positivism and ethical legitimacy of the natural law 
theory. Also, multilateralism as “international governance of the many”75 (global 
institutions and conglomeration); and international treaties as legally binding 
instruments are all subsumed under international law which governs the international 
community. 
1.6.1 Nuclear Weapons: Definition and Explanation 
Nuclear weapons are explosive and destructive devices that derive their 
destructiveness from nuclear reactions, through fission or the combination of both 
fission and fusion.76 These nuclear reactions discharge enormous quantities of energy 
from infinitesimally small amount of matter. The first nuclear fission (atomic) bomb test 
discharged the same amount of energy as around 20,000 ton of TNT (Tri-
nitrotoluence).77 Similarly, the first thermonuclear (hydrogen) bomb test discharged an 
amount of energy approximately 10,000,000 tons of TNT (Tri-nitrotoluence).78 
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All existing nuclear weapons get some of their explosive energy from nuclear fission 
reactions. Weapons whose explosive production is exclusively from fission reactions 
are known as atomic bomb or atom bomb (A-bomb).79 Fission weapons are weapons 
assembled with a collection of fissile materials of enriched uranium or plutonium into a 
supercritical mass.80  
A supercritical mass is the quantity of material required to start off an exponentially 
growing nuclear chain reaction either through the shooting of one piece of sub-critical 
material into another (the gun method) or through compressing by using explosive 
lenses of sub-critical sphere materials of chemical explosives as many times of its 
original density (the implosion method). The later implosive method is more 
complicated and sophisticated than the gun method and only the implosive method 
can be used if the fissile material is plutonium.81 
82 Types of Nuclear Weapons: CTBTO (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organisation) Preparatory 
Commission www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear 
The most important challenge in all nuclear weapon designs is to ensure that a major 
fraction of the fuel is consumed before the weapon explodes itself. The total amount 
of energy discharged by fission bombs can range from the approximate of just under 
a ton of TNT, to upward 500,000 (500kilotons) of TNT. All fission reactions 
automatically generate fission result; the radioactive remain of the atomic nuclei split 
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by the fission reaction.83 Many fission products are either highly radioactive (short 
lived) or moderately radioactive (long lived) and as a result a there can be severe form 
of radioactive contamination if not fully contained. Fission products are the principal 
radioactive component of nuclear outcome.84 
The most frequently used fissile materials for nuclear weapons purpose have been 
uranium-235 and plutonium-239.85 Less frequently used has been uranium-233. 
Neptunium-237 and some isotopes of americium may be usable for nuclear explosives. 
Thermonuclear weapons also known as the hydrogen bombs (H-bombs) are other 
kinds of nuclear weapons that generate significant amount of its energy in nuclear 
fusion reactions.86 The H-bombs depend on fusion reactions between isotopes of 
hydrogen called deuterium and tritium. These devices derive a considerable segment 
of their energy from fission as fission weapons are needed to cause fusion reactions, 
which in turn will stimulate extra fission reactions.87 
Amongst all the nations in the world, only the United States, United Kingdom, China, 
France, Russia, and India have known to have carried out thermonuclear weapons 
tests.88 However, it has not been verified whether India conducted a real multi-staged 
thermonuclear weapon detonation test. Thermonuclear weapons are usually more 
complex to effectively design and implemented than archaic fission weapons.89  
All deployable nuclear weapons in the world today use the thermonuclear design 
because it is more efficient and effective. Thermonuclear bombs function through the 
usage of energy of a fission bomb to condense and heat up fusion fuel through the 
Teller-Ulam design that stimulates all multi-megation yield hydrogen bombs. The 
biggest nuclear weapon ever detonated was the USSR Tsar Bomba which discharged 
an estimated energy of over 50 million tons (50 megatons) of TNT and 3,800 times 
more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.90 Almost all the thermonuclear weapons are 
relatively smaller than the USSR Tsar Bomba.91 
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The table below highlight the difference between Atomic Bomb and Hydrogen Bomb 
Atomic Bomb  Hydrogen Bomb 
Atomic bombs release atomic 
energy through nuclear fission 
reactions from large unstable 
radioactive elements like uranium or 
plutonium. 
Hydrogen bombs (H-bombs) also known 
as thermonuclear weapons are more 
complex and larger than atomic bomb and 
their fusion reactions are from hydrogen 
isotopes known as deuterium and tritium 
fuse to form helium in releasing energy. 
In atomic bombs, only fission 
reactions take place. 
In hydrogen bombs, both fission and 
fusion reactions take place. 
Atomic bombs are simpler than 
hydrogen bombs 
Hydrogen bombs release much more 
energy than atomic bombs because 
hydrogen bombs contain several elements 
of atomic bombs 
Atomic bombs release split of huge 
amount of atomic energy  
Hydrogen bomb is up to 1,000 times more 
powerful than an Atomic bomb 
 
Some nuclear weapons are specifically designed for a specific use.92 The boosted 
fission weapon is a nuclear bomb that accelerates its explosiveness by a considerable 
amount of fusion reactions and it is not a fusion bomb.93 The neutrons generated by 
the fusion reactions in the boosted bomb provide the efficiency of the fission bomb.94 
A neutron bomb is thermonuclear weapon that produces a reasonably small explosion 
but with a rather large amount of neutron radiation. The neutron bomb is targeted to 
cause colossal casualties when used and at the same time leaving infrastructures on 
the whole intact with negligible amount of nuclear fallout.95 
A thermonuclear weapon weighing slightly more than 2,400 pounds that is, 1,100 kg 
can produce an explosive and destructive force analogous to the detonation of more 
than 1.2 million tons or 1.1 million tonnes of TNT.96 Invariably, a small nuclear device 
no larger than the normal size of a bomb can catastrophically devastates an entire city 
through its explosions, fire, and radiation.97 The explosion of any nuclear weapon is 
simultaneously followed by a blast of neutron radiation.98  
A nuclear weapon coated with fitting materials such as cobalt or gold produces a device 
known as a salted bomb. Nuclear weapons alongside with biological weapons and 
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chemical weapons are classified as Weapons of Mass Destruction. (WMD).99 The 
production, acquisition, conveyance, controls, as well as the legality of the use of threat 
or otherwise of nuclear weapons has been controversial and thematic concern of 
international law in terms of international diplomatic relations.  
  
 
 100  
 Basic design of hydrogen bomb: a fission bomb uses radiation to compress and ignite a separate section of fission fuel  
Types of Nuclear Weapons: CTBTO (Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty Organisation) Preparatory 
Commission www.ctbto.org/nuclear-testing/types-of-nuclear-weapons  
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In the history of warfare in the world, nuclear weapons have only been used twice. The 
atomic bombing of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan, executed by the 
United States of America during the final stage of the World War II in 1945.101 The 
bombing of Hiroshima was carried out on August 6, 1945 at about 8:15 in the morning 
with an American B-29 Bomber code-named the Enolay Gay or “Little Boy” which 
released an atomic bomb at the height of 31,000 feet above the city.102 In the same 
vein, in August 9 1945, three days after the bombing of Hiroshima the United States 
also bombed Nagasaki. In the bombing of Nagasaki, the U.S. B-29 Bomber dropped a 
single MK-II code named “Fat Man” atomic bomb over the city.103 These two bombings 
resulted in the deaths of around 200,000 including civilians and military personnel as 
well as various degrees of acute injuries sustained from the explosions by innocent 
victims.104 
Since the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki with nuclear weapons, nuclear 
weapons have been detonated over two thousand times for demonstrations and testing 
purposes.105 Not too many nations possess nuclear weapons in the world and some 
countries are suspected of either secretly or openly seeking to have them. However, 
these countries have detonated nuclear weapons and have openly acknowledged of 
possessing them: the United States of America, Russia, United Kingdom, and France, 
the People’s Republic of China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea.106  
Israel is strongly and generally believed to possess nuclear weapons, but it does 
maintain the principle of opacity, meaning, neither acknowledging nor denying the 
possession of nuclear weapons.107 In the past, South Africa, manufactured nuclear 
weapons but as a result of the extinction of its apartheid government it disassembled 
its nuclear armaments, acceded to the NPT and accepted full–scope international 
safeguards.108 According to the Federation of American Scientists report as of 2014, 
there are more than 16,000 nuclear warheads in the world with about 4,300 serviceable 
for operational use, that is, tested and ready for use.109 
Nuclear weapons delivery which means the technological systems deployed to convey 
nuclear weapons to their specific targets is a pivotal process crucial to enhance nuclear 
weapons fabrication, design, and strategy.110 Essentially, the development, protection, 
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and maintenance of delivery preference of nuclear weapons are integral aspects of 
nuclear weapons programmes.  
The first delivery deployment of nuclear weapons which was used in the bombing of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during the World War II was the gravity bomb, 
released from bomber aircraft. This is normally the first delivery system the States that 
mastered the front end of nuclear weapons adopt; as it does not restrict the size and 
shape of the nuclear weapons. Although, it has the limitation of attacks and slow 
response to an imminent attack that requires immediate response.111 With modern 
technological advancement and the advent of miniaturization, nuclear weapons can 
now be conveniently delivered through strategic bombers and tactical fighter 
bombers.112 
More modern delivery methods of nuclear weapons from its strategic perspective are 
through ballistic trajectory of horizontal warhead mounted on missiles for faster and 
more successful delivery. These include the Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs) 
and the Submarine-launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs) which are long-ranged 
technological deployments. Beyond these ballistic launchers are the Multiple 
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MIRVs) which are more advanced in 
technological delivery and can simultaneously launch multiple weapons at different 
targets from one missile, making the chances of missile defence almost impossible.113 
The risks posed by the continuous existence of nuclear weapons including the dangers 
associated with their delivery system either by design, accidental detonation or 
miscalculation emphasise the risks of security of humanity. To prevent these risks, all 
States have the shared responsibility of nuclear disarmament. 
1.6.2 Disarmament: Means and Meaning  
Nuclear disarmament means the process of reducing, limiting and the total abolishion 
of nuclear weapons to the state of a nuclear free world.114 Generally, disarmament 
refers to the complete elimination of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) which 
include nuclear weapons, biological weapons and chemical weapons.115 The United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Final Document of the First Special Session on 
Disarmament defined general and complete disarmament as “balanced reduction of 
armed forces and conventional armaments, based on the principle of undiminished 
security of the parties with a view of promoting or enhancing stability at a lower military 
level, taking into account the need of all States to protect their security.”116 
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Disarmament entails the process of arms control measures, most especially in the 
absence of extensive means of verification procedures.117 The concept of disarmament 
existed before the event of the First World War (WWI). At The Hague Peace 
Conferences of 1899 and 1907, participants and government delegates extensively 
debated about disarmament of weapons and the establishment of international court 
vested with the jurisdiction and the binding powers to adjudicate on disarmament 
matters.118 Such an international court was deemed necessary as it was clear no nation 
would willingly disarm its armaments. It was a general belief that the cause of war was 
increasing rearmament amongst the great powers in the previous half century before 
the WWI.119 
Consequently, the 1919 Treaty of Versailles was able to effectively made Germany to 
disarm its conventional armoury with a clause that equally called on the great super-
powers to gradually disarm their armament over a period of time.120 Following this 
development, the League of Nations in Article VIII of its Covenant explicitly provided 
for the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consist with national safety 
of all member states.121 In 1921, prior to its Covenant, the League of Nations set up 
the Temporary Mixed Commission on Armament. This commission explored the 
possibilities for disarmament with proposal ranging from the abolishion of chemical 
warfare and strategic bombing of civilian populations to the limitation of more 
conventional weapons.122 The Geneva Disarmament Conference of 1932 - 37 which 
had Arthur Henderson former British Foreign Secretary as chairman was heralded by 
the 1926 Preparatory Commission for Disarmament Conference. The League of 
Nations attempted to make disarmament a possibility before the breaking of the 
Second World War (WWII).123  
An earliest successful achievement of disarmament was the Washington Navy Treaty 
(also known as the Five–Power Treaty) of 1922. This was a treaty ratified among the 
governments of British Empire, Empire of Japan, France Third Republic, the Kingdom 
of Italy, and the United States of America, to prevent the continued construction of 
capital ships and the limitation of ship of other classification under 10,000 tons 
displacement.124 From the 1963 Partial Nuclear Test Ban Treaty to the 1996 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, there have been various treaties either to 
reduce or to out rightly prohibit nuclear weapons testing and stockpiling.  
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Several efforts over the years to ensure the realisation of disarmament of destructive 
weapons and influence of war across the globe include the following instruments and 
conferences: 
1. The Hague Conference 1899 
2. World Disarmament 1932-34 
3. Ten National Committee 1960 
4. Eighteen Nations Disarmament Committee 1962-1968 
5. Conference of the Committee on Disarmament 
6. Present Conference on Disarmament 1979125 
Practical Steps towards Nuclear Disarmmament 
The 1968 Treaty of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) explicitly 
expresses that all signatories should “pursue negotiations in good faith complete 
disarmament.” At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference 
(NPTREC), the States parties of the treaty agreed on “13 practical steps” to actualise 
their commitments towards nuclear disarmament.126 These 13 practical steps are 
explained are as follows: 
1. Entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty CTBT – State 
parties’ signatures and ratifications are crucially needed without delay and in 
accordance with stipulated conditions and processes to bring into effect the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). The CTBT, which prohibits all 
nuclear weapons tests and exposion, was opened for signature in 1996. The 
CTBT requires at least 44 States with nuclear weapons and capabilities 
ratification to come into force. The United States and China have signed but not 
ratified the treaty. North Korea, India, and Pakistan are yet to sign. This treaty if 
come into force, is laudable legal framework and comprehensive approach to 
disarmament. 
2. Nuclear Testing Moratorium - Agreement to a moratorium was made by State 
parties on nuclear weapon test explosions pending on the operational effect of 
the Comprehensive Nuclear-Ban Treaty (CTBT). All the Nuclear Weapons 
States have complied with this agreement since it was agreed upon in 2000. 
However, North Korea though withdrew its membership from the NPT in 2003 
have conducted series of nuclear tests from 2006 to 20017 (time of writing this 
thesis). The Nuclear Testing Moratoruim reinforces confidence on the possibility 
of nuclear disarmament in the forceable future 
3. Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT) – The conference on disarmament 
necessarily needs to meet and negotiate on non-discriminatory, multilateral and 
effectively verifiable FMCT within five years for the probibition of the production 
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of fissile materials for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. The 
FMCT would include the banning of Highly Enriched Uranium and plutonium for 
nuclear weapons purposes. Banning these materials is a right target approach 
to end the possibility of producing more nuclear weapons. 
4. Conference on Disarmament (CD) – The conference on Disarmament will have 
the mandate to establish a sub-group to deal with nuclear disarmament 
programmes and processes. As a result of the mandate of the CD, the UNGA 
on 7 July 2017 have adopted Resolution 71/257 to negotiate a legally binding 
treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons. This treaty if eventual come into force would 
satisfy Article VI of the NPT of negotiating in good faith to complete disarmament. 
5. Irreversibility of Nuclear Reductions – The State parties of the NPT, 
unanimously and strongly agreed not to reverse nuclear disarmament, and other 
arms control and reduction measures undertaking. Many States would have 
prefered the principle of flexibility to irreversibility but as a multilateral agreement, 
they are obliged to abide by the principle of irreversibility as a commitment to 
disarmament obligation.  
6. Elimination of Nuclear Arsenals – The NWS unequivocally undertaken the 
obligation under the Article VI of the NPT to totally eliminate their nuclear 
arsenals, leading to nuclear disarmament. However, there are no verifiable 
means to determine whether the NWS are complying with this obligation. It is 
expected that the NWS should demonstrate their commitments to disarmament 
by eliminating their nuclear arsenals as justification for othe States with nuclear 
capabilities to follow. 
7. Implementation of START II, START III and Anti-ballistic Missile Treaty – 
The State parties of the NPT should bring the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START II) into force and fully implement it within the shortest possible time. 
Consequently, they are also to begin the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
(START III) as well as to preserve and strengthen the existing Treaty on Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems. 
8. Implementation of the Trilateral Initiative (Declaring Excessive Military 
Fissile Material) – The United States of America, the Russian Federation and 
the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) agree to complete and 
implement their Trilateral Initiative. This trilateral initiative started in 1996 and it 
seeks to develop methods and measure for the IAEA to secure and verify the 
peaceful status of excess weapons-grade nuclear materials in the United States 
and Russia. 
9. International Stability – All the NWS and NNWS will promptly begin the 
processes towards nuclear disarmament in a manner that promote international 
stability. This include reducing their nuclear arsenals, absolute transparency 
about their nuclear weapons capabilities, material devices and their delivery 
vehicles, unilateral initiative to reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons; measure 
to further reduce existing nuclear weapons systems’ operational status; 
reduction of nuclear weapons’ role in security policies and engaging 
appropriately in the process leading to complete disarmament. The international 
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stability is viewed as a further determined efforts by the NWS to reduce their 
nuclear armaments unconditionally and unilaterally as part of disarmament 
process. 
10. Peaceful Purposes - The NWS have all arranged and agreed to place excess 
fissile military materials under the IAEA and other international verification and 
subsequently arrange such materials for peaceful purposes. This is also to 
ensure that such fissile material remains permanently outside military use and 
programmes. 
11. General and Complete Disarmament – The NPT State parties reaffirmed their 
desire towards the goal of general and complete disarmament for all States 
under effective international control. Although, progress in nuclear disarmament 
has been slow, but there are concerted multilateral efforts to general and 
complete nuclear disarmament in the foreseeable future. 
12. Reporting – All states parties of the NPT (the NWS and the NNWS) will regularly 
report on their implementation within the provision of Article VI obligations and 
the entire framework of the NPT. Regular reports on the progress and 
shortcomings associated the disarmament framework strenghthened the review 
process. 
13. Compliance – All the State parties of the NPT will develop verification 
capabilities to assure compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements, to 
achieve and maintain a nuclear-weapon-free world.127 Compliance and 
verification are crucial dimensions of disarmament and international arms control 
strtategies. 
 
 Various Forms of Disarmament 
There are existing five various forms or types of disarmament in determining to what 
degree or levels which disarmament is required in ensuring arms control measures. 
These forms of disarmament are as follows: 
1. Unilateral Disarmament – Unilateral approach to disarmament implies that 
nuclear arms cause existing tension and their absence will virtually lead to the 
absence of nuclear crisis. Many NNWS States have practiced unlitaral 
disarmament. Notably amongst countries that uphold unilateral disarmament 
principles include Switzerland, Sweden, Germany The Netherlands, and South 
Africa. These countries and many others which do not keep nuclear weapons and 
spend money on nuclear armaments desmostrate that every State can exist without 
relying on nuclear weapons for their national security. 
2. Categorical Disarmament – Categorical disarmament means the elimination of 
certain categories of weapons such as biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. 
The 1925 Geneval Convention was an earlier legal instrument that banned the use 
of gas and biological weapons. However, the emergence of the Treaty Prohibiting 
Nuclear Weapon (TPNW) is an that categorical centres on nuclear disarmament. 
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3. Negotiated Disarmament – Negotiated disarmament is a bilateral or multilitaral 
agreements that exist between two or more States on the terms and conditions 
needed for disarmament. All the arms control instruments and the various nuclear 
weapons treaties are forms of negotiated disarmament. The Concept of negotiated 
disarmament is deemed to be binding and mutual than unilateral disarmament that 
is considered one-sides and very flexible to be abandoned. 
4. Arms Reduction – Arms reductions is a form of disarmament as it is aimed at 
reducing the number and types of existing weapons considered catastrophic to man 
and the environment. The various types of agreements beween the United states 
and the defunct Soviet Union on strategic negotiations on the reductions and 
control of their armmaents are examples of arms reduction as a form of 
disarmament. 
5. Georgraphical Reduction – Geographical reduction as form of disarmament is a 
focus on particular geographic locations or areas as nuclear free zones. The aim is 
to minimise nuclear tensions in such locations. During the Cold war era, the Soviet 
Union made proposals to de-nuclearised the entire Europe, Africa, Middle East and 
parts of Asia.128  
 
From inception, the United Nations aims of multilateral disarmament and arms control 
are central to the maintenance of international peace and security. These aims range 
from reduction to eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons, destruction of chemical 
weapons, the strengthening of the prohibition of biological weapons, and the halting of 
the proliferation of landmines small arms and light weapons. The United Nations 
strongly supports the various regional nuclear weapons ban treaties in Antarctica, Latin 
America and the Caribbean, the South Pacific, South-East Asia, Africa and Central 
Asia.129 
1.6.3 International Law: Its Relationationship to Internal Law 
International law is traditionally characterised by a system of rules, principles, and 
norms that regulate the international affairs, diplomatic relations and other contractual 
engagements between sovereign states as well as other international recognised 
organs such as the United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), Arab League (AL), and 
the African Union (AU). Primarily, the norms of international law are enacted by states 
both for their own purposes as individual sovereign entities and as a means of 
facilitating and regulating the activities of other international actors on the international 
plane.130  
The rules of international law virtually cover every aspects and facets of national and 
international activities. These range from the laws governing the use of the sea, outer 
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space, and Antarctica; to the laws regulating international telecommunications, postal 
services, carriage of goods and passengers by air as well as international money 
transfer.  Indubitably, international law is the bedrock and the legal yardstick to 
measure the conduct of international trade. International law also spread across 
human rights, dignity of the individual, nationality, extradition, the use of armed forces, 
protection of the environment and the security of nations. Obviously, there is little or 
nothing conducted on the international sphere that is not controlled by international 
law.131  
 In view of academic purposes, the phrase International Law implies two distinctive 
legal sub-divisions namely: public international law also known as international public 
law; which regulates relationship between sovereign states and other international 
entities in terms of international treaties, international criminal law, law of the sea, 
international human rights law, and law of war or international humanitarian law. And 
private international law (commonly known as “conflict of law” in civil law jurisdiction); 
is concern with conflicts between private individuals and addresses the questions of 
which jurisdiction has the permission to hear a legal dispute between private 
individuals and which jurisdiction’s law should be applicable and takes precedence, 
thereby making international law complex.132  
Whatever benefits or burdens international law bestowed or compelled on nation states 
or individuals were regarded as merely derivative from jus gentium – law of sovereign 
states and jus inter gentes – agreements between sovereign states.133 Essentially, 
international law has: international treaties, international custom, and the general 
principles of the law, judicial decisions and writing of publicists as its five distinct 
sources as enshrined in Article 38 of the International Court of Justice.134 
International law is the sole mechanism that makes the interdependent world functions 
effectively. Though it does not have a coercive procedure of the law as it is primarily 
controls the conduct of legal equals. Overtime, international law has developed 
institutional mechanisms analogous to the ones existing in sovereign States. These 
include the International court of Justice, International Criminal Court, European Court 
of Human Rights, the Tribunal for War Crimes of Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia 
genocides.135  
Modern international law controls states not only in regulating their conducts with other 
states such as the law prohibiting the use of armed forces to settle dispute but also in 
inhibiting their relations with their national and international individuals such as issues 
concerning human rights and the excise of criminal jurisdiction for the case of 
international individuals.136 However, in the case Concerning the Application of the 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and 
                                                          
131 Martin Dixon, International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2013) 2 
132 Peter Malanczuk, Akehurst’s Modern Introduction to International Law (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 
7th edn, 2002) 71 
133 Thomas Buergenthal and Sean D. Murphy, Public International Law (Thomson West Publishing Co., 4th edn, 
2007) 
134 Status of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), June 26, 1945, art, 38 
135 Martin Dixon, International Law (Oxford University Press, 7th edn, 2013) 2 
136 Ibid  
28 
 
Herzegovina v Serbia & Montenegro),137 Serbia was not able to deny the existence of 
international law concerning genocide but argued that it was not responsible for the 
violations of international law that happened.   
The evolution of international law from the primary concern of sovereign states as its 
subjects to the engagement of international cooperation of all actors is pre-eminently 
and intrinsically bound up with diplomacy, politics and the conduct of all international 
affairs. It is fallacious to consider international law as the sole facilitator of State 
conduct. International law does not  strive on infertile field and international legal rules 
are determining factors for every state or government to consider before embarking on 
any line of action. The most fundamental fact and a very cogent argument for the 
existence of international law as a system of law is that the entire international 
community recognise that there is the existence of rules normatively and effectively 
binding upon them as law.138 
The international community and sovereign states strongly  believe that international 
law exist when Tanzania invaded Uganda between 1978 and 1979 and when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait in 1990. Many States considered these invasions as not only immoral 
or merely unacceptable but unlawful. In the same vein, the United States led invasion 
of Iraq in March 2003 and the unlawful and forceful intervention of Israel in Lebanon in 
July 2006 were both condemned as violation of international law by the international 
community.139  
Similarly, the criticism that followed the war crimes committed in Bosnia and the 
Rwanda genocides and the various impositions of sanctions by the United Nations 
Security Council on delinquent states underscores the intensity of international law.140 
International actors who potentially engage in unlawful and unethical actions or 
inactions do not deny international law thematically but affirm it un-thematically. For 
example, when Iraq invaded Kuwait it argued that international law justified its action 
stressing that the law prohibiting armed forces was not consequential and not 
applicable in such invasion.141 
International law is practiced on day-to-day basis in the foreign affairs ministries and 
offices, national courts, international courts and governmental organs of States, and in 
international organisations such as the United Nations. All foreign affairs ministries or 
offices have legal departments saddled with the responsibility  on issues bordering on 
international law and the drafting of international agreements amongst others.142 
National courts are consistently concerned with substantive international norms and 
regulations. This was evident in the series of Pinochet cases, R v Bow Street 
Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Pinochet143 in the United Kingdom 
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concerning the issues of immunity and human rights and in the House of Lord 
Judgement in the case of R v Jones144 concerning the interpretation of the meaning of 
international crime of aggression on national law.  
These cases underscore the legal validity of international law. However, international 
organisations in terms of inter-governmental and non-governmental responsibilities 
employ the services of lawyers and use the language of the law to conduct their daily 
affairs. These organisational entities and their affiliates accept that they are legally 
obliged to conduct their affairs in conformity with the standard of prescriptive norm 
codified as international law. 
. The landmark establishment and the successful operation of the International 
Criminal Court responsible for the prosecutions of dictators and  tyrants who violated 
fundamental international human rights; the protection of civilian populations during 
the 2011 Libyan political upheaval are commendable. The continuous humanitarian 
responses to Syrian refugees,; and the global impact of the International Court of 
Justice in regulating Sovereign States against the monopoly a  nd the use of World’s 
ocean and their natural resource as well as the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the 
International Court of Justice on the Legality of the use of Threat or Otherwise of 
Nuclear Weapons are amongst the incontrovertible success story of international 
law.145  
In either case, international law has been derided by some legal scholars and 
commentators on account of the failure of the United Nations and the international 
community to savage the Bosnia, Somalia, Sudan, Rwanda and the Syrian civil wars 
that resulted in massive causalities of defenceless civilians. Criticism still exists against 
international law on the genocide activities of Pol Pot of Cambodia, between the 
periods of 1975 – 1979 whereby about 1.7 million people were massacred. The 
episode of the denial of procedural and substantive rights of those detained in 
Guantanamo Bay by the United States under President George Bush regime which 
constituted a gross violation of international law of human rights without any 
corresponding response from the international community is still a fertility of criticism 
of international law.146 
By and the large, the role of international law is circumscribed to two major functions 
namely: the technical rules of engagement or conduct; and the keeping of the breach 
to a minimum. This is factual as many of the rules of belligerency (warfare) exist in un-
codified form, while others are codified in international conventions, specifically in The 
Hague and Geneva Conventions. The acceptance of the existence of international law 
resonates in international co-operation, co-existence and conflicts around the globe. 
States have common interests and mutually interdependent in diverse ways and 
international law facilitates this mutuality.147  
States co-exist in the form of consensual and contextual agreements in treaties and 
other reciprocal engagements. In conflicts, international law has the unmitigated role 
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in enforcing the system of remedies available to a state aggrieved by a violation of 
legal obligations by another State. This role was consolidated by the Articles on 
Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts adopted by the International 
Law Commission (ILC) in August 2001 and acceded by the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC) in December 2001.148   
1.6.4 Multilateralism: The Attitude and Magnitude of International Response 
Internationally, sovereign states are increasingly and imperatively using the results of 
majoritarian voting procedures in international cooperation on foreign policies and 
global discourse and the concept of multilateralism stand as a means and serve as a 
plausible yardstick of measurement. Multilateralism in the vein of international relations 
is the collective response of multiple countries to international problems149 (such as 
the existence of nuclear weapons and their proliferation) either through policy by 
choice or by necessity. States can choose from a wide range of organising form on 
which to base their interactions and multilateralism is an absolute means of such states 
interactions.150   
As defined by Miles Kahler of the United States after 1945, “Multilateralism is 
international governance of the many”, with the core principle of “opposition to bilateral 
and discriminatory arrangements that were believed to enhance the leverage of the 
powerful over the weak and to increase international conflict”.151 However, J.G. Ruggie 
in his work “Multilateralism: the Anatomy of an Institution”, explains that Institution of 
Multilateralism (IM) has three principles namely: indivisibility, non-discrimination or 
general organising principles, and diffuse reciprocity. Indivisibility is demonstrated by 
collective security strategies whereby an attack on one state means an attack on all 
states. Non-discrimination which implies the general organising principles indicate that 
all states should be treated equally in all aspects and facets of international co-
existence and co-operations. Essentially, diffuse reciprocity means that states do not 
solely rely on quid-pro-quo exchanges, but on longer-term balance assurances 
international agreements.152 
The utility of multilateralism was consolidated after the World War II, as there was a 
progressive shift away from bilateral regime and hegemony in which cooperation 
among states were compartmentalised.153 Under sovereign equality of states, smaller 
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and weaker states were believed to be disadvantaged by bilateralism.154 
Multilateralism requires that all states sacrifice substantial levels of flexibility in decision 
making and resist the short-term temptation in favour of long term benefits. This implies 
that multilateral regime is characterised by equal treatment and universal participation. 
This further means that regardless of differences in territorial size, population size, 
military capabilities, or economic powers, all states have the same legal recognition.155 
Multilateral organisations and activities such as the United Nations (UN), the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Trade Organisation (WTO), and the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) and Conference on Disarmament (CD) have occupied the global space and 
have been extensively employed as theoretical categories that provide the central 
conceptual focus, and international co-existence and cooperation.156 Multilateralism 
presupposes cooperation. Not all cooperation is multilateral, but all multilateral 
activities include cooperation.157 This include all global and concerted efforts on 
nuclear disarmament in terms of international conferences and forums on the 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons. 
International institutions embodying multilateralism and mode of universal acceptable 
governance have generated realistic and universalistic criticisms. On the one hand, 
the realists argue that multilateralism will woefully fail as a result of great powers wish 
to exploit their advantages and pursue their national interest in bilateral bargaining, 
oppose to the general acceptance of other states.  
Obviously, the equality character of multilateralism does not support the hierarchical 
power of configuration of the international system and greater powers that choose to 
engage in collaborative ventures do so in institutions that risk domination by the 
many.158  A good example is the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) having the 
five officially recognised NWS as five Permanent member with a special priviledged 
status of veto power. 
On the other hand, the neo-liberals tackle the universalists character of multilateral 
principles and its preferences for global rather than regional or other more limited 
organisations. Unarguably, the membership of most international multilateral 
organisations, that was less than fifty percent after World Word II, had asymmetrically 
grown to be over hundred by 1990. To this end, the neo-liberal sceptical criticism about 
multilateralism is on emphasising on the problem of cooperation in group with large 
membership. In the same vein, the formal and conventional agreement on which most 
multilateral institutions are established also heighten the obstacles to cooperation in 
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comparison with the customary accretions that provide a decentralised source for 
much of international law.159 
Nonetheless, each of the aforementioned criticism addresses its own anomalies 
associated with multilateralism. The realist scepticism must accept the fact that the 
United States of America, the most powerful country of the post-war era, was the most 
consistent promoter and conscientious supporter of multilateral norms and procedures. 
Most powerful nations in various key issues have jettisoned free riding on mini-lateral 
bargains by their weaker counterparts.160  
Multilateralism was also circumscribed by a huge number of continuous derogation 
from its injunctions: its rivals, discriminatory and bilateral forms of organisations, were 
far from vanquished in the decades following World War II. The North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation (NATO) which is exceptional in security relations within the multilateral 
paradigm as a collective security mechanism of the United Nations (UN) has provided 
the essential framework for a multilateral order.161  
For the purposes of actualising the principles governing disarmament, the United 
Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC), a subsidiary organ of the General 
Assembly, comprised of all the Member States of the United Nations make 
recommendations in all aspect and facets of disarmament and essentially, following 
up on the various decisions and recommendations on the Special Session of the 
General Assembly. Since its inception, the United Nations Disarmament Commission 
(UNDC) formulates consensus principles and guidelines on nuclear disarmament and 
is substantively serviced by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs 
(UNODA) under the auspices of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 
collaborations with the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Affairs (UNIDIR).162  
As a result of multilateralism and nuclear disarmament, the United Nations General 
Assembly established a resolution known as A/RES/67/56 – an open-ended Working 
Group, to develop proposal to take forward multilateral nuclear disarmament 
negotiations for the achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear 
weapons.163 This Working Group met between March and August 2013 with the active 
participation and unassailable contributions of international organisations and the Civil 
Society. The group submitted the report on its work to the General Assembly at its 
sixty-eight session, (A/RES/ 68/46) on December 5 2013, which was in turn transmitted 
to the Conference on Disarmament and the Disarmament Commission of the United 
Nations.164 
Prior to this multilateral nuclear disarmament negotiation, the herculean efforts to 
negotiate a resolution to the second North Korean nuclear crisis in August 2003 have 
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hitherto stretched the limits of the six principal players: North Korean, South Korean, 
the United States, China, Japan and Russia. In spite of the extensive diplomatic efforts 
to aid and host the six-party negotiations, domestic policy constraints, divergent views 
and conflicting historical analogies of the each of the nations have adversely affected 
the multilateral negotiation.165  
The recommendations of the Working Group report of the United Nations General 
Assembly resolution A/RES/67/56 is a prerequisite to realising a comprehensive 
multilateral resolution on nuclear disarmament.166 Following the collaboration cases, 
cooperation is threatened rather than enhanced by a longer shadow of the future of 
nuclear disarmament. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has played an 
unbiased and dominant role on multilateralism on nuclear disarmament.167  
Thus, multilateralism in general and multilateral institutions in particular provide a more 
democratic means of determining which global issues should be addressed and how 
states should address them. Multilateralism is the most egalitarian form of international 
cooperation and decision-making and multilateral institutions remain the very few 
forums whereby NNWS can potentially project their voices and they will be heard.168 
In a globalised networked and interdependent world, multilateralism would continue to 
be the key pillar of international co-existence in matter such as nuclear disarmament. 
Existential global realities like international peace and security, human rights, 
economic development and international trade, protection of the environment and 
sustainable development as well as functional and technical co-operation require joint 
effort to bring down costs and to bring order and regularity to international relations. 
These areas cannot be adequately addressed unilaterally or bilaterally, they need the 
optimum effectiveness of multilateralism. The rationale behind this truism is that all 
states alongside with some non-states actors face mutual vulnerability and intensifying 
interdependence and as such require global support for public good. The international 
system is hung on a network of treaties, regimes, and international organisations. 
Obviously, the NWS can neither unilaterally achieve nor attain prosperity and security 
effectively in isolation.169 Hence, the continuous global efforts and multilateral 
negotiations on nuclear weapons disarmament is a commendable necessity. The 
emergence of the Treary on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) and the 
various NPT Review conferences as well as the regional and global conferences on 
nuclear disarmament are realisable through the concept of multilateralism. 
1.6.5 International Treaties: Intent and Potency   
The negotiations and process of nuclear disarmament is regulated by international 
treaties. The term “treaty” is a generic expression to denote various international 
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agreements and contractual engagements between states. These international 
agreements are variously referred to as conventions, pacts, declarations, charters, 
concordats, protocols and covenants. International treaties may be quasi-legislative or 
solely contractual. In other words, international treaties may specify rules binding them 
upon states and explore fresh areas into which international law is developing. 
International treaties are mostly codify, clarify, or supplement the already existing 
customary international law.170 The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) 
in Article 2 (2) defines a treaty thus:  
“[a]n international agreement concluded between States in written form and governed by 
international law, whether embodied in a single instrument or in two or more related 
instruments and whether its particular designation”.171 
In the view of the International Law Commission (ILC), a treaty can be described in a 
multitude of ways thus: 
In addition to a ‘treaty’, ‘convention’, and ‘protocol’, one not infrequently finds titles such as: 
‘declaration’, ‘charter’, ‘covenant’, ‘pact’, ‘act’, ‘status’ ‘agreement’, ‘concordat’, whilst names 
like ‘declaration’, ‘agreement’, and ‘modus vivendi’ may well be found given both to formal and 
less formal types of agreements. As to the letter, their nomenclature is almost illimitable, even 
if some names such as ‘agreement’, ‘exchange of notes’, ‘exchange of letters’, ‘memorandum 
of agreement’ or ‘agreed minute’ may be more common than others ... there is no exclusive or 
systematic use of nomenclature for particular types of transaction.172 
The 1969 Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties (VCLT) does not specify or 
prescribe that a treaty should be in a particular format or possess some specific 
elements. However, if there is a dispute arising from the status of document as a treaty, 
for example, a joint communiqué, an objective test is employed to determine the 
question, taking into full consideration its actual terms and the specific circumstances 
in which such document was made.173  
Treaties concerning nuclear weapons include the just concluded July 2017 Treaty on 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the 1969 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the five existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones Treaties 
(NWFZs), and the 1996 Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) which has 
not come into force. Treaties on nuclear weapons also all hitherto bilateral agreements 
beween the United States and the defunct USSR and tri-lateral agreement between 
the United States, United Kingdom and the defunct USSR relating to nuclear weapons.   
A minute of a meeting can assume the status of a treaty. In view of this possibility, the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled and explained in the case of Qatar v Bahrain 
(also known as Doha Minute) that: 
The Court does not find it necessary to consider what might have been the intention of the 
Foreign Minister of Bahrain or, for that matter those of the Foreign Minister of Qatar. The two 
ministers signed a text recording commitment accepted by their Governments, some of which 
were to be given an immediate application. Having signed such a text, the Foreign Minister of 
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Bahrain, is not in the position subsequently to say that he intended to subscribe only to a 
‘statement recording political understanding’ and not to an international agreement.174 
Following the aforementioned ICJ ruling and since a treaty is a medium of creating a 
legally binding agreement; it presupposes that there must be the intention to create a 
legal rapport between States parties concern. Consequently, the Rapporteur of the 
International Law Commission (ILC) states that the element that comprises a treaty is 
explicitly express in the phrase ‘governed by international law’.175 There are some 
international acts which were never intended to have enforceable legal obligations that 
assume the form of international treaties. The 1975 Final Act of the Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe which was not eligible for registration under Article 
102 of the United Nations Charter and was generally regarded not to have binding 
effect.176 Similarly, in the Nuclear Test case of Australia v France, the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) made it categorically clear that:  
The unilateral statements of States can have binding force if the intention that they be legally 
binding is clear; and there is clear evidence regarding the circumstances in which they are 
made; and the question is approached with due caution.177    
Also, there are some other documents registered under Article 102 of the United 
Nations Charter, as treaties whereas they have neither binding force nor have the 
status of a treaty. These include: the 1957 Declaration by Egypt Concerning the 
Nationalization of the Suez Canal, the 1972 Stockholm Declaration on Human 
Environment, the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, the 1988 
Baltic Sea Ministerial Declaration and the 1992 Baltic Sea Declaration which later 
snowballed into the 1992 Convention on the Protection of the Marine Environment of 
the Baltic Sea and the Baltic Area (The Helsinki Convention - HELCOM).178 
Similar to the above, the various Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension 
Conferences (NPTREC) final documents such as “a-13 practical steps towards 
disarmament” document of 2000, the 2010 document on “catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons”, the Preparatory 
Committee (Pre/Comm) of the 2015 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference 
(NPTRC) can assume the form of treaties. 
The central and the essential characteristics of a treaty as a source of law is that it is 
operational and it is binding on all consensual parties.179 There may be real 
circumstances whereby a treaty might create rights or duties for third parties in 
conformity with Articles 34 – 37 of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties.180 There is a dichotomous difference between treaty as law-making and 
treaty as contract. Law-making treaties deal with wide range of activities as a result of 
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inadequacy in customary international law in meeting the demand of States for rules 
regulating inter-states relations.181   
Examples of law-making treaties are the 1884 Convention for the Protection of 
Submarine Telegraph Cables, the International Convention for the Suppression of 
White Slave Traffic and the Geneva Conventions which is comprised of four treaties 
and three additional protocols that established the standard of international law for the 
humanitarian treatment of war. Areas that urgently need law-making treaties in 
international law include the control of narcotic, pacific settlement of international 
dispute, nationality and statelessness, climate change, world trade organisation, 
international terrorism and international corruption. 182 
A more recent and a more relevant example of law-making treaty is the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear weapons (TPNW) adopted on 7 July 2017 by the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) by resolution 71/258.183 The treaty will enter into force 90 
days after the fiftieth instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has 
been deposited. The treaty will be reviewed on a conference following its entry into 
force after five years. Its subsequent review conferences will be convened every six 
years.184 
Unlike the law-making treaties, contract treaties are usually made to govern a narrow 
area of activities between States, such as trade agreements. Contract treaties, may 
lead to the enactment of widely recognised international law through the practice of the 
principles regulating the development of customary rules in any or all of these tripartite 
ways: a series of treaties laying down a similar rule that may produce a principle of 
effective customary international law; acceptance or limitation of general rule contain 
in a treaty originally concluded between a limited number of  State parties; and the 
possession of evidential value of a treaty to the existence of a rule which may had 
crystallised into law by an independent process of development.185  
The five existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zones Treaties are example of contract 
treaties as they are regional approach and made between states of respectives regions 
to strengthen the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament norms and 
consolidate multilateral efforts towards peace and security. 
Provisionally, treaties may generate autonomous rules of law besides the customary 
State Practice. This is exemplified in Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter which 
prohibits the threat of or the use of force in international relations.186  
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Treaties are usually written instruments concluded between States and the applied 
terms are in most case unwritten agreement between the States and international 
organisations under general international law.187 A good example is the 1946 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations and between 
International Organisations. As it pertains to arms controls and nuclear weapons non-
proliferations, the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM Treaty) 
of 1972 which was amended in 1973 is an example of treaty of applied terms. The 
treaty which was between the United States and the former Soviet Union provides that 
each State could have only one very restricted ABM deployment area, thereby 
precluding either state from developing a nationwide ABM defence. Logically, since 
each State would have the capability to retialiate against the other State, it necessarily 
implies that it would be unlikely that both States would resort to nuclear first strike.188 
In this convention, the agreement involved the State signatories that made up of the 
United Nations and non-State actors. While the convention possesses the 
characteristics of treaties with its subjection to the rule of interpretation, it was 
frequently described by many as a general concession.189 Another example is the 1947 
UN Headquarters Agreement between the United Nations and the United States.190 
Many international treaties most especially the multilateral ones are made to create 
general rules of common application with elements of legislative features.191 This is 
seen is Article 55 of the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea which made provision 
for the recognition of the Executive Economic Zone (EEZ).192 In a similar way, the 
Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) made provision for its 
review every five years in Article VIII (3), apparently, purporting to codify existing 
customary law in it.193   
1.7 Conclusion and the Structure of Thesis 
This thesis, which is centred on nuclear weapons disarmament in international law, as 
a research, also examines their historical and political contexts.194 It is factual, that 
nuclear weapons disarmament must be a collective pursuit to be largely successful.195 
Based on this ground of de-legitimising nuclear weapons, Squassoni, expresse that: 
“the vision of a world without nuclear weapons has taken shape outside of 
governments, but is increasingly creeping inside governments.”196 It is therefore, 
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important in examining the broader political context including the role of non-state 
actors. 
For the avoidance of international infringements and to highlight the international legal 
necessity for nuclear weapons disarmament, the court adjudicated on the fundamental 
issues of policy and substantive merits of factual decisions in delicate cases like 
national security, defence and international relations, in the legal suit, (On the 
Application of the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament) v The Prime Minister of the 
United Kingdom and others.197 The claimant in this case, sought the ruling of the court 
for the declaratory relief of the real interpretation of the United Nations Resolution 1414 
and requesting the court to declare that the United Kingdom government will be 
violating international law if it were to embark on military actions against Iraq without 
further supporting resolution.198 Conversely, the respondent succumbed that the 
English court would not rule on the actual implication and effect of international 
agreements which is only applicable on the sphere of international law.199    
Meanwhile, as explicitly expressed more than five decades ago by Christopher Driver: 
 “Disarmament can never remove the residual potentiality of force . . . But if the disarming of 
States were accompanied by a similar build-up of non-violent defence techniques in the 
countries concerned, then at the level of force which aggressor States could mount, invasion 
and subjection of other countries would not seem a profitable or attractive policy.”200  
Prior to the emergence of the TPNW in the course of this research, the researcher 
observed that, “nuclear weapons legal regulation is fragmented.”201 The various 
international treaties on nuclear weapons hitherto addressed precise issues such as 
explicit ban of states on nuclear weapons testing and detonation, either in certain 
underground locations or only in specific uninhabited atmospheric places.202  
Consequently, this thesis is structured into six chapters. Chapter one, which is the 
introductory chapter, contextualises the nuclear weapons problems with elaborate 
elucidations of key concepts of the research. Chapter two centres on research 
philosophies, methodologies and literature review.  
As part of the broader context of this research, chapter three examines the nuclear 
arms race, its antecendents and historical overview as well as the legal imperative for 
nuclear disarmament.  
Sequentially, chapter four uses academic legal research lens to look at the political 
implications and diplomatic influences on the legal framework for nuclear disarmament. 
Chapter five is entirely on the research findings and fundamental recommendations 
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for nuclear disarmamen. Lastly, chapter six, which is the concluding chapter, is 
specifically on research summary, limitations and conclusion. 
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CHAPTER TWO  
RESEARCH PHILOSOPHY METHODOLOGY AND LITERATURE REVIEW   
2.1 Introduction  
The introductory chapter of this research gave a background overview on nuclear 
weapons disarmament in the context of legal provisions in terms of international law, 
embodied in international treaties and multilateralism. However, this chapter 
progresses the discusions by examining research philosophies, methodologies and 
literature review on nuclear disarmament.    
In undertaking scholarly research, it is fundamental to consider various research 
paradigms under ontology and epistemology. These paradigms elucidate beliefs, 
assumptions, perceptions, nature and knowledge of reality as they invariably influence 
the processes and outcome of research, through research design, methodology and 
conclusion. Consequently, the understanding and discourse of philosophy of research 
and its methodological approaches are in comformity with the nature and aims of 
specific enquiry adopted by the researcher; ultimately to ensure that the researcher’s 
biases and pre-conceptions are identified, exposed and eliminated. This is obvious, as 
we all have our inherited preferences, which are most likely to shape our research 
designs.203 
In view of the above considerations about research, researchers must maintain 
academic objectivity at all times in considering series of choices and demonstrate that 
these choices are in conformity with the original research problem.204 Therefore, this 
chapter examine the jurisprudential rational and paradigmatic assumptions 
consequential to nuclear weapons disarmament. These are discussed in the light of 
natural law theory and legal postivism as well as research philosophical concepts of 
ontology and epistemology, interpretivism and social constructivism that underpinned 
the arguments for nuclear disarmament. 
This chapter equally discusses the various legal research metholdologies namely: 
doctrinal lagal methodology (black letter law), comparative legal methodology or 
empirical legal methodology as well as qualitative and quantitative research 
methologies and the rationale for adopting the doctrinal legal research method for this 
reseach. 
Furthermore, this chapter also features the literature review of this research.The 
literature review is classified into parts. These include: review of academic scholar 
articles and review of selected academic textbook authors on nuclear weapons, 
international law, and disarmament.The research methodology adopted in this 
research and the literature review are interwoven as the black letter law approach 
complement the analysis of nuclear weapons disarmament in international law. 
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2.2 General Jurisprudence: Philosophy of Law  
Jurisprudence which began in the 18th century is the study of the first principles of the 
nature of law, namely, the civil law and the law of the natures known as juriprudentia 
naturalis.205  Jurisprudence can therefore be said to be the study and the theory of law. 
It is the study of fundamental elements of legal system in general and the consideration 
of collective judicial precedents.206 Etymologically, the English word jurisprudence is a 
derivative of the combinative Latin word jurisprudentia: juris which is the genitive form 
of jus which means ‘law’ and prudentia means ‘prudence’. Contextually, prudence also 
implies discretion, foresight, forethought, and circumspection, in reference to the 
exercise of good judgement, common sense and caution in the conduct of practical 
issues such as law.207 
In its broader sense, jurisprudence is the study of legal doctrines, rules, and principles 
of any legal system. In a more common and narrower sense, it is the designation of 
the study of the actual laws of a particular legal system, body or division of law.208 
Historically, jurisprudence is defined as encompassing all kinds of general intellectual 
inquiries about law which are not solely restricted to doctrinal exegesis or technical 
prescription.209 Essentially, jurisprudence has been centred on the question: “what is 
law.”210 
“Jurisprudence addresses the questions about law that an intelligent layperson of speculative 
bent – not a lawyer – might think particularly interesting. What is law? ... Where does law come 
from? ... Is law an autonomous discipline? ... What is the purpose of law? ... Is law a science, 
a humanity or neither? ... A practicing lawyer or judge is apt to think questions of this sort at 
best irrelevant to what he does, at worst naive, impractical, even childlike (how high is up).”211 
The aforementioned question “what is law”? invariably leads to more fundamental 
questions such as: what is the purpose of the law? Does the law consist of mere rules 
and regulations? Can anything be law? Does the law have anything to do with justice, 
morality or democracy? What determines the validity of the law? Are we obliged to 
obey the law? These and other similar important questions suffuse the framework of 
jurisprudence in the light of nuclear disarmament. Does nuclear weapons disarmament 
have an existings legal framework? Is there ethical justification or morale rationale for 
nuclear disarmament? 
Consequently, jurisprudential questions are ubiquitous and inescapable from the 
feature of law and legal system.212 Scrupulous analysis and jurisprudential 
consideration of the most fundamental questions of law, justice, and the meaning of 
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legal concepts are thus essential213 of which the legal framework of nuclear 
disarmament is part of the present research. 
Scholars in jurisprudence who are also known as legal theorists include legal 
philosophers and social theorists of law. The scholars desire to acquire deeper 
comprehension of the nature of law, legal reasoning, the legal system, and legal 
institutions. Jurisprudence broadly construed as the philosophical enquiry into the 
nature of law and the value it serves is confronted by two categories of pertinent 
problems proper to law in general:  
(1) Problem internal to law and legal system as such and 
(2) Problem of law as a particular social institution as it relates to larger  
political or social situation in which it exists.214  
The answers to the above problems are intrinsically within the domain of General 
Jurisprudence or Philosophy of Law.215 
In the United States and in most Anglo-American legal academic opinion jurisprudence 
is synonymous and mostly interchangeably used with the phrase “Philosophy of Law” 
(Legal Philosophy). This is inevitably so because, “Philosophy of Law” is ostensibly 
intertwined with the nexus between the academic disciplines of Philosophy and Law. 
This is not a general or unanimous perception. There exists a persistent dimension of 
jurisprudence that encompasses a pre-dominant legal theory of non-philosophical 
nature that expatiate legal concepts and normative theory arising from law as an 
autonomous academic discipline.216 This implies the autonomy of this present 
academic legal research on nuclear disarmament by using the provisions of 
international treaties as justification to espouse the discourse for disaramament. 
Legal philosophy categorised as jurisprudence can encompass all philosophical 
speculations rather than empirically, based social scientific theory on matters of law or 
related to law.217 The central focus of legal philosophy is to analyse the structures of 
reasoning concerned with the presuppositions of legal doctrine driven by the 
conceptual apparatuses by which human experience is interpreted.218 Thus, legal 
philosophy in this sense cannot be clearly separated from the form of enquiries 
undertaken by sociology of law. This is factual as this research is an intellectual effort 
within legal scholarship in examining nuclear weapons and disarmament as 
conceivable societal phenomena. 
Interestingly, there are four dimensions of jurisprudence within the domain of law. The 
first and the most prevailing aspect of jurisprudence seek to analyse, explain, classify 
and criticise the whole bulk of law. Law books and legal encyclopaedias as well as law 
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books on nuclear disarmament stand to represent this form of jurisprudence. The 
second dimension of jurisprudence compares and contrasts law with other academic 
disciplines such as Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, and other 
disciplines in the humanity and the social sciences. The third form of jurisprudence 
seeks to expose the historical, moral and cultural background of a particular legal 
concept such as nuclear disaramment. And the fourth type of jurisprudence centres on 
finding answers to such abstract questions as what is law? And how do judges properly 
decide cases?219  
“Jurisprudence has generous frontiers”220 and it accommodates numerous subjects of 
cognitive enquiry221 as indicated in the above discusions. However, jurisprudence and 
the law itself are troubled with the questions of definition. This problem of definition is 
very much easy to state than to resolve. Nonetheless, there exist effortless processes 
by which scholars can simplify and clarify issues on this fundamental question of 
definition.222 Such questions may include what is law as it is? or what is law as it ought 
to be? In line with this research, questions can equally be asked as what is the need 
for nuclear weapons disarmament? And why has there not be nuclear disarmament 
inspite of its legal framework and international efforts? 
In Hart’s ‘Definition and Theory of Jurisprudence’, he admonishes that the act of 
attempting to define a legal concept should not be confused with an account of what 
one might call ideological function. And to do so conflates logical and political criteria. 
This he called the ‘theory of the back of definition’.223 Legal theory has a central role to 
play in defining, determining, and upholding the values that underpins our world.224 
This truism underscores both the natural law theory and the theory of legal positivism 
vis a’ vis nuclear disarmament in the light of the existing international law and 
multilateral treaties. 
2.3 Revelance of the Concept of Law to the Research  
The jurisprudential notions of the rule of law, legal moralism, and civil disobedience, 
extend beyond political theory225 in all aspects and facets affecting the campaign of 
nuclear weapons disarmament. Legal theories require a principle or the rationale that 
will enhance them to be differentiated from the fundamental reasons of other theories 
and to identify what is pivotally salient when analysing the different interpretations of 
the concept of law.226 Research on the methodology of legal theory aims to expatiate 
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the ways or paths to identify the topical issue of jurisprudence, that is, the rationale that 
underpins the jurisprudential argumentation that has not been deeply considered.227  
Controversies exist whether the concept of jurisprudence is either social or a normative 
truism or the combination of both.228 Sociological jurisprudence entails the examination 
of the relationship between legal rules and the behavioural character of individuals, 
groups and institutions. This sociology of jurisprudence leads to functional 
jurisprudence which is an enquiry into the relationship between legal framework of 
disarmament underlying social interests or needs.229  
The combination of sociological jurisprudence and normative fact makes jurisprudence 
analytical. Analytical jurisprudence investigates the meaning and connections amongst 
legal concepts. Within analytical jurisprudence, the extensive bulk of thought centres 
on the meaning of the concept of law itself. The concept of law is predicated on 
historical jurisprudence which is a study and development of legal principles over time, 
and frequently emphasising the origin of law in custom or tradition in contradistinction 
to enacted rules.230  
Further to this jurisprudential discourse, how can we explain the reality that there is 
one concept of law when there are different conceptions of law within a range of 
different features? In the central case of Aristotelian notion, the idea that the concept 
of law is most likely unified by a primary concept then leads us to the concept of “law 
as a practical reason”; meaning law conceivable from an ethical perception231 as it 
pertains to nuclear disarmament. 
Consequent to this epistemic question on the concept of law as stated in the above 
paragraph, the methodological assumption(s) required for this research is integral to 
legal academic specialty because it specifies a relatively specific area of international 
law as its focus. The preference concerning the methodology chosen in this research 
arose with the methodological assumptions that permeated the research in its entirety.  
For the avoidance of “paradigmatic confusion” which occur when contrary 
epistemological assumptions are inadvertently mixed in explanations and practice,232 
the key paradigmatic assumptions in research philosophy will be elucidated in this 
chapter. If for any reason the paradigm underpinning a particular practice is different 
from the explanations accruable to it, both the credibility of the concept and the 
effectiveness of the method adopted suffer a research set back.233  
The choice regarding methodology, whether been qualitative, quantitative, mixed 
methods or comparative legal analysis a researcher adopts, the exposition of all the 
assumptions need to be explicitly explained. Consequently, the jurisprudential theories 
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of natural law and legal positivism as well as all the ontological and epistemological 
assumptions associated with this research are methodological imperatives not only for 
the purposes of this research but essentially to broaden the research feature inquiry. 
2.4 Natural Law Theory: Its Relevance to the Debate on Nuclear Disarmament 
Natural Law, also known as the law of nature is the non-codified body of natural and 
universal moral principles that underscore the ethical and legal standards by which 
human conduct is often evaluated and ruled.234 Natural law, which has an ancient 
history stretching back over 2000 years is sometimes compared with positive law which 
consist of written rules and regulations enacted by governments or sovereign 
authorities.235  
The phrase natural law is derived from the Latin words jus naturale. Naturalists, as the 
adherents of natural law are known, strongly believe that natural law norms are 
inherent part of nature and exist in the world irrespective of whether the sovereignty of 
States recognises or enforces them. Naturalists also believe that government of States 
as a matter of necessity must incorporate natural law principles into their legal system 
before true justice can be achieved.236 
There are three schools of thought of natural law theory namely: divine natural law, 
secular natural law, and historical natural law. However, as a result of the stance of 
these schools of thought, natural law theory is splinted into two parallel positions: 
natural law theory of morality and natural law theory of legality or natural law theory of 
law (positive law).237 The various schools of natural law will be reviewed before drawing 
inferences to the issue of nuclear disarmament. 
Divine natural law as a school of thought maintains that natural law represents the 
system of principles believed to be inspired or revealed by God or other supernatural 
or supreme power. Proponents of divine natural law hold that law must be enacted in 
conformity with what was inspired by God or some other deity, who rules the world 
according to the principles of truth, compassion and justice. The naturists of the divine 
natural law also assert that the legitimacy of any human law made must be measured 
by its compliance of standard with divine principles of right and wrong.238  
St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 74), the Italian philosopher and theologian and the most 
influential thinker of the medieval epoch that produced powerful philosophical 
synthesis that combined Aristotelian and a Neo- platonic element with a Christian 
context in an original and ingenious manner was the originator and leading exponent 
of divine natural law.239 
The secular natural law school of thought represents the body of principles arising from 
the physical, biological, and behavioural laws of nature perceived by the human 
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intellect and understood through human reasoning. This school of thought theorises 
about the standardized and fixed rules of nature, specifically human nature, to know 
moral and ethical norms. In view of the influence of the 17th century of rational 
empiricism and the 18th century enlightenment theorists who laid emphasis on 
observation and experiment in attaining reliable and demonstrable truths, secular 
natural law places the capacity of the human intellect above spiritual authority or 
religiosity.240 
The secular natural law theorists predicate their arguments and critical thinking on 
hypotheses about human behaviour in the state of nature, a presuming primitive stage 
in human evolution before the creation of governmental structures and institutions as 
well as other complex societal organisations. In the state of nature, John Locke wrote, 
human beings live in accordance with three principles: liberty, equality, and self-
preservation.241 As a result of the absence of government in the state of nature to 
maintain law and order, police protection and the regulation of distribution of goods, 
benefits, and other services, each individual has the right to self-preservation which he 
or she might excise on an equal scale with everyone.242 This righ of self preservation 
in the above presuming state of nature in relation to self defense in view of nuclear 
weapons, negates efforts to the arguments and discourse in support of nuclear 
disarmament. 
The right everyone has in the state of nature includes the liberties to a peaceful life, 
accumulation of wealth and property and the satisfaction of personal needs in 
conformity with the liberty of others. Arguably, Locke posited that anyone who deprives 
another person his or her right in the state of nature violates the principle of equality. 
This principle of equality is deficit in terms of nuclear weapons possession. This 
invariably leads to the fundamental research question: what is the sovereign equality 
rational behind the five NWS as nuclear weapon states? 
Meanwhile, John Locke used the state of nature to ultimately illustrate the unsatisfying 
nature of human society. Human liberty is neither equally fulfilled nor protected 
because individuals have the tendency to possess the liberty that delineate the limits 
of their own personal needs or desires in the state of nature. Inevitably, greed, 
narcissism, and self-interest will eventually rise against the liberty of others, creating 
irrationality and excessiveness, thereby placing human safety and society at risk. 
Therefore, in Lockean Jurisprudence, the law of nature directs people to establish a 
government that is empowered to protect life, liberty and property.243  
The historical natural law school of thought stands to represent the system of principles 
that developed over time through gradual process of accretion of custom, tradition, and 
human experience. In the view of the naturalists of this school of thought, the law must 
be made to correspond with long-standing but unwritten, customs, traditions and 
human experience.  
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However, in jurisprudence, natural law theories are opposed to legal positivism, the 
categorical view that the only binding laws are those enacted by human sovereignty 
which are not subjected to higher legal constraints.244  Modern proponents of natural 
law are rare; amongst the staunch modern naturalists are Robert P. George whose 
work: In Defence of Natural Law is probably the most outstanding modern defence of 
naturalism and John Fennis whose genre: Natural Law and Natural Rights is acclaimed 
as contribution to the subject area.245   
2.5 Legal Positivism and how it Relates to this Research 
Legal positivism is a jurisprudential theory about the nature of law generally 
characterised by two major views: that there is no necessary connection between law 
and morality; and that legal validity is ultimately influenced by reference to certain 
crucial social facts such as the command of the sovereign and the rule of recognition. 
Legal positivism is predicated on the simple claim that the proper description of law is 
a commendable objective and a duty that needs to be kept separate from moral 
judgements in view of the present law, and in view on how the law should be upheld, 
developed, or changed.246  
The theory of legal positivism is opposed to the theory of natural law, which is ultimately 
associated with morality, and identify that there are laws that are immanent in nature 
with the intentions of God. The core tenets of legal positivism are that all laws are made 
and laid down by human authorities and the validity of a rule of law rests in its formal 
legal status.247 This implies that laws which are validly made, articulated, and 
recognised by a law-making body are not deducible from extra-legal sources like 
morality, human dignity, or religious doctrine unless a valid legal norm specifically 
make reference to such concepts to determine its content and context.248 
From this standpoint of legal positivism, the requirement for nuclear disarmament 
should be limited to the rules of the legal framework free from any consideration based 
on ethical or moral judgement. 
Essentially, in theorising about law, the view of description and the least morally neutral 
theory of law is not only possible but also valuable.249 Thus, law is limited to observable 
phenomenon of legislation, adjudication by the courts and customs by other legal 
institutions. The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648, which is widely considered as the 
beginning of the modern international legal system of sovereign states, epitomised the 
break down of the ancient Roman Empire’s supremacy and religious legitimacy world, 
thereby making legal positivism a dominant approach in international law. 250  
Legal scholars like Jeremy Bentham (1748 – 1832) and John Austin (1790 -1859) 
successfully espoused the theory of legal positivism.251 Digging deeper, the root of 
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legal positivism is traceable to these socio-political philosophers and social theorists: 
Thomas Hobbes (1588 – 1679),252  David Hume (1711 – 1776)253 and Auguste Comte, 
the founder of sociology (1798 -1857).254 In modern times, the most prominent scholar 
in the history of the theory of legal positivism and jurisprudence is H.L.A. Hart, (1907 -
1992) whose wonderful piece of scholarship: The Concept of Law fundamentally 
reshaped the positivistic doctrine and its correlation with other major theories of law.255 
Simply put, legal positivism is constructed within and around the belief or the dogmatic 
assumption that the question of what is law is separate from, and must be separated 
from, the question of what law ought to be.256 John Austin succinctly expresses this 
assertion thus: 
“The existence of law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another. Whether it be or be not is 
one enquiry; whether it be or be not conformable to an assumed standard, is a different 
enquiry. A law, which actually exists, is law, though we happen to dislike it or thought it; vary 
from the text by which we regulate our approbation and disapprobation.”257 
From the study of law, legal positivism seek nothing more and nothing less than what 
it considered the foundation of modern social theory: that is, social institutions can be 
studied in an objective approach, free from preconceived notion or ideology.258 Hence, 
the comparison and contrast between legal positivism and scientific positivism by 
Fuller (1968) is contextually relevance and commendable. 
“[I]t will be helpful to offer some comparisons between legal positivism and its counterpart in 
science. Scientific positivism condemns any inquiry projecting itself beyond observable 
phenomena: it abjures metaphysics; it renounces in advance any explanation in term of 
ultimate causes. Its programme of research is to chart the regularities discernible in the 
phenomena of nature at the point where they become open to human observation, without 
asking – as it were, how they got there. In the setting of limits to inquiry, there is an obvious 
parallel between scientific and legal positivism. The legal positivist concentrates his attention 
on law at the point where it emerges from the institutional processes that brought it into being. 
It is the final made law itself that furnishes the subject of his inquiries. How it was made and 
what directions of human effort went into its creation are for him irrelevancies.”259 
Academically, it is imperative to know that positivism is not an absolutely jurisprudential 
approach. Positivism can be logical, philosophical, sociological, scientific or legal. Its 
central concern or claim is the view that only true knowledge is exact knowledge, which 
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emerges only from the positive verification of theory by application of firm scientific 
methods.260 
Therefore, legal positivism is suitable to research questions concerning the description 
and explanation of law as it addresses the analysis of complex legal texts to unravel 
their meaning. In the same vein, legal positivism is suited to research projects that are 
design to systematise legal norms and to correlate the rationale between different 
bodies of legal norms. It also analyses the judgements of the courts to determine their 
coherence or accuracy of the application of their sources of law.  
In view of this objective fact, looking at the law as it is and looking at the law, as it ought 
to be in terms of substantial compliance on nuclear weapons disarmament, there is the 
dire need for appreciable improvement and the implementations of the various 
recommendations arising from nuclear weapons non-proliferation treaty review 
conferences. 
Legal research based on positivism is often referred to as analytical or doctrinal legal 
research. However, doctrinal legal research is proper to the law and it cannot be a 
substitute to the law nor can it make a categorical statement about what the law ought 
to be.261 
Furthermore, legal positivism attempts to discover the characteristic features of the 
legal system that are posited by legislators, judges and all lawmakers. In spite of this, 
legal positivism as a theoretical legal doctrine has generated a lot of 
misunderstanding.262 In fact, the misconception generated by the theory is so acute 
that some renowned legal scholars are of the view that the phrase ‘legal positivism’ 
should be jettisoned.263 Following the ambiguity surrounding legal positivism, Hart 
(1954) in his work, ‘Positivism and the Separation of Law and Morals’ enumerated five 
salient factors inherent in legal positivism: 
1. That laws are commands of human beings. 
2. That there is no necessary connection between law and morals. 
3. That the analysis of legal concepts is (i) worth pursuing, (ii) distinct from (though 
not hostile to) sociological and historical enquiries and critical evaluation. 
4. That a legal system is a ‘closed logical system’ in which correct decision may 
be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical means alone. 
5. That moral judgement cannot be established, as statements of fact can by 
rational arguments, evidence, or proof. 264 
In the light of the above Hart’s five factors inherent in legal positivism, the legal 
framework on nuclear disarmament seems to be in correlation. Certainly, the various 
existing international treaties on nuclear weapons are made by state actors, 
respresentatives of non-state actors, and legal professional body such International 
Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) through multilateral 
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negotiations by the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA). This 
makes it in line with the first factor that says, “Laws are command of human beings.” 
However, the legal framework for nuclear disarmament appears to be somewhat a 
departure from the second factor inherent in legal positivistim. In terms of nuclear 
disarmament, there is the semblance of necessary connection between law and 
morality as disarmament is being underpinned by both ethical and legal standards. For 
instance, Article IV of the NPT probibits States from the spreading of nuclear weapons 
and technology and encourages States to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses 
of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear complete and general 
disarmament. This presupposes that nuclear weapons usage are not peaceful 
because of both their inherent and indiscriminate destructiveness. Obviously, any 
pursuit of peace is influenced by moral motive or ethical consideration. 
 
Similar to the first factor inherent in legal positivism, the legal framework for nuclear 
weapons disarmament is in consonant with the third factor; as the concepts of nuclear 
disarmament is worth pursuing and not a mere sociological and historical enquiries 
driven by critical evaluations. For example, Article VI of the NPT says: 
 
“to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measure relating to cessation of nuclear arms 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”265 
  
The Non-Proliferation Treaty is the bedrock of the various existing Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zones Treaty as the subceeding Article VII states the:  
 
“Nothing in this Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in 
order to assure the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.”266 
 
In summary, the legal framework for nuclear disarmament is tripartite in nature as: 
States without nuclear weapons should not acquire them; States with nuclear weapons 
should pursue disarmament; and all States can and should access nuclear technology 
for peaceful purposes under safeguard. 
 
It is on this basis of safeguard and on the Phrase “complete and general disarmament 
under strict international control” in Article VI of the NPT that the nuclear weapons legal 
framework corresponse with the fourth factor inherent in legal positivism. Nuclear 
weapons legal framework is clearly both “a legal and ‘closed logical system’ in which 
correct decision may be deduced from predetermined legal rules by logical means 
alone” in terms of verification and compliance. The International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA) is empowered by law in Article XII of its Status to regulate and verify nuclear 
materials and installations in the world by the creation and administration of safeguard 
designs by which all Nuclear Weapons States and States with nuclear capabilities are 
obliged to comply. 
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Sentimental judgement or reasons outside the legal framework on nuclear 
disarmament by advocacy groups such as the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND), underscores the validity of the firfth factor inherent in legal positivism. Arguably, 
mere moral judgement cannot be established as the factual statements of the law. All 
global, regional and national advocacies and campaigns for nuclear disarmament with 
moral persuations and ethical colorations that are outside the provisions of the 
multilateral treaties on nuclear disarmament are not analogous to legal framework on 
nuclear disarmament. 
 
In the explicit or ‘scientific’ analysis of law and legal rules, it is arguable that law as laid 
down (positum) should be separated from the purpose of studies and analysis from 
law as it ought to be. This implies that a clear cut dichotomy should be established 
between law as it ought to be (the moral desirability of law) and law as it is (law which 
actually exists).267 It is on this background that the legal framework on nuclear 
disarmament should be gauged or evaluated.  
From the fore going, legal positivism takes a very narrow view of legal research. 
Modern research in its very nature is multi-disciplinary and legal research is sometimes 
influenced or extended to to deal with moral questions. This present research which is 
on nuclear disarmament in international is not devoid of moral questions. 
2.6 Ontology and Epistemology: Their Relevance to the Present Research  
Ontology which is rooted and synonymous with metaphysics within a circumscribed 
context is generally known as the philosophical investigation of the nature, constitution 
and structure of reality. In other words, ontology is the study of being and being is the 
most general necessary characteristics that anything must possess in order to be 
counted as an existing entity.268 Ontology portrays the concept of our general world 
view (whether claims or assumptions) on the nature of reality, regardless whether it is 
an objective reality that really exist on subjective reality created in our minds.269  
Subjective reality in the context of this research is predicated on the fact of the threat 
nuclear weapons pose to the world; while objective reality, is the very existence of 
nuclear weapons and the discourse associated with them. 
The description of ontology as the study of being that extends to the social sciences 
(inclusive of law) include claims about what exists, it appearances, and the units that 
consitute it and how the units interact with one another.270 The complexities of the 
phenomena of power, culture and control as specific realities are daily basic societal 
illustrations of ontology. Do these realities exist only through experience (subjectivism) 
or do they exist independently of those who live it (objectivity) and ultimately how do 
an individual or group determine these realities? The determination of these realities 
in view of this research is the evaluation of the effectiveness of the applicable legal 
provisions on nuclear disarmament. 
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Consequently, there are several deeply rooted ontological assumptions which 
invariably influence our human views on what is real and at the same time are 
attributable to one category of being (entity) over another.  If these underlying 
ontological assumptions are not clearly identified and given utmost considerations, the 
researcher will definitely be blinded to scertain aspects of the jurisprudential enquiry 
on nuclear weapons disarmament which is predicated on multilateralism and 
international treaties in international law. 
Closely related to ontology and all its considerations of what constitute reality is 
epistemology. Epistemology gives due consideration to the views about the most 
suitable ways of enquiry into the nature of the external world271 and to what is 
knowledge, what are the sources of knowledge and the limits of knowledge272. 
Epistemology is the philosophical theory about the method of justification of knowledge 
and the set of claims or assumptions about the ways in which it is possible to attain the 
knowledge of reality. In epistemology, the assumption is, what exist may be known, 
and can be known, and the question is, what criteria must be met in order ascertain 
knowledge?273 
In the same vein, epistemology revolves around the need to reflect on methods and 
standards through which reliable and verifiable knowledge is acquired274. This implies, 
knowing how we can know, asking how is knowledge acquired, what criteria 
differentiate good knowledge from bad knowledge, and how should reality be 
described or represented? These questions underscore both the nexus between 
Ontology and Epistemology and their inter-independent connectivity275.  
The quest to achieve true objectivity leads to the concepts of ‘research paradigm’276 or 
‘research philosophy.’277. Research philosophy is fashioned from fundamental 
ontological and epistemological assumptions which has developed into both classical 
and contemporary paradigms to effectively categorise various research approaches278.  
Research paradigm is an ‘interpretive framework’ and a set of beliefs that guide 
action279. There are three key prevalence paradigms which effectively formed the basis 
from which other paradigms are derived. These include: positivism, realism and 
interpretivism/constructivism. However, for the purposes of this research, the 
interpretivist/constructivist paradigm is being used to drive home the social context of 
the discourse on  nuclear weapons disarmament.  
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Postivism and realism as research paradigms are embedded in the 
interpretivistic/constructivism paradigm in this research. As it pertains to the fact that 
reality entails entities, structure, and events, both natural law and legal positivism 
theories are interpretivistic framework adopted in this research. Interpretivism of the 
legal framework on nuclear disarmament is a reality that entails the entities of nuclear 
weapons. Interpretivism in this research sees nuclear disarmament as an achievable 
reality. Constructivism on the other hand is distinct but fundamental and instrumental 
to interpretivism as both share common philosophical roots. 
Constructivism perceives knowledge as constructed as opposed to created and it is 
concern with the nature of knowledge. Consequently, concstructivism purely 
emphasises the significance of the context of culture in understanding what transpire 
in the society.280 In view of understanding what transpire in the context of culture of 
existence of nuclear weapons in our world, this research maintain that reality is 
constructed through human efforts and activities. In the light of nuclear weapons 
disarmament, the United Nations through its office – United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) and the United Nations Institute for Disarmament 
Research (UNIDIR) are existing structure and efforts promoting nuclear disarmament. 
2.7.1 Doctrinal Legal Research Method (Black Letter Law)  
The doctrinal legal research which is often complemented by “Black Letter approach” 
method281 also known as library based or pure theoretical research is part of qualitative 
methodology. The doctrinal research asks fundamental questions on what the law is 
on a particular issue. It is characterised by a simple research aimed at a specific 
statement of the law or directed at a more complex and in-depth analysis of legal 
reasoning.282 In the context of doctrinal research, law is seen as a self-contained entity 
characterised by political neutrality and autonomous of other academic disciplines.283  
This research approach exclusively focused on the traditional legal research and 
materials and it the required techniques to interpret them, thus, it has been termed 
‘technocentric approach to law.’284 Doctrinal researchers ‘systematise and rationalise’ 
the law. They use the techniques of deductive reasoning or syllogistic argument. That 
is argument by analogy.285  
Essentially, the term doctrinal briefly needs to be clarified. The word ‘doctrine’ is a 
derivative from the Latin noun ‘doctrina’ which means instruction, knowledge, or 
learning.286 Meanwhile, the word doctrine has several derivations and plethora of 
meaning. A succinct explanation of the term ‘doctrinal’ is that it originates from the 
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‘doctrine’ of precedent in which legal rules exist on the quality of being doctrinal 
because they are not merely casual or convenient norms, but because they are meant 
to be rules which are consistently applicable and develop organically and gradually.287 
Legally, doctrine has been defined as: 
 ‘a synthesis of various rules, principles, norms, interpretive guidelines and values. It explains, 
makes coherent or justifies as a segment of the law as part of a larger system of law. Doctrine 
can be more or less abstract, binding or non-binding’.288 
Researchers who use the doctrinal legal research method are concerned with 
jurisprudence or the philosophy of law as the topics involved are restricted or 
circumscribed to a specific law. They mainly concentrate on the nature of law and legal 
authority; the nature of right, justice and political authority; the theories behind a 
particular substantive area of law; and the studying of legal decision making process, 
and the theory of legal interpretation and legal reasoning.289 Significantly, ‘theory 
highlights and explains something that one would otherwise not see’.290 Doctrinal 
research is strengthened by positivism with the world view whereby the law is objective, 
neutral and fixed.291 It is on this basis that the jurisprudential theories of natural law 
and legal positivism are used in this research both to elicit the ethical considerations 
and elucidate the positivists’ legal approach to nuclear disarmament.  
This necessarily implies that the doctrinal legal research strategy is a research into law 
and legal concepts. Consequently, the doctrinal methodology is directed at specific 
enquiries in view of acquiring particular information. For instance, in the case of the 
present research, an investigation may be conducted into international legal 
freamework on non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament and 
which convention or treaty is actually most applicable. These kinds of question(s) 
which have definite answers and are verifiable constitute the domain of doctrinal or 
analytical based research.292  
This method of research was the predominant approach in the 19th and 20th centuries 
in terms of law and legal scholarship and it had dominant influence in legal research 
design.293 Fundamentally, can the law – legislation and case law be classified as data? 
Arguably not, ‘law is not a datum; it is constant evolution, developing in ways that are 
sometimes startling and endlessly inventive.’294 It is worth noting that with the advent 
of the 21st century, legal research is becoming more inter-disciplinary and therefore 
empirical in nature. 
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In contradistinction to the spectrum of scientific and social research methodologies, 
the pertinent question is, where does the doctrinal research (black letter law) 
methodology fits in within any wider cross-disciplinary research framework, specifically 
the approach in this nuclear disarmament research? Evethough the present research 
is predominatly doctrinal in nature, has nonetheless utlilises secondary data sources 
as part of the methodology. 
The doctrinal legal research method revolves at the basis of the common law and it is 
the core legal research method. Until most recently in legal scholarship, there has been 
no necessity to explain or justify the doctrinal legal research methodology as a 
presupposition of juxtaposing cross-disciplinary research methodologies. If it is 
acceptable that law has a paradigm according to the definition of Kuhn,295 and it is a 
peculiar field of scholarship and that juristic thought particularly constitutes that 
discrete and credible paradigm, it then necessarily follows that law would have its own 
unique research method.296   
In precision, doctrinal research methodology in law is a research predicated upon 
seeking a solution to a particular legal discourse or finding the ‘one right answer’ to a 
particular legal question or set of questions.297 The required approaches in doctrinal 
research methodology are frequently infused.298  
These approaches include analysing, synthesising, and critiquing legal issues in view 
of identifying the core issues that required further research. This involves a lot of 
background reading so much so that the researcher is well versed in the area of law 
being researched.299 Using the doctrinal approach does not imply that a research 
should be exclusively limited to an exposition and clarification of the law.300 Critique 
and suggestions for the reform of the law are entirely possible and are ‘expected at the 
doctoral level’ and they should take place within the domain of the doctrinal analysis.301 
This realy shaped this research in the analysis of the political implications and 
diplomatic influences on the legal framework for nuclear disarmament. 
Background reading include primary sources, and primary sources comprise of original 
and authoritative statements of law, and sub-divided into three: legislation – law made 
by parliament; case law – the decision of the courts; and a minor, frequently overlooked 
yet valuable, group of sources which might be collectively referred to as “extra-
legal.”302 However, it depends whether the research is based on international law or 
national law, the sources material will include international treaties and conventions, 
declarations, and resolutions; as well as delegated legislation and case law.303 The 
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background reading in this research include the the five existing Nuclear Weapon Free 
Zone (NWFZ) treaties, the Single State Nuclear Weapon Free zone (SS-NWFZ) 
treaties the Non-Proliferition Treaty (NPT) and the documents of it various review 
confernces as well as the various United Nations resolutions on nuclear disarmament. 
Also required is a substantive wide range background reading of secondary sources. 
Secondary sources refer to any background material that provides a summary or 
overview of an area of law in text or encyclopaedic form. Secondary sources are 
analogous to legal encyclopaedias, dictionaries, books and journal articles; they 
provide an overview on a particular area of law by pulling together statutes and case 
law and interpreting them in light of each other. In general, secondary sources are not 
themselves the law and should not be cited as the law. Rather, they are a helpful way 
to get a quick overview of an area of law and to find primary authority such as cases 
and statutes that constitute the law.304 
Consequent upon the background reading in using the doctrinal legal methodology, it 
is incumbent on the researcher to determine the rules of law applicable to the identified 
legal issue or issues under research enquiry and to critically analyse the facts in terms 
of the law because the character of legal scholarship is derived from law itself.305  
This is unarguably the most critical stage of the doctrinal legal research methodology 
as it tends to annex the legal issues already identified with the applicable rule of law 
and synthesise all other legal discourse arising from the research within the context of 
the applicable law under research. Upon doing the legal analysis associated with the 
doctrinal legal research, the researcher would then come to a probable conclusion 
predicated on the established and considered facts of the law. The concepts and 
standard that are embodied in the law such as international conventions, legislation, 
and case law would have been investigated, analysed and elucidated by various 
authors in different contexts both from convergent and divergent perspectives.306 
There are numerous advantages embedded in doctrinal legal research and black letter 
methodology. Primarily, it is the customary or traditional method for conducting 
research in law and as such is it necessarily taught during the initial stages of legal 
training.307 In legal research, data are screened to differentiate the most authoritative 
from the least authoritative due demand to the quality or relevance of the data to the 
research enquiry.308 As a result of the dominance of doctrinal and black letter law 
research in law schools and law offices, research carried out under its designs is most 
likely acceptable as having the characteristics of legal research. Doctrinal research still 
stands to represent the norm within legal circles and the most operational as most legal 
scholarship and researches are based on doctrinal framework.309  
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Judging from the aforementioned backdrop, and because of its focus on established 
sources of law, doctrinal research method which is usually a two-part process involving 
both sourcing for the sources of the law and the interpretation and critical analysis of 
the text is more predictable and time manageable.310  
Expectedly, several criticisms have been levelled against the doctrinal legal research 
methodology. Some scholars consider it as too conservative, too theoretical,311 too 
technical, trivial and uncritical without utmost consideration of the social, economic and 
political significance of the legal system and process.312 Similarly, other scholars are 
of the view that the doctrinal research method is too restrictive and narrow its choice 
and range of investigation. In an attempt to address the above mentioned criticisms, 
this present research tends to be dynamic by looking beyond its legal content in terms 
of its aim and object. 
This is because, the legal profession is exponentially growing into the larger social 
context and the context encompasses legal and social theory and this theory 
encompasses other methodologies subsumed in the natural and social sciences. In 
view of the contextual reality, doctrinal research methodology does not offer sufficient 
framework for addressing issues that arise as it assumes that the law exist in objective 
doctrinal vacuum rather than within a social context or framework.313  
As a negation of the above criticisms levelled against the doctrinal legal research, 
Richard Posner 2009, explicitly express that doctrinal research “is important for the 
vitality of the legal system and of greater social value than much esoteric 
interdisciplinary legal scholarship.”314 However, as some scholars made a passionate 
appeal for emphasis on multidisciplinary legal research and enrichment of the 
traditional legal scholarship with empirical methods, they went to the extreme to argue 
that ‘doctrinal legal research is dead.’315 Irrefutably, ‘if doctrinal legal research has ever 
been dead, it has until today always succeeded in rising from the grave.’316  
Generally, one of the disincentives associated in undertaking both the doctrinal and 
the empirical or socio-legal research is that the researcher needs to spend enough 
time to adequately master the subject area before commencing the research.317 
Ultimately, doctrinal legal research methodology transcends any multidisciplinary legal 
research or empirical research because the corpus of rules, principles, doctrines and 
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concepts form the basis for legal reasoning and justification and these constitute legal 
doctrine which assert that ‘legal science, being itself a body of practices, can be 
understood only by references to its own self-conception.’318  
Consequetly, the adoption of the doctrinal legal research approach in this research is 
justified based on the analysis of nuclear disarmament within its legal framework in 
international law. The black letter law embedded in the doctrinal legal research 
approach in this research is used to analyse, interpret and examine the doctrine of 
nuclear deterrence, the 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapon as well as applicable international 
humanitarian law prohibiting the use of nuclear weapons. In the same vein, this 
methodological legal approach is also used to analyse the 1969 Vienna Convention on 
the Law of Treaties, the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapon Treaties and the Treaty 
on the Prehibition of Nuclear Weapons. The five existing Nuclear Weapons Free Zone 
Treaties and the Single State Free Zone treaties are also examined with the black letter 
law approach. 
2.7.2 Comparative Legal Methodology     
Comparative legal research methodology is an analytic format of research specifically 
used to study texts, jurisprudence and legal doctrines of foreign laws. The comparative 
legal research can be undertaken within the same legal family such as common law 
jurisdiction or civil law jurisdiction, or between legal families – encompassing 
customary system of law to the common law, or comparing the common law to the civil 
law.319  
Basically, the comparative legal analysis is undertaken for two major purposes: looking 
outside one’s one jurisdiction to understand how legal issue has been resolved 
elsewhere. For example to know whether the New Zealand Bill of Rights would serve 
as a good model for the United Kingdom; and looking beyond one’s own jurisdiction of 
family law for common threads of development or patterns in legal responses to 
societal matters such as how do western European countries react to the wearing of 
burqa by Muslim women?320 The above issues are called transplant approach and the 
harmonised approach in comparative law analysis.321 
This methodology spreads the awareness of the cultural and social context of the law 
as it elaborate a unique understanding of the way law evolves and work in different 
cultural backgrounds.322 Comparative legal analysis in research provides deeper 
understanding of the functions of the rules and principles of the laws and involves the 
exploration of detailed knowledge of the law of other nations to understand them, to 
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document them or to trace their evolution.323 Consequently, this research methodology 
is essential in a legal development process where changes, amendment, and 
modification are necessarily required in law.324 
Dues to its fundamental dichotomies between nature and cultures; presumption of 
similarity and preseumption of difference; and ultimately the comparison of laws of 
different legal system, the comparative legal methology is therefore not relevant to this 
research and as such is not being used in this thesis analysis and approach. The 
comparative legal research methodology is not being used in this research mainly 
because this thesis does not compare legal jurisdictions to deduce how legal issues 
surrounding nuclear weapons disarmament has been addressed. 
2.7.3 Socio-legal or Empirical Legal Research Methodology  
Law is indisputably an essential and critical part of the social world. Consequent upon 
this truism, Lord Leslie Scarman (1911-2004), strongly emphasised that: 
“There is no cosy little world of lawyers’ in which learned men may frolic without raising socially 
controversial Issues-I challenge anyone to identify an issue of law reform so technical that it 
raises no social, political or economic issue. If there is such a thing, I doubt if it would be worth 
doing anything about it.”325 
Following the recognition of the fact that the law operates in the social context of the 
wider world, the development of socio-legal methodology as a framework for 
conducting legal research thus become an undeniable necessity.326 Socio-legal 
research also known as empirical legal research method or non-doctrinal research is 
a research in law that uses the methods taken from other academic field of studies to 
generate empirical data in order to provide answers to research questions. Socio-legal 
research can be qualitative or quantitative based on a problem, policy or law reform.327 
Socio-legal research looks beyond legal doctrine to understand law as a social 
phenomenon or type of social experience and existential reality. Thus, socio-legal 
scholars confidently classify the socio-legal research methodology as different from 
‘law in books’ but as value as ‘law in action’.328 The Socio-legal research approach was 
first used in the area of criminology, but presently it has been used to conduct research 
in all fields of law.329  
Observably, the socio-legal research can unravel the unexposed and the unquestioned 
previous political nature of law, uncovering whether laws have fulfilled their intended 
purpose; help in promiting law reform proposals by bringing law and the goals of public 
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policy; and ultimately showing how law effectively operates in practice by elucidating 
the experiences of various groups in affiliation with the law.330   
Socio-legal or empirical legal research methodology embraces interdisciplinary 
research areas concerned with law as a social institution and reality, with the law 
serving legal processes, services on economic, social services and political factors in 
the society.331 As a result of its dynamism, the socio-legal research methodology is 
diversified and encompasses a wide range of theoretical perspectives, using social 
research methods, like interviews, observations or questionnaires.332 Empirical 
research in law uses both qualitative and quantitative forms of data collection and 
analysis.333   
Consequently, socio-legal or empirical legal researchers may engage in qualitative or 
quantitative research methods or both, depending on the research design and the topic 
under research enquiry.334 The analysis of the empirical legal research includes the 
following: 
 Interviews  
 Observation, instances of courtroom interactions or lawyer-client exchanges   
 Surveys (electronic or face-to-face) 
 Case studies 
 Data collection (primary or secondary sources materials) 
 Economic analysis 
 Examinations of court records and transcripts.335 
All of the above factors were considered and discussed with the supervisor at the early 
stage of this research.  Due to the given nature of the research, enough materials of 
analysis are available and used. In as far as this research is predominatly doctrinal, 
there is the sociological dimention. This include the visit of the researcher to the United 
Nations Institute for Disarmament Research (UNIDIR) for the participation on 
international symposuim on ‘Understanding the Risk of Nuclear weapons’ as part of 
research visit. Consequently, this thesis is primarily a legal research as it centres on 
international law encapsulated in international treaties.The various international 
treaties on nuclear weapons as well as the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties together with applicable international humanitarian law analysed in this thesis 
makes the socio-legal methodology not fit into the research, hence, is not being 
adopted as this research methodology. 
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2.7.4 Qualitative Legal Research Methodology 
Qualitative legal research is understood as the research strategy that emphasises on 
and interpretative analysis rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of 
data. It expresses predominantly an inductive approach to the relationship between 
theory and research enquiry with much emphasis laid on the generation of theories. 
Evidently, qualitative research does not accept the procedures and norms of the 
natural scientific model. In preference, qualitative research focuses on the procedure 
by which researchers interpret their social world and it equally concerns with the view 
of social reality.336  
Consequently, qualitative research recognises there is no single reality instead; reality 
is variable, situational and personal. For instance, qualitative interviews are less 
structured than the quantitative methodology, consisting of an exchange of ideas 
between the interviewer (the researcher) and the interviewee; not for the purposes of 
quantifying the subject matter under research but for eliciting new information, insight, 
and practical awareness of the topic under research investigation.337 The method this 
research adopt is therefore qualitative. 
 This research solely adopt the qualitative legal methodology by its approach of the 
black letter law embedded in the doctrinal legal method. By its interpretative analysis, 
this thesis addresses the core international treaties on nuclear weapons alongside with 
applicable international humanitarian law and all relevant legal discourse associated 
with nuclear disarmament.This therefore underscores the rationale why this research 
is purely qualitative.  
2.7.5 Quantitative Legal Research Methodology 
Quantitative legal research is construed as a method of research that emphatically 
stresses quantification in the collection and analysis of legal data. It is characterised 
by deductive approach of the nexus between theory and research with predominant 
concern on the veracity of theories. Furthermore, unlike the qualitative research, 
quantitative research combines the practices of the natural scientific model. This 
implies that it maintains the control of the research to reduce the number of variables 
affecting the results, exact measurement and the precision; it is also the certainty and 
necessity of repeating the finding or experiment with exact outcomes and the testing 
of the hypothesis by statistical data or means.338  
More often than not, quantitative research uses the devices of surveys and 
questionnaires to collect necessary data. Collection of quantitative research data 
includes closed questions, resulting in easy statistical Summaries, or the open 
question approach which allow a very lengthy and productive individual response.339 
At the preliminary stage of this research, the quantitative methodology was considered 
                                                          
336 Caroline Morris and Cian Murphy, Getting a PhD in Law (Hart Publishing Ltd, 2011) 35 
337 Ibid  
338 Ashish Kumar Singhal and Ikramuddin Malik, ‘Doctrinal and Socio-legal Methods of Research: Merits and 
Demerits’ [2012] Educational Research Journal Vol.2 (7), 252-256 
339 Ibid 
62 
 
but as the research progressed, the researcher  horizon was broadened thereby 
deeming the quantitative legal research methodology not relevant to be used or 
adopted. 
The quantitative legal research methodology is not adopted in this thesis. This is mainly 
because of the absence of the basic elements of quantitative methodology such as the 
use of survey, questionaires and the quantification of collection of legal data this 
research does not ultilise.Available legal data in terms of earliest and 
contemporaneous legal instruments on nuclear weapons disarmament and the existing 
legal framework on nuclear disarmament supercede the needto use the quantitative 
legal research methodology in this research.   
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2.8 Literature Review 
The central focus of the literature review of this research is to critically explore areas 
of controversies of secondary sources materials that discuss, explain, interpret and 
analyse, what the law is, and what the law ought to be on nuclear weapons 
disarmament. Secondary sources refer to any background material that provides a 
summary or overview of an area of law in text or encyclopaedic form and with the view 
of identifying the gaps in the course of this research. 
Secondary sources are analogous to legal encyclopaedias, dictionaries, academic 
textbooks, scholarly journal articles; they provide an overview of a particular area of 
law by pulling together statutes, legal principles, case law, interpreting, and critiquting 
them. In general, secondary sources are not themselves the law and should not be 
cited as the law. They are helpful ways to get a quick overview of an area of law and 
to find primary authority such as cases and statutes that constitute the law.340  In the 
case of international law, Article 38 of the International Court of Justice include 
secondary source of persuasaive authority which the ICJ may consults. 
Following the background of secondary sources, the researcher has read and 
espoused the significance of international treaties and multilateral agreements 
abrogating nuclear proliferation and re-armament that constitute the research primary 
sources, thereby identifying a gap where new and viable contributions could be 
inputted. However, “a researcher cannot perform significant research without first 
understating the literature in the field.”341 In the light of this truism, this literature review 
in its entirety is underpinned by contemporary research on international legal and 
political discourse on nuclear disarmament.  
The black letter law approach embedded in doctrinal legal research method under 
qualitative methodology is being used to address the gaps in the literature.This 
methodolical approach is used to analyse and examine key sections in this research 
such as: the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, and the 1996 International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the newly emerged Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the Non-Proliferation of Nucleaar Weapons 
Treaty together with the five existing Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties and the two 
Single States Free zone Treaties are analysed with black letter law approach.   
Nuclear weapons have their place among the sought-after technology with nations 
that seek to be ultimately secured with nuclear ambition. The global campaign against 
nuclear weapons strongly posits that nuclear weapons in territorial battles are 
completely unethical, with devastating environmental and humanitarian impacts, 
physical damage and high cost of maintenance. Antithetically, the proponents of 
nuclear weapons opine that nuclear weapons are sources of war deterrent, strategic 
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global defence and power supply. These parallel views constitute the framework of 
this literature review. 
However, the issues discussed have no clear themes but the literature review structure 
adopted a wholistic approach haven cut across the sceptrum of nuclear disarmament 
debate. It is for this reason the literatures cannot be categorised under any specific 
theme but designed into the threat of nuclear weapons, the legal framework on nuclear 
disarmament and the morality between the law and the use of nuclear weapons. These 
are captured in the two major divisions of review of selected academic journal articles 
and review of selected academic textbooks that constitute the litrerature review. 
2.8.1 Review of Selected Academic Journal Articles 
Literature review of scholarly journal articles on nuclear weapons disarmament and 
non-proliferation is an imperative for this research. The analyses of various academic 
articles suggest persistent relevancy and accuracy contemporaneous with the 
discourse of nuclear weapons and disarmament in the light of international law. The 
future of the global nuclear landscape has received intense scrutiny since the dawn of 
the nuclear epoch and the intellectual contributions of scholarly journal articles have 
awakened the academic community, professional experts, world leaders and non-
State actors to the pace and timing of non-proliferation and disarmament which has 
been consistently slower than was envisioned. Scholarly journal articles have exibit 
the tone of consistency of both the convergent legal and divergent political positions 
on issues arising from nuclear disarmament.  
‘Nuclear Power’s Disarmament Obligation under Treaty on the Non-proliferation 
of Nuclear Weapons and the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty: 
Interactions between Soft Law and Hard Law’342 – Alessandra Pietrobon  
This article pinpoints some salient issues in international law as it pertains to its subject 
matter. The author articulates how nuclear testing started and continues to generate 
serious concern for international security and safety of the environment.343 The means 
of international law agreements to put an end to nuclear testing by the international 
community has not been enforced, owing to the non-ratification of the Comprehensive 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) by the United States and some other countries.344 
The researcher views this as not only a gap in the law but also a major challenge in 
the disarmament legal framework. Concerning the law, there is no way a State can be 
compelled to ratify a treaty.  
In the view of the researcher, there should be an international legal framework 
underpinning the regulation of nuclear testing. As opines by Pietrobon, a necessary 
connection can be created between the ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the disarmament obligation codified in Article VI of the Treaty 
of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Furthermore, this connection 
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embedded in some soft law, interfaces with hard law to provide consequential legal 
effect in influencing the stands of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) that yet to ratify 
the CTBT.345 Soft law is a term that emcompasses soft rules that are included in 
treaties, non-binding, voluntary resoluctions, recommendations, codes of conduct and 
standards. 
The opinion conveyed in this article lends credence to the concept of multilateralism 
and ensuring international treaties as the key rule to the nuclear disarmament. The 
article clearly explains the antecedents of nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer 
space and underwater in the light of the Partial Nuclear Ban Treaty (PTBT) that 
resonates in various nuclear weapon free zones treaties and consolidated in the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT).  
As discussed by the author, the CTBT is considered comprehensive because it 
prohibits all kinds of explosive nuclear device tests including underground 
detonations.346 The CTBT aims to avoid every nuclear explosive test undertaken either 
for military or civilian purposes’ under its control or jurisdiction.347 
The author also points that this CTBT provision is quite articulate and legally 
resounding but it cannot be enforced due to the non-ratification by some specific 
States (China, Egypt, India, Iran Israel North Korea, Pakistan and the United States) 
and as such, the researcher cannot rely on it to buttress any substantive analysis in 
the course of this research. In order for the CTBT to enter into force, it needs the 
ratification of at least 44 States as specifically stipulated in its Annex 2.348 Therefore, 
if the threshold is not reached it, it legally invalidates all other States effort towards the 
axiomatically acclaimed comprehensive ban of nuclear test. This awareness exposes 
the existing legal limitation associated with this treaty which in turns to be considered 
as limitation to this research. 
In comparison with the CTBT, this Pietrobon’s article identifies some legal 
characteristics of the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT). Ab initio 
(from the beginning), the NPT was not originally intended to be perpetually operational. 
Its Article X(2) makes the provision for a conference to be held after twenty-five years  
the treaty entered into force, to determine whether the treaty is to continue ad infinitum 
(to infinity) or to be extended for an additional or specific period.349 The first NPT 
Special Extension and Review Conference was held in May 11 1995 and decision was 
unanimously taken in favour of indefinite and unlimited extension in conformity with 
the original terms and conditionality of the treaty.350   
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Subsequently, every five years, the NPT Review Conference convene to examine the 
milestone of the treaty and in 2000, the Conference met and agreed by consensus, a-
13-practical steps measures considered as progressive and systematic efforts in 
implementing Article IV.351 Upon critical studies of the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
by the researcher through this scholarly article, the NTP does not outlaw the existence 
of nuclear weapons; rather it dichotomises States into Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 
and Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNW) 
As the author points, in spite of the landmark significance of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and its Review Conferences that led to the 13 Practical Steps to meet 
disarmament commitments, the Nuclear Weapon Non-proliferation Treaty is fraught 
with vague obligations on all party signatories to advance to the common front of total 
nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the NPT which says: 
  
“Each of the Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control”352 
 
The above provision does not impose or strictly requires all signatories of the treaty to 
embark on immediate disarmament. The author rather fails to poin that this provision 
is a concession on all party States “to negotiate in good faith”353 and this is inherently 
laden with divergent interpretations and can also be misconstrued as vague. The 
researcher considers Article VI of the NPT as the basis that constitutes the criticism 
that the Nuclear Weapon States NWS have failed to meet their formal and specific 
obligation on disarmament. The criticism is so strong such that the failure of the NWS 
to disarm their arsenals of nuclear weapons, most especially in the era after the Cold 
War has provoked some Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) such as North Korea 
and Iran to justify their withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty and acquire their 
own nuclear weapon armament. 
 
In the same vein of its criticism, the researcher deciphers that many developing 
nations over the years have viewed the NPT as a conspiracy of the nuclear ‘haves’ to 
subjugate the nuclear ‘have-not’. This assertion is predicated on the disappointment 
with the insignificant progress on nuclear disarmament, where the NWS still possess 
up to 22,000 warheads and among themselves with the reluctance to eliminate them 
without any proscriptive sanction contained in the NPT. 
 
However, a major gap on this Pietrobon’s article and other supplementary sources on 
the effectiveness and fairness of the NPT is the provision of Article IV, which 
encourages party States to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Factually, 
the technology for producing nuclear energy is the same as the technology for 
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producing nuclear weapons. The conversion from peaceful to non-peaceful use only 
entails enriching the uranium or simply reprocessing the fuel rods into plutonium.354 
  
With the awareness of this technological capability, the NPT negotiators relied on the 
requirement of the recipients of nuclear technology to allow international inspection 
such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to monitor nuclear facilities to 
ensure compliance. But this has been under strain after the 1991 Gulf War, when the 
United Nations (UN) mandated inspector team discovered that Iraq had clandestinely 
worked on the development of nuclear weapons in undeclared facilities, located 
adjacent to the facilities that had been declared to the International Atomic Energy 
(IAEA) under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA).355   
 
Beyond its criticism, the researcher understands the indisputable fact that the Treaty 
on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons is the cornerstone of the global non-
proliferation architecture. As a normative legal framework on nuclear disarmament, its 
universalization directly requires State actors to conclude all protocols as a condition 
for gaining nuclear co-operation. Legal possibilities and limitations are examined both 
directly and indirectly in ensuring absolute non-proliferation of nuclear materials for 
attaining comprehensive nuclear disarmament.356 
 
The Researcher Reflection on Pietrobon’s Article  
 
Upon the review of this article, it becomes clearer to the researcher that complete 
nuclear disarmament is more an idealistic goal than realistic one. As present state 
practice indicates, the process leading to nuclear disarmament is procedural and 
slowly progressive. The NWS are not willing to do away with their nuclear armaments 
and their “continuality and genuineness”357 in the negotiation towards disarmament is 
mere an affirmation of soft law. Understandably, ratification of the CTBT by the NWS 
would be most valuable in the course of disarmament. A unilateral or self-retrained 
moratorium by a State cannot be deemed as equivalent to the CTBT requirment.358 
 
‘Recent Developments in International Law Regarding Nuclear Weapons’359 – 
Daniel H. Joyner 
The researcher deems it necessary to select this academic journal article for review 
because its author examines some fundamental developments in State policy and 
international law concerning nuclear weapons in the early years of the 21st century. 
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According to Joyner, by virtue of State policy many States especially the NWS and 
other nuclear weapon-possession governments have adopted conflicting 
interpretations of the content of principles underscoring the 1968 NPT, which is the 
fundamental milestone of the nuclear non-proliferation legal regime.360 The elucidation 
of the veritable potency of the NPT by the author of this article has broadened the 
horizon of the researcher concerning erroneous legal interpretations associated with 
some of the provisions of this treaty. 
In the review of the proceeding article by Alessandra Pietrobon, the researcher 
adopted a more critical than neutrally analytical approach about the NPT from to the 
individual and collective failures of the NWS to comply with their disarmament 
obligations in Articles VI. However, Joyner, opines that the NPT “has been distorted in 
favour of a disproportionate prioritisation of non-proliferation principles and an 
unwarranted under-prioritisation of the peaceful use of disarmament principles.”361  
Consequently, it is an obvious necessity that policies and interpretations of treaty such 
as the NPT can be meaningfully acceptable as pattern of continuity and change by the 
actions of the NWS. This is evidenced as pointed out by the stands of the United States 
of America on Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). On 6 April 2010, the American 
government released a comprehensive policy statement regarding nuclear weapons 
that formalises the US disarmament posture in view of the existing US nuclear 
armaments.  
Joyner’s underlying point of this policy statement indicates that without prejudice to 
the jeopardy of the American traditional deterrence and reaffirmation, the US 
government is now able to review its nuclear weapons policies for the betterment of 
its most pressing security challenges.362 Indicatively, this policy recognises that the 
previous US government showed reluctance in acknowledging between nuclear 
disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.363 
However, the researcher perceives the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) as an 
autonomous U.S. policy at variance with Article VI of the Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) that emphasises the obligation of all signatories to make progress towards 
disarmament. Arguaby, the American government ought to assert itself in a more 
formidable position to persuade other NPT members in adopting the procedures 
needed to strengthen the nuclear weapons non-proliferation regime. 
Also, a controvertial issue associated with the America NPR is that it negates 
disarmament advocacy, as it reaffirms the traditional deterrence of the U.S. 
government’s defence strategy. The NPR acknowledges U.S. nuclear weapons as a 
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fundamental tool of its nuclear commitment not to use or threaten Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States (NNWS) with their nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the commitments 
actually expressed in the NPR policy statement report are very puzzling and enigmatic. 
In politics and in theory, the U.S. and NWS will organise and participate in all manner 
of conferences and deliberations on nuclear disarmament. In practice, they will adopt 
the traditional military doctrine of deterrence thereby making all efforts on nuclear 
weapons disarmament a matter of security and political precedence rather than legal 
compliance. 
Importantly, the analysis and interpretations of the view of the author in this article has 
shaped the understanding of the researcher in terms of the legal basis for the NPT 
and the policies of the NWS that are either convergent or divergent to the NPT regime. 
According to the author, a number of these policies have “unlawfully prejudiced the 
legitimate legal interest of NPT Non-nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), pursuant to the 
NPT’s grand bargain.”364   
‘Pre-empting Proliferation: International Law, Morality and Nuclear Weapons’365 
– Michael J. Glennon 
This article examines the possibility of nuclear weapons proliferation against the 
background of international law and and argument centre on morality. The author 
acknowledges the view of Robert McNamara that nuclear weapons “are totally useless 
– except only to deter one’s opponent from using them.”366 The extension of this view 
implies that the ghastliness of nuclear weapons actually promote their stability; not 
only to deter nuclear armed States from attacking each other but also to forestall 
conventional weapons attacks, fearing the possibility of nuclear weapons reaction. 
This analytical assertion by this author is the rationale behind the review of this article. 
Prior to the review of the literatures for this research, the researcher hitherto had 
misgivings about the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Indisputably, deterrence has 
played a key role in the existence of nuclear weapons in the world, but the doctrine is 
certainly more dynamic in its implication. In this article, Glennon pinpoints the 
correlation between nuclear weapons and the existing peace amongst the great 
powers; for more than 65 years, the longest since the Second World War there have 
been a sort of relative peace devoid of arms confrotations between the great 
powers.367 However, the Glennon equally explains the risk attached to deterrence 
regardless of whatever stability the possession of nuclear weapons might have 
provided.The logic of nuclear deterrence presupposes nuclear proliferation. The 
danger is, the more States that acquire nuclear weapons, the more chances are there 
that these weapons can be used.368 Even as the dangers of nuclear weapons 
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deterrence are glaring, implying that no policy-maker would risk annihilation by 
approving their use.369 
From Glennon’s article, the researcher deduces that nuclear weapons proliferation 
against international law and moral arguments against their use poses a threat to the 
international community.  Ironically, legal treaties on nuclear disarmament do not have 
sufficient plausibility and consistent explanation for moral arguments. This is why the 
super powers especially NWS seems to be imposing their political influences on the 
rest of the world in the disarmament discourse. In the words of the author of this article, 
“law is a species of cooperation and cooperation occurs only under specific 
conditions.370”  
This explains why the provisions of the various nuclear weapon treaties and the 
resolutions of the United Nations as well as the 1996 advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality or otherwise of the use of nuclear 
weapons have not acquired the degree necessary to generate consistent multilateral 
cooperation in enforcing complete disarmament. 
‘Legality of the Threat or use of Nuclear Weapons’371 – Nicholas Grief 
This article dwells on the historic Advisory Opinion of 8 July 1996 of the International 
Court of Justice (ICJ) on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in 
response to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) question: “Is the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons in any circumstances permitted under international law?”372 
Prior to this UNGA question, the World Health Organisation (WHO) had hitherto 
requested the ICJ opinion on this same question, but the court declined on the ground 
that the WHO question is not in conformity within WHO scope of activities as enshrined 
in Article 92(2) of the United Nation Charter.373 Politically, the initial WHO request 
necessarily paved the way for the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) question. 
Grief’s argues that the question of the UN General Assembly seeking the advisory 
opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the use of nuclear weapons had 
political motivation. He further argues that the political dimension did not contravene 
its legal character. Consequently, the Court acknowledged that in order to appropriate 
and correctly select applicable law, it is basically important to recognise the distinctive 
characteristics of nuclear weapons, especially their destructiveness, their capacity to 
inflict untold human suffering and the attendant damage to  future generations.374  
Based on the combination of legal and political elements embedded in this nuclear 
weapons disarmament research, the researcher considers it expedient to explore this 
article in its entirety. A striking point here is, the ICJ observed that with regard to 
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nuclear weapons, there is no treaty on general prohibition.375 However, there are 
multilateral treaties dealing with the acquisition, manufacture, possession, deployment 
and testing of nuclear weapons. These treaties only indicate the international 
community unflinching concern for the threat of nuclear weapons; they not constitute 
a general prohibition. 
Meanwhile, the Court expressed that nuclear weapons are subsumable under 
international law regardless of their invention before the emergence of most 
humanitarian norms and principles.376 The fundamental principles of distinction of 
international humanitarian law that confirm this truism are: State must never make 
civilians the target of attacks by using weapons that cannot delineate between civilian 
and military targets. And it is prohibited to inflict unnecessary suffering on combatants; 
consequently, it is therefore unlawful to use weapons that breach these principles.377 
Furthermore, Grief clearly highlights both the legal and political importance of the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion. The resolutions underlying the requests were the consequence of 
the adoption of the draft of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) duly supported by the 
World Court Project.378 Notably, the ICJ Advisory Opinion is the first time in history an 
international judicial proceeding has considered the legal status of the existence of 
nuclear weapons and declared that they are subject to the principles of the Charter of 
the United Nations and the applicable international law of Armed Conflict.379 
Explicitly, the ICJ unanimously held that: “a threat of the use of force by means of 
nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the United Nations 
Charter and fails to meet all requirement of Article 51 is unlawful.”380 In the same vein, 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons must be in conformity with the principles of 
applicable international humanitarian law with specific obligations under international 
and multilateral treaties which out rightly deals with undertakings relating to nuclear 
weapons.381 On a political position, the ICJ unanimous decision that there is an 
obligation to negotiate disarmament still counts a clear-cut victory and support for the 
Non-Aligned Movement (NAM).382  
Critically, the researcher observes that the ICJ in its Advisory Opinion did not address 
the fundamental issue of nuclear deterrence theory unanimously. For example, Judge 
Ferrari Bravo opined that the deterrence theory cannot amount to a customary rule. In 
a similar view, Judge Shi expressed the view that the deterrence policy should be the 
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object of regulation by law, not vice versa, also adding that the unwarranted emphasis 
on the practice of the NWS and their allies which embrace the protection of the nuclear 
umbrella breach the principle of sovereign equality. And Judge Weeramantry stated, 
every nation is specially affected by nuclear weapons.383  
The above positions of the ICJ judges on deterrence imply that deterrence in effect is 
not a topic of legal consideration but a political pre-emptive and defensive measure 
falling aside legal regulation by States. Still on the doctrine of deterrence, the 
researcher is of the submission that the ICJ should have been more forthcoming in its 
dictum in order to nagate the argument founded on the logic of nuclear detterence  
‘Arms Control and Disarmament’384 – J.C. Woodliffe 
The of lack of mutual understanding and trust driven by the absence of political will 
between the East and the West relations after the post-war period was responsible for 
the retarded progress in the pursuit of arms control and disarmament. This article 
argues that a turning point may have been attained and reached through the main 
issues of verification regardless of the impediments associated with the arms control 
and disarmament negotiations. 
In the view of the author, the traditional global arms control agreements solely relied 
on “National Technical Means of verification” (NTMs) to supervise compliance with 
their provisions by contracting States. The NTMs, which are subsumed under national 
regulation, consist of photographic reconnaissance satellites, radar operated from sea 
and ground-based systems and seismographic monitoring of nuclear weapons 
testings and explosions.385 Every State party has the undertaking not to use NTMs in 
an approach contradictory to the generally recognised principles of international law 
and in a manner inconsistent with other nations.386 
Practically, international means of verification predicated on inter-state agreement 
have been said to be only “reluctantly and exceptionally accepted by States outside 
arms control and disarmament contexts.387 This by implication means there is an 
important element of consent given on-site inspection to be conducted either by 
another State or by an international agency such as the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). The shortcoming arising from this includes the impossibility to operate 
without the full cooperation of the State on whose territory the inspection is being 
carried out. 
As a consequence of reviewing this article, the researcher discovered the Arms 
Control and Disarmament (Privileges and Immunities) Act of 1988, an Act of 
parliament of the United Kingdom with the provisions of conferring privileges and 
immunities on observers, inspectors and auxiliary personnel exercising functions 
                                                          
383 Ibid  
384 J.C. Woodliffe, ‘Arms Control and Disarmament’ [1988] ICLQ 37(4), 988 - 1002 
385 J.C. Woodliffe, ‘Arms Control and Disarmament’ [1988] ICLQ 37(4), 988 - 1002 
386 Ibid 
387 Ibid 
74 
 
under international agreements or arrangements for furthering arms control and 
disarmament is a veritable legal instrument in nuclear disarmament discourse.388  
However, according to Woodliffe, the arms control and disarmament agreement is 
devoid of multilateralism thereby making it not universalistic. For example, The Limited 
Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) of August 5 1963 was a trilateral agreement (tripartite pact) 
between the U.S., U.S.S.R., and the U.K. banning all nuclear explosions except for 
underground tests.389 The United States and many nuclear weapon States currently 
practice self-imposed moratorium on any underground nuclear tests, while India and 
Pakistan both conducted such test in 1998.390 
Further to the LTBT, the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 adopted the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that prohibits all States from conducting any 
nuclear tests regardless of the purposes of nuclear development or otherwise as well 
as established a surveillance system of seismic incidents and on-site inspections.391 
It is worth recalling that the CTBT was signed by the United States in 1996, but the 
U.S. Senate vote of 51 – 48 in 1999 failed to achieve the required consent of 2/3rd 
majority.392 
Arguably, the treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System (ABM Treaty) of 
May 26 1972, which was amended in 1973, is one of the most important nuclear arms 
control agreement. The treaty which is between the United States and the former 
Soviet Union provides that each State could have only one very restricted ABM 
deployment area, thereby precluding either State from developing a nationwide ABM 
defence. Logically, since each party would have the ability to retaliate against the other 
party, the ABM Treaty was fractioned to make it unlikely that both parties would resort 
to a nuclear first strike.393  
This was the reason why President George W. Bush announced in December 2001 
that the United States was withdrawing from the ABM Treaty, to enable the U.S. have 
the freedom to develop and deploy a national missile defence system capable of 
stopping ballistic missiles that might be launched by “rogue” States like the North 
Korea.394 
Various types of agreements such as the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) 
agreement which led to the ABM Treaty, the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) 
agreement, and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, were all designed to 
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freeze, reduce, and possibly eliminate all kinds of nuclear weapons during the Cold 
War period.395 
Actually, some of these agreements never entered into force, while others have been 
disputed after the Cold War era as no longer contemporaneous with present day 
reality. In May 2002, The Russian Federation and the United States built upon these 
treaties by concluding a Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty, in which they agreed to 
reduce nuclear warhead. When signing the treaty President George W. Bush said 
“[t]his treaty liquidates the Cold War legacy of nuclear hostility between our 
countries.”396 
By and large, the researcher acknowledges the success of this article of which the 
autor exposes the purpose and reasons for legislation that will contribute to reducing 
the risks of armed conflict and misunderstanding or miscalculation of military 
engagements. The analysis of the Stockholm conference on confidence and Security 
Building Measure and Disarmament in Europe and the Geneva talk on a Treaty for the 
Elimination of Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missile involving the United 
Kingdom (UK), the United States of America (USA), and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics (USSR) in conjunction with North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) has 
broaden the research horizon of the researcher. As part of the review of the lituretures, 
the researcher identified some gaps which will be presented at the end of this chapter. 
2.8.2 The Rationale behind the Selected Academic Textbooks  
Nuclear weapons as one of the categories of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 
has been a topic of both political and legal controversies. The debate associated with 
nuclear weapons became intense since the bombing of the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in Japan by the United States of American during the final stages of the 
World War II in 1945, which pose a horrific threat of human self-annihilation.397 
Therefore, the fundamental question of legality of the possession or use of nuclear 
weapons became an urgent attention of intense academic scrutunity. This is factual 
as it pivotally involved humanity and it is impossible to downplay its attendant threats. 
The choice of this section is guided by the themes of the following academic textbooks 
below: 
Istvan Pogany: Nuclear Weapons and International Law.398   
The rationale for selecting this book for review is not farfetched: it thematically 
underpinned the basis of this research in its entirety. Essentially, morality, legality, and 
international politics are intertwined in the analysis of nuclear weapons discourse and 
any effort to solely deal with the legal aspects is destined to justifiable accusation of 
lop-sided consideration. Nevertheless, “International Law provides the framework 
within which States conduct their international behaviour, commonly accepting certain 
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reciprocal constraints and regulating expectations raised”.399  A conspicuous gap here 
is, there is no international legal framework for morality and political considerations in 
terms of nuclear weapons. This implies that the law does not determine moral 
consciousness and political principles.  
Is the possession of nuclear weapons politically reasonable and their acquisition 
economically rational by any State? It should be recalled that there is no existing 
international treaty out rightly banning the existence of nuclear weapons and as such, 
it should be recalled that recourse must be made to other sources of international law 
to ascertain the international legal principles regulating nuclear armaments. 
International law can come into force by any or all of these three recognised 
mechanisms: international treaties and international convention, accepted as 
evidence of the general practice of States or general principles of law accepted by 
States, judicial decisions and juridical and writings of publicists as subsidiary means 
and determination of law.400 
In practical procedure terms, there is an extensive State practice dealing with the 
conduct of nuclear weapons. Pogany points that this range from specific bilateral and 
multilateral regional and international agreements to the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) 
Resolutions. The United Nations resolutions are recommendatory but they constitute 
the necessary obligatory elements of State practice that create customary international 
law binding on all.401  The various United Nations resolutions on nuclear disarmament 
revolve around the central legal questions of whether the use and the deployment of 
nuclear weapon are lawful. Most of the discussions on the legality of nuclear weapons 
are predicated on the applicability of the general principles to nuclear weapons. The 
nature of nuclear weapons and their destructive capabilities has affected the 
perception of many analysts as pointed out by Pogany. 
In the face of the actual possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS and the adoption 
of the policy of opacity or strategic ambiguity by some NNWS, it is very difficult to 
legally prove that possession and acquisition of nuclear weapons are unlawful. This 
unambiguous perception is the bane and the major shortfall of the law in the midst of 
the existence of nuclear weapons in the world. International law either by virtue of 
general principles or by specific provisions does adequately control the use of nuclear 
weapons. This is regrettable not only because of the lethality of these weapons but 
also by the virtue of impotency of the law faced by the threat of nuclear weapons.  
According to Pogany, as a substantive means of international law, the ICJ advisory 
opinion on the legality of the threat or otherwise of the use of nuclear weapons 
characterised by the consciousness of the risks of the continuing existence and 
development of nuclear weapons pose to humanity and the complete elimination of 
these weapons is the only guarantee against these risks.402 
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Pogany explains that as a result of the present recrudescence of anxiety and acrimony 
arising from the very existence of nuclear weapons, there is a widespread feeling that 
the nuclear arm race had become uncontrolled and uncontrollable, thereby casting 
doubt on the superpowers agreement to put a clamp on the upward escalation in 
numbers and sophistication of the their devastating nuclear armouries.403 In evaluating 
the position of certain customary international law, special attention and persuasion 
must be given to NWS and their allies.  
This book, Nuclear Weapons and International Law has a selection of essays by 
British and North American international legal scholars who use the law to explain the 
illegality of the use, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons, the history and 
efficacy of arms control agreements, legal controls on the proliferation of nuclear 
weapon and the establishment of nuclear-free zones. This book with 9 chapter and 
245 pages is very consequential for this research. However, it does not examine any 
moral concern and political considerations as veritable options in nuclear disarmament 
discourse. 
Elli Louka: Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law.404  
The existence of nuclear weapons in the midst of the law which nuclear disarmament 
seek to acquire and the concept of justice is one of the central problems of the twenty-
first century.405 Nuclear power is globally relied upon for energy and increasingly, a 
number of States incorporate nuclear weapons into their defence system. 
Consequently, nuclear technology may proliferate and spread such that, States 
including the ones with nuclear warheads may not be able to exercise the use of 
nuclear capabilities.  
As explained by Louka, non-governmental entities may acquire and conspire to use 
nuclear energy in a destructive form. Nuclear weapons have been hitherto the 
exclusive prerogative of small number of the most powerful States in the world. But 
now, they have been proliferated. The deterrence defence theory which became 
palpably dynamic amongst the nuclear club during the Cold War epoch and already 
helped to keep the world from nuclear annihilation may be a mere illusion instead of a 
solution The reason for selecting this text book is because the author deals 
comprehensively with some core issues essential for this present research. 
In the view of Louka, the Cold War was characterised by salient questions such as: 
how many weapons were enough? What are their destructive capabilities? And at 
what target and what degree of certainty of their delivery accuracy?406 The politics of 
nuclear weapons imply changing the operational strategies of the battlefield of a future 
of the post World Wars era.407  
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The utility of nuclear weapons become clear when war is viewed as a stamina exercise 
between populations rather than military defence against external aggressions.408 
Nuclear weapons have psychological effects. Their use is retributive as their target 
becomes example and act as deterent to potential aggressors. The psychologically 
crippling effects and the combination of lethality of nuclear weapons shapes the 
concept of warfare as an exhibition of military might that decisively disheartens and 
defeat any force of adversary.409 
Supposing that the more practical, the less destructive and the less catastrophic 
nuclear warheads become widely available, the difference between nuclear and 
conventional weapons will disappear into oblivion. It is quite clear that if nuclear 
weapons are used within the next 15 – 20 years, the international community will be 
shocked and the kind of institutional response such use will generate will be difficult to 
predict.410  If they are used, the less destruction nuclear weapons will cause, the more 
legitimate they will become.411 
From the fore going, this book of 440 pages with 11 chapters offers an unflinching 
assessment of the uses and potential abuses of nuclear instrument both presently and 
in the projected future of interlocking international belligerency as it pertains to 
international law and politics. However, the concept of justice as regarding nuclear 
weapons is not enunciated and the law is not elucidated in this book.  In chapter 9, the 
author refers to the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the 
Legality of the Threat or Otherwise of the Use of nuclear weapons in the light of the 
survival of the States. This does not adequately explain the legal framework regulating 
the non-proliferation on nuclear disarmenent.  
In chapter 4, Elli Louka, captures the architecture of nuclear non-proliferation order 
through the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT). She identified deficiencies 
associated with the NPT, including the division of States into nuclear-weapons-haves 
and nuclear-weapons-have-nots; and the loose links between non-proliferation 
principles and nuclear disarmament. The later implies that the principle of non-
proliferation is difficult to uphold because it requires draconian punitive measures of 
enforcement. 
Louka explains the principles of humanitarian law against the backdrop of the use of 
nuclear weapons in war. She demarcates the concept of necessity from that of 
proportionality in warfare involving nuclear weapons. On the one hand, necessity in 
the conduct of war is tantamount to the concept of military necessity. Meaning, war is 
considered as a last resort when other means of peaceful settlement of a dispute have 
been exhausted.412 On the other hand, proportionality in the conduct of war centres 
on the combatants and civilians causalities. Proportionality also involves an overall 
evaluation between the destruction by war to the enemy state and the interests and 
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values that must be protected by engaging in a war.413 Louka does not argue the use 
of nuclear weapon may amount to war crime. 
Consequently, the author neither identifies nor situates the place of nuclear weapons 
in these concepts of necessity and proportionality in the light of the principle of 
international humanitarian law. Fundamentally, either of the concepts does not justify 
nor support the use of nuclear weapons in war. If nuclear weapons are used in war 
under the concept of necessity, it then negates the principle of the doctrine of 
deterrence and if nuclear weapons are used under the concept of proportionality, it 
could well lead to Third World War in place as this may involve at least two Nuclear 
NWS and their allies with the resultant effects of unimaginable catastrophic effects 
arising from the use of nuclear warheads. 
Sidney D. Drell: Facing the Threat of Nuclear Weapons.414 This book is given 
utmost consideration for review as part of the literature for this research by the 
researcher, because it is one of the ablest with constructive and neutral analysis of the 
controversy of nuclear disarmament discourse. As credence to its selection, it is a 
thought provoking piece written by an internationally acclaimed theoretical and 
professorial physicist. The author examines the nature and the magnitude of the threat 
posed by nuclear weapons. The book explains the technical realities of nuclear 
weapons and how these realities limit the options for policy by policy makers. 
The author emphatically examines the arms control approaches that can reduce the 
threat of nuclear weapons, the need for government to make effective use of scientific 
advice and the demonstration of the importance of public opinion for making progress 
in arms limitations. These views of the author of approximately three decades ago are 
contemporaneous with the World Court Project that resonated in the concept of The 
Public Conscience, which is highly esteemed in international law. 3.6 million 
Declarations of Public Conscience, stating the belief of ordinary citizens that nuclear 
weapons are immoral and unethical, were sampled globally in 36 languages, 110,000 
of the sampled collected were from the United Kingdom. This Declarations of Public 
Conscience was officially received by the Registrar of the World Court with the 
attention of all the judges.415 
In the same vein, the writer acknowledges the fact that the unprecedented scale of 
destruction and devastation inherent in nuclear weapons present humanity with 
fundamental moral issues. The researcher appraises the author for his moral concern 
and analysis about nuclear weapons, because as a scientist, it would have been 
natural for the author to have addressed the issues of nuclear weapons, war and 
peace with scientific or technologic orientations devoid of moral concerns. However, 
the author posits that the avoidance of nuclear holocaust is the absolute and moral 
imperative of our time.416 
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Remarkably, the author in his analysis balances the controversy associated with the 
doctrine of nuclear deterrence. Nuclear deterrence is the key concept of the nuclear 
age and it has stood the test of time for decades. A clear understanding of what 
deterrence means must underpin any discussion or explanation of nuclear policy and 
weapons.417 Based on the balanced analysis of nuclear deterrence in this book, the 
book stands to serve as veritable source for this research.  
Dimitris Bourantonis: The United Nations and the Quest for Nuclear 
Disarmament.418 This book is being reviewed as part of the literature of this research 
because it focuses on the role the United Nations has played and still playing in the 
negotiation process of nuclear disarmament. The book poses some questions crucial 
for the elucidation of the research in view of the United Nations disarmament 
negotiations: what was the particular policy or approach of the United Nations to 
nuclear disarmament at any given time? To what extent was there broad consensus 
amongst the United Nations membership on disarmament? And was the United 
Nations afforded with primary or secondary responsibility in dealing with nuclear 
disarmament negotiations? 
In seeking answers to these questions, the primary sources of this research which 
include: United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions and United Nations 
Security Council (UNSC) resolutions on disarmament, Multilateral and International 
Treaties, Conventions, and Declarations on disarmament have been accessed 
through the database of the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs. Also, there 
are several publications and articles which are specifically on nuclear weapons 
disarmament in the website of the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Research 
in Geneva, Switzerland; as well as the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the use of Nuclear Weapons.  
This book as a secondary source material complements the various United Nations 
General Assembly and Security Council resolutions on nuclear disarmament. The 
author evaluates the role of the United Nations as a regulator of nuclear disarmament 
and the conditions which can make the UN more effective. The UN’s effectiveness 
which depends on the reliance of the readiness of its member States will likely have 
limited effect, therefore, the UN need to have an enforcement mechanism in the field 
of disarmament.419  
The United Nations as a non-supranational entity and authority means that the 
potential for the attainment of its goals on disarmament implies a comprehensive 
regime. The member States do not only determine what UN action and policy should 
be adopted at any given time but also the means by which to accomplish this policy. 
Hence, the United Nations Charter urges all member States to give the UN all 
necessary assistance.420 
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Han Blix: Why Nuclear Disarmament Matters.421 The selection of this book for 
literature review is predicated on its precise introduction of history, state of affairs and 
the continued relevance of nuclear disarmament. The author presents valuable 
preposition on how to move the disarmament agenda forward. This book is 
consequential for this research because it approaches its theme from the legal 
perspective. In chapter two, entitled Globalisation of Law, the author explains that 
since the end of the Second World War there have been a tremendous consolidation 
and expansion of international law and as a consequence, continuing issues including 
those of hard core security are settled through international legal system.422 
Nevertheless, the writer does not dwell much on the legality of nuclear weapons as 
such. Rather, he focuses on the structure of the international system, specifically, the 
role of the United Nations Security Council. While acknowledging the enormous 
security threats posed by the spread of nuclear weapon to the so-called rogue States, 
he cautions against pre-emptive military action aimed at stopping such proliferation. 
His argument is such that an over stretch of legal prerogative by the United Nations or 
individual States with superior military capability would diminish the international rule 
of law, thereby undermining the long term shared security of all. His recommendatory 
view is that States must ensure security without nuclear weapons and this possibility 
obliterates the tendency to acquire them.423   
Presumably, this assertion is possible according to Blix, in a world where the rule of 
law has been globalised. However, it remains unclear to the researcher whether the 
globalisation of law posited by the author is a necessary condition for nuclear 
disarmament or a pre-condition for acquiring nuclear weapons. Generally, this book 
places nuclear disarmament on the international agenda as it analytically brings 
objectivity to the debate.    
John Fennis, Joseph M. Boyle, and Germain Grisez: Nuclear Deterrence, 
Morality and Realism.424 The clarity and precision with which the authors set out the 
arguments about the morality of nuclear deterrence through this book influenced its 
selection as part of the literature review of this research. Nuclear deterrence requires 
objective ethical analysis. In providing this analysis, the authors address the realities 
of nuclear weapons threat, nuclear holocaust and strategic nuclear weapon as 
imperative. In unmasking moral evasions, deterrence cannot be bluff, pure 
counterforce of the lesser evil or a greater evil, or a step toward disarmament. 
Writing within the influence of the Roman Catholic tradition, the writers of this book 
base their belief on a strict construction of the rule derived from the ‘common morality 
of the Judaeo- Christian tradition’.425 They stress the forbidding of the killing of the 
innocent, especially the innocent non-combatants during warfare. Obviously, any 
action which kills such innocent people is nothing but pure murder and as such, any 
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intention which embraces such killing is an immorally inclined intention not different 
from crime against humanity. 
This belief of the writers of this book is in conformity with part of the jurisprudential 
rationale of this research embedded in the ‘natural law theory of morality’. Natural law 
of morality centres on what is right and what is wrong. The principles of right and wrong 
are found in the various sacred books, such as Koran and the Bible (scriptures), 
doctrine of the church, papal decrees, and the decisions of the ecclesiastic courts and 
council.426 Human law that are inconsistent with divine principle of morality are 
basically invalid and they should neither be enforced nor obeyed.427  
Also, the researcher acknowledges the influence of St Thomas Aquinas views on the 
authors. St. Thomas Aquinas (1225 – 74), was an Italian philosopher and theologian. 
Aquinas was the originator and leading exponent of divine natural law and the most 
influential thinker of the medieval epoch that produced powerful philosophical 
synthesis. This sythensis combined Aristotelian and Neo-platonic elements with a 
Christian context in an original and ingenious manner, whose works underpinned the 
natural law theory of this research.428 
The Researcher’s Reflection on the Aforementioned Book 
Through this book, the horizon of the researcher has been broaden, as it pertain to 
the ambivalence of the U.S atomic bombing during the Second World War and the 
present day deterrent policy, which is laden with foreseeable consequences. Though, 
it is worth pointing out that deterrence does not intend any destructive consequence, 
however the political leaders have opened the possibility wth reference to the scope 
and magnitude of both conditionally and unconditionally implementing it. 
Nevertheless, there is a credit to the proponents of deterrence. It could be argued that 
deterrence has ensured avoidable nuclear war and produces a kind of peace with the 
recognition of moral responsibility. However, such peace can be overshadowed by 
tyranny with no guarantee against a war involving some use of nuclear weapons. 
There is an identifiable gap of moral responsibility to resist the hegemony of the 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) by the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS). This 
moral responsibility can only be breached with the violation of more binding moral 
requirements. The NNWS over time have rejected arguments based upon a 
comparison of the consequences of the successful deterrence with those of failure to 
deter. The Kantian ethics of duty of always to do always what we would wish everyone 
to do429 is a dichotomous issue not only identified as gap in this literature but also an 
integral aspect of the entire research on which the research need to strike a balance. 
The condemnation attributable to deterrence theory rests upon the intention of those 
who espouse the policy. The theory proposes that nuclear weapons are intended to 
deter other States from launching attacks with their nuclear weapons through the fear 
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of retaliation usually occasioned by concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD).430 
The deterrence theory inherently presupposes and promotes nuclear proliferation 
against the axiomatically accepted nuclear non-proliferation obligations codified in the 
various multilateral treaties. However, ‘common morality’ is considered absolute, yet 
deterrence is adjudged suitably acceptable by most upholder of common morality.431 
These divergent views on deterrence are indices of an in depth analysis required of 
the research in its critical analysis. This is because they are different grounds for the 
condemnation of deterrence, use of nuclear weapons and disarmament. 
Further to the explicit analysis of this book, the researcher understands that the 
objective of nuclear deterrence is to prevent nuclear war.  Deterrence does not actually 
imply killing, but it is criticised for moral deformation of those who holds the conditional 
intention.432 The incommensurability of goods and evils is a major logic deduced by 
the researcher in deciphering the core issues of the deterrence debate.  
Wade L. Huntley, Kazumi Mizumoto, and Mitsuru Kurosawa: Nuclear 
Disarmament in the Twenty-first Century.433 
This book is deemed necessary for review by the researcher for this research, as its 
offers an elucidating analysis of the present state, retrospect and prospects of nuclear 
disarmament in the wake of the twenty-first century. The authors, combine a sensible 
appraisal of nuclear disarmament initiatives made in the last decades with a proactive 
proposal and agenda for the next decades. In contradistinction to conventional 
perception, their contributions propose that the snowballing global cache, 
accumulations, and proliferations of nuclear weapons is diminishing the nuclear 
disarmament initiatives of recent years.  
By the examination of the emerging circumstances of the twenty-first century, 
characterised by subject-based perspectives of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
disarmament, this book unravels how the possibility of enduring uncertainty and 
change in global issues create prospects and the need for reactivated progress toward 
nuclear disarmament. Consequently, the researcher considers this book very 
insightful because since the beginning of the twenty-first century, nuclear weapons 
and nuclear disarmament have crucially dominated the international domain in terms 
of the actions and inactions of States with regard to State policy and State practice. 
The twenty-first century has been till today the most innovative century in human 
history characterised by technological advancement and achievements. Living in the 
twenty-first century also has the threat of untamed spread and proliferation of nuclear 
weapons and nuclear materials as well as nine States possessing nuclear weapons 
and several States with nuclear ambition and capability. It is imperatively crucial to 
accentuate the necessity for nuclear disarmament. Hence, this book is not only 
valuable for this research but also underscores the exigency of the time of this 
research. 
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V.R. Raghavan: Global Nuclear Disarmament: Geopolitical Necessities.434 
As the title implies, this book is a compendium of ten global contributors to the 
necessity of nuclear disarmament across geopolitical lines, edited by V.R. Raghavan. 
The contributors are made of - five academics, two former Ambassadors, one retired 
army General with a doctoral degree and former commandant of the New Delhi 
National Defence College, and two researchers in international security, nuclear non-
proliferation and nuclear disarmament issues. 
The rationale behind the selection of this book for review is predicated on the several 
important issues it addresses in the wake of the push for disarmament initiatives. 
These issues include “lower arsenal level which can be reached by Nuclear Weapon 
States and speed with which such can be attained.”435 Motivated by his enriching 
contents which include: “Pathways to Nuclear disarmament and Time Challenges”; 
“Nuclear Doctrines and Nuclear Disarmament”; and “Geopolitical Conditions Enabling 
Nuclear Disarmament”, the researcher explores a comprehensive analysis of the 
imperatives for nuclear disarmament to address the determinants of the de-
legitimation pathway.  
The de-legitimation or de-legitimization is a legal effort to prohibit nuclear weapons 
influenced by public opinion on the basis of humanitarian considerations.436 This is in 
conformity with the jurisprudential theory of Natural Law as ethical legitimacy for 
nuclear disarmament espoused for this research. On the basis of legal pathway, the 
NNWS are more vulnerable to the threat of nuclear weapons than the NWS when the 
need for Mutual Assured Destruction applies (MAD). Consequent upon the interplay 
between vision and action, this book synergistically synthesises the problem of arms 
controls and it examines disarmament measures as it pertains to the attractiveness of 
the vision of objective in a more thinkable decision making and, the assertiveness of 
action in equitably addressing the current dichotomy between the NWS and the NNWS 
in the imbalance of implementation and compliance of disarmament obligations and 
commitments.   
James Penner and Emmanuel Melissaris: McCoubrey & White’s Textbook on 
Jurisprudence.437  
This textbook is elucidative and quite suitable for usage and review for this research. 
The authors cover almost every aspects and facets of jurisprudence, philosophies and 
theories of law thus making the researcher to explore it as an appropriate guide for 
this doctoral thesis. The characterisation of this book includes the extensive discussion 
of the Concept of Law and the provision of analysis of the development of legal 
theories pre and post H.L.A. Harts’ jurisprudential contributions. 
Captivatedly, this book explicitly explains the complexities of the subjects with their 
sophisticated ideas without prolixity and over-simplification, thus, providing a solid 
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base for further research on its subject matters and as well motivating the researcher 
to daunt its topics with assertiveness in deducing the jurisprudential rationale for 
nuclear disarmament. Chapters are dedicated to major jurisprudential theorists like 
Thomas Hobbes, Immanuel Kant and John Rawls and putting theirs view in contextual 
perspectives to the extracted primary sources materials. Absolutely consequential to 
this research, the Hobbeans, Kantian, and Rawls’ politico-legal philosophies 
embedded in three sequential chapters of this book’s edition, are chapter 7 – “The 
Building Blocks of Law: Norms and their Nature”; chapter 8 – “Governing and 
Obedience” and chapter 9 - “Law and Adjudication” are veritably enriching and 
encoding. 
2.8.3 Identification of Gaps in the Literature  
In reviewing the above literatures comprising of scholarly articles and academic 
authors, the researcher identifies the following gaps which he considers as not been 
adequately addressed and thematically covered by the various writers.  
a) Absence of contextual examination of the analysis of nuclear weapons 
disarmament from the perspective of Philosophy of Law. The authors 
reviewed do not seem to have addressed the core issues associated with the 
research holistically. The contextual examination and analysis of nuclear 
weapons and disarmament matters from the perspective of philosophy of law 
underlying such discourse is obviously lacking in all the literatures. 
Consequently, the researcher has made an attempt to fill this obvious gap in  
section 2.2, General Jurisprudence: Philosophy of Law and in section 2.3, 
‘Relevance of the Concept of Law to the Research’. The focal point of Legal 
Philosophy is to explore the structures of reasoning concerned with the 
presuppositions of legal principles driven by the theoretical apparatuses by 
which human experience is interpreted.438 Thus, Legal Philosophy in this 
context cannot be clearly detached from the kind of enquiries undertaken by 
sociology of law in view of this research in relation to nuclear disarmament. 
Emphatically, there are quadruple dimensions of jurisprudence within the 
domain of law. The first and the most customary aspect of jurisprudence seek 
to analyse, explain, classify and criticise the whole bulk of law. Law books and 
legal encyclopaedias stand to represent this form of jurisprudence. The second 
dimension of jurisprudence compares and contrasts law with other academic 
disciplines such as Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology, Political Science, and 
other disciplines in the humanity and the social sciences. The third form of 
jurisprudence seeks to expose the historical, moral and cultural background of 
a particular legal concept. And the fourth type of jurisprudence centres on 
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finding answers to such abstract questions as what is law? And how do judges 
properly decide cases?439  
Based on the above, this research tries to demonstrate and justify how the law 
codified in the treaties on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament interact 
with International Humanitarian Law (IHL) in Chapter 3, section 3.4 and by 
extension societal value and belief system. The jurisprudential concept of the 
rule of law, legal ethics, and civil disobedience, extend further than political 
theory440 in all dimensions affecting the campaign for nuclear weapons 
disarmament. Legal theories require a principle or the rationale that will 
enhance them to be differentiated from the fundamental reasons of other 
theories and to identify what is pivotally relevant when analysing the different 
interpretations of the concept of law.441 
In specifically addressing the absence of Philosophy of Law or General 
Jurisprudence as an identified gap in the literature review, the thesis examine 
the jurisprudential theories of natural law, its relevance to the debate on nuclear 
disarmament in section, 2.4 and legal positivism, how it relates to this research 
in section 2.5. The concepts of natural law of morality and natural of legality 
presuppose that the universe has a divine order which naturally translated into 
an ethical and legal frameworks. An ethical framework for the ultimate good of 
humanity and a natural legal framework that negates the consequences of 
manmade. corrupt and bad law. 
As it relates to nuclear disarmament and the catastrophic impacts and 
humanitarian consequences associated with any use of nuclear weapons, 
humanity has ethical norms derived from wisdom and good conscience. This 
implies that humanity has the responsibility through the duty of States and non-
States actors to ensure nuclear weapons are prohibited and eliminated to 
obliterate the dangers surrounding them. The fundamental characteristic of all 
civilised human values to protect lives and the environment should take 
precedence over any persuasive argument on retaining nuclear weapons.  
Legal positivism as explained in section 2.5 is predicated on the claim that the 
proper description of the law is a commendable objective that needs to be kept 
separate from moral judgements in view the existing law, and in view on how 
the law should be upheld, developed or changed. Nuclear weapons and the 
concept of disarmament have codifications in various treaties such as the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the Non-proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons Treaty and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone Treaties. The 
description of the law on disarmament as codified in these treaties should by 
implemented by command of the sovereign that is State actors regardless of 
the merit or otherwise of the law.  
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b) Lack of comprehensive synergy between the legal challenges and the 
political considerations on nuclear disarmament.There is a lack of synergy 
in the literature review. The writers of the reviewed literatures do not synergise 
the legal imperative and political consideration embedded in the topic of nuclear 
weapons disarmament. However, Istvan Pogany in his book: Nuclear Weapons 
and International Law synthesises morality, legality and international politics in 
the analysis of nuclear weapons discourse, but his synthesis and analysis do 
not serve as a synergy to cover the existing gap between the legal concern and 
political exigency arising from the nuclear weapon non-proliferation and 
disarmament discourse. As a result of this notable gap, the research addresses 
in Chapter 4 the legal framework for nuclear disarmament and international 
challenges (politics) affecting the legal procedures for nuclear disarmament. 
In an attempt to fill this gap, the thesis examine the nuclear weapon states and 
their positions on nuclear disarmament from the perspective of international 
politics in chapter 4, section 4.2, in complementing the legal challenges 
associated with nuclear disarmament. The principles and perspectives of 
commitment of all the nuclear weapon states and other nuclear possessing 
states are predicated on their national and foreign policy statements. The 
nuclear weapon states have not yet seriously and conscientiously focused on 
the required steps needed for general and complete disarmament.. 
Nevertheless, there is an extensive and appreciative precedent of the United 
States of America and the defunct USSR in bilateral agreements regarding 
nuclear arms control since 1969. The United States and the present day Russia 
have been strategically limiting their nuclear capabilities by reducing their 
nuclear aramments through bilateral treaties. These treaties include the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Talk (SALT) held from 1969 to 1972, and the Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM) Treaty of 1972 and amended in 1973. 
As a political will and disposition towards disarmament as explained in Chapter 
1, section 1.1.3, entitled the world court project paragraph 4, there was a 
trilateral agreements (tripartite pact) amongst the US, the UK and the defuct 
USSR on the Limited Test Ban Treaty of August 5 1963. This treaty prohibited 
all nuclear explosions with the exception of underground tests.. 
As indicated in chapter 4, section 4.2, paragraph 7, the United States and 
Russia, which still hold over 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons are 
consciously reducing the size of the nuclear armaments. However, the general 
perception of other nuclear weapons states and non-nuclear weapon states is 
that these two states still need to reduce their nuclear weapons from thousands 
to hundreds to demonstrate the serious of their disarmament commitments.  
c) The legal gap between the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and nuclear 
disarmament. In the course of the literature review, the researcher discovers 
that the authors of the literatures appear not to establish the nexus between 
nuclear deterrence and the legality of the use of threat or otherwise of nuclear 
weapons. The doctrine of nuclear deterrence has military origin with 
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international political determinacy and it tends to have hold sway over the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons. 
Consequently, this research will attempt to fill this gap in Chapter 4, section 
4.4 – The Doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence: Military Illusion or Political Solution? 
Rationale for Disiarmament with allusion to the 1996 International Court of 
Justice Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Otherwise of the Use 
of Nuclear Weapons. This will explian how the international legal and political 
systems can be viewed as reciprocally autonomous but not self-sufficient.  
 
This thesis extensively examines the doctrine of nuclear deterrence with the 
view of trying to fill the gap between the legality of the use of threat or otherwise 
of nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence as military illusion or political 
solution to disarmament. As explicitly elucidated in chapter 4, section 4.4, 
paragraph 11, the ultimate determination of nuclear deterrence happens in 
nuclear crisis situation. Furthermore, in paragraph 13, nuclear deterrence is 
explained as a measure to dissuade a nation’s adversaries from possible 
nuclear attack by the corresponding threat of overwhelming retaliatory counter-
attack. 
 
As shown in paragraph 14, it could be argued that nuclear deterrence is not a 
recognised norm in international law. Viewed from the persperctive of 
international humanitarian law, both nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence 
constitute instrumentalities of international lawlessness and ambitious global 
political hegemony of the Nuclear Weapon States. In paragraph 16, it is 
deduced that the combination of military and political elements embedded in 
the doctrine of nuclear deterrence contravene the legal conditionality on 
disarmament.  
 
d) Lack of legal cases arising from the legal provisions on nuclear 
disarmament and question on legality of nuclear weapons. An outstanding 
deficiency or gap discovered from the afore-reviewed literatures is the total 
absence of legal cases arising from the ambiguity of some of the provisions of 
the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty (NPT) and by extension the 
entire nuclear disarmament issue. Upon further research, the researcher 
discovered that in April 24, 2014, the Republic of Marshall Islands (RMI) filed 
separate applications before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) against the 
five Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) recognised by the NPT and other nuclear 
weapon possessing states operating the policy of opacity or strategic ambiguity 
such as Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea that are not party to the NPT.442  
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Marshall Islands is claiming a violation of Articles VI of the NPT: “Each party of 
the treaty undertake to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measures 
relating to cessation of the nuclear arm race at an early date and to nuclear 
disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict effective international control.”443 This case has been decided by the ICJ 
and the outcome  was, the ICJ ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because no legal 
disput existed when application initiating the case was filed in April 2014 by the 
Republic of Marshall Island. 
In recognising that there is a gap of lack of legal cases arising from the 
discourse on nuclear disarmament in the literature review, this thesis attempt 
to address this gap in chapter 4, section 4.7, entitled the 1996 International 
Court of Justice on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons. In the 
two separate International court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinions: (i) on the 
legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons and (ii) on the legality of the use 
of nuclear weapons by a state in armed conflict, the world court judicially 
declared that nuclear weapons are subject to international humanitarian law. 
 
The ICJ expressed with deep concern the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences any use of nuclear weapons would cause and reaffirmed the 
need for all states at all time to comply with applicable international 
humanitarian law.The ICJ make references to earliest legal instruments and law 
of armed conflict all of which suggest the prohibition of nuclear weapons. This 
ICJ judicial position on nuclear weapons is the expectation of the global public 
on any legal case that would have hitherto arose from the question on the 
legality or otherwise of nuclear weapons in our world as well as any future case 
pertaining to the legal question on nuclear weapons.    
In addition to the above identified gaps namely:  
(a) Absence of contextual examination of the analysis of nuclear weapons 
disarmament from the perspective of Philosophy of Law;  
(b) Lack of comphensive synergy between the legal challenges and poltical 
considerations on nuclear disarmament;  
(c) The legal gap between the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and nuclear disarmament 
and 
(d) Lack of legal cases arising from the legal provisions on nuclear disarmament 
question on legality of nuclear weapons.   
The thesis analytically reinforces and consolidates the filling of these gaps in chapter 
3. Section 3.13 entitled the legal and humanitarian imperatives for nuclear 
disarmament.The legal imperative for nuclear disarmament are associated with the 
legal instruments that both explicitly and implicitly regulate nuclear weapons. There is 
no legal vacuum or gap in view of nuclear disarmament, rather there is a gap in 
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compliance of the legal provisions on disarmament. This gap in compliance 
necessitate the humanitarian imperative.The humanitarian imperative for nuclear 
disarmament resolve around the emergence of the concept of Humanitarian Pledge. 
The Humanitarian Pledge is an intensified global disourse on the humanitarian 
consequences arising from the use of nuclear weapons. The legal and humanitarian 
imperatives for nuclear disarmament are embedded in the deep concern on non-
compliance with applicable international law. 
2.9 Conclusion  
Indisputably, research methodology is an efficient necessity and a paradigmatic 
imperative crucial for a substantive doctoral thesis. In view of this reality and the 
various explicitly explained research methodologies and paradigms, this research is 
characterised by qualitative research methodology with the approach of the doctrinal 
legal (black letter law) research strategy. It is a qualitative research approach due to 
the emphasis on the in-depth exploration and crique of international treaties and 
multilateral agreements on nuclear disarmament rather than comparative legal 
analysis or quantification in collection and analysis of data. 
This research is doctrinal in nature because the doctrinal legal research method is 
concerned with critical analysis of jurisprudence or the philosophy of law as the topic 
involved is restricted or circumscribed to international law. Doctrinal research is 
strengthened by positivism with the worldview whereby the law is objective, neutral 
and fixed444 with emphasis on enforcement such as the existing of the legal framework 
on nuclear disarmament.  
The approaches needed in the black letter law include analysing, synthesising, and 
critiquing legal provisions in view of identifying the core legal problem which required 
further address. This involves a lot of background reading so much, so that the 
researcher is well versed in the area of law being researched.445 
Judging from the aforementioned backdrop and because of its focus on established 
sources of law, doctrinal research method which is usually a two-part process involving 
both sourcing for the sources of the law and the interpretation and critical analysis of 
the text is more predictable and time manageable.446 The adoption of the doctrinal 
legal method under the qualitative methodology in this research suitably underpins the 
nature and structure of international law and nuclear weapons disarmament, which 
constitute the main theme of this research 
Consequently,  Consequently, the various literature reviewed serve as a worthwhile 
research integration by bringing together the views of intellectuals and academic 
scholars on nuclear disarmament in the light of international law. The structure of the 
literature review is analogous to a double part format as it is classified along the line 
of a selected academic journal articles and a spectrum of selected academic 
textbooks. The authors of the scholarly journal articles are selected based on 
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contemporary publications on nuclear disarmament with regards to the norms and 
tenets of international law. In the same vein, the writers of the selected academic 
textbook are chosen not necessarily on the account of recent publications on nuclear 
disarmament but on the basis of nuclear weapons disarmament, international law, 
morality, deterrence, and international politics. 
All the reviewed literature combined have the tone of legal speculation, political 
considerations and the logical evidence of the strategic possibility of nuclear warfare 
and the seeming reluctance of the NWS to think about the unthinkable. Inferentially, 
nuclear weapons disarmament discourse is predicated on the strata of interests and 
ideas. On the one hand, political hegemony and military superiority represent an 
interest in the continuation of the existence of these weapons. On the other hand, 
power of ideas in reconstructing thinking about nuclear weapons resonates in the 
doctrine of nuclear deterrence, ethical consideration and scholarly campaign against 
nuclear weapons. These factors are derived from the views of the various reviewed 
authors of this research literature. 
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    CHAPTER THREE    
THE NUCLEAR ARMS RACE: HISTORICAL OVERVIEW, THE LEGAL 
ARGUMENTS AND HUMANITARIAN IMPERATIVES FOR DISARMAMENT 
 3.1 Introduction  
The 20th century witnessed revolutionary breakthroughs in every aspect and facet of 
human endeavours especially in the fields of science and technology. Within the 
technological inventions and scientific discovery of this century, nuclear science and 
the development of nuclear weapons came into limelight.447 In October 1939, just at 
the dawn of the World War II in Europe, President Franklin D. Roosevelt of the United 
States of America received a letter from the physicist Albert Einstein and his Hungarian 
counterpart Leo Szilard, drawing his attention that a bomb of extraordinary power 
could be manufactured by deriving the force of nuclear fission. Roosevelt accepted 
the request of Einstein and Szilard, urging the government of the United States to 
manufacture the unprecedented atomic bomb to beat the Hitler ambition to be the first 
to produce this lethal bomb.448 
For the next four and half years, the United States with the cooperation of the United 
Kingdom and Canada launched the effort to produce this bomb in utmost secrecy and 
it was code-named “The Manhattan Project.” This scientific effort led by Dr Robert J. 
Oppenheimer employed more than 200,000 workers and numerous thousands of 
scientists and engineers.449   
Eventually, the atomic bombs were produced and the first nuclear bomb took place on 
16 July, 1945 in New Mexico in the United States with a spectacular explosion to the 
astonishment of the scientists who manufactured it. As a result of the successful 
testing of the first nuclear bomb, nuclear weapons were consequently used in the 
bombing of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan during the World War II.450 
Note worthily, nuclear weapon or bomb is of two types: an atomic bomb and a 
hydrogen bomb. An atomic bomb works by splitting large atomic nuclei (fission) as 
uranium or more usually plutonium with usual release of substantial amount of energy. 
This is carefully operated or delivered with extreme caution as a limited size of this 
bomb can make it tends to blow itself apart before it all ignited. Howeve, hydrogen 
bombs use an atomic bomb to ignite nuclear fusion bomb. That is, fusing hydrogen 
istopes together to form helium which releases a much more amount of energy 
especially as the neutrons released by fusion part of the bomb makes the fission 
element more efficient.451 
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Based on the reality of the actual use of atomic nuclear bombs and as well as the 
possibility of the potential use of nuclear weapons, this chapter critically analyses the 
effects of the use of nuclear weapons against the background of the following:  
 The principles of International Humanitarian Law (IHL),  
 Nuclear deterrence: illusion or solution,  
 Nuclear non-proliferation order and  
 Nuclear Free-Zone (NFZ),  
 global advocacy for disarmament, the legal arguments  
 Humanitarian imperatives for nuclear disarmament amongst other 
consequential analyses.  
The appraisal of the historical antecedents and analysis of nuclear weapons has 
broaden the horizon of the researcher in the course of this research on nuclear 
disarmament. This purpose of this chapter is to examine the historical overview of the 
nuclear armed race against the background of the legal arguments and humanitarian 
imperatives for disarmament.This chapter, directly addresses the second research 
objective linked to the second research question in section 3.3: the use of nuclear 
weapons in warfare and the principles of international humanitarian law. It 
equally addresses part of the third research objective linked to the first research 
question in section 3:13: the legal and humanitarian imperatives for nuclear 
disarmament. The history of the nuclear arms race are interwoven with the principles 
of applicable international humanitarian law in terms of prohibition and nuclear 
disarmament.  
3.2 The History and Chronological Analysis of the Nuclear Arms Race 
In August 1942, the United States of America (USA) with the collaboration of the 
United Kingdom (UK) and Canada established the “The Manhattan Project” to 
manufacture the first nuclear weapon. This project, which provided over 20,000 
employments, cost $2 billion US dollars (equivalent of $25 billion US dollars as at 
2012); was coordinated by the United States Army Corps of Engineer under the 
administrative control of Brigadier General Leslie Groves and its scientific research 
directed by the famous American physicist Robert Oppenheimer.452  
On 16 July 1945 the government of the United States successfully tested its first 
nuclear bomb with the code-name “Trinity” in Alamogorodo desert in New Mexico. This 
bomb yielded 20,000 tonnes of Trinitrotoluene (TNT). Essentially, the date of this test 
historically marks the beginning of the nuclear age. The nuclear arm race is the 
exhibition of hegemony in nuclear warfare between the Unites States of American and 
the defunct Soviet Union and their respective military alliances from other States.453  
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3.2.1 The Nuclear Age: Atomic and Hydrogen Bombing and Testing 
The nuclear age was heralded with the atomic bombing of the cities of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki in Japan by the United States of America during the final stage of the World 
War II. The United States detonated a uranium (atomic) bomb over the city of 
Hiroshima on 6 August 1945, killing over 140,000 people besides many other 
casualties associated with radiation related diseases arisen from the destructive 
bombing. In the same vein, America also exploded a plutonium bomb on Nagasaki on 
9 August 1945, three days after the bombing of Hiroshima. In Nagasaki, an estimated 
74,000 people were killed while many survivors suffered from various degrees of 
deformity.454 
Following the devastating atomic nuclear bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the 
United Nations (UN) in its very first General Assembly resolution on 24 January 
1946455 called for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons and as a result 
established the United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) subsumed under 
the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) with a general mandate on nuclear 
disarmament discourse and questions.456 
In spite of this UN resolution on nuclear disarmament, the defunct Soviet Union 
detonated the nuclear bomb code-named: “First Lighting” as its first test in August 29 
1946 in Semipalatinsk in Kazakhstan.457 In a like manner, the United Kingdom carried 
out its first nuclear test at Montebello Islands off the coast of Western Australia and 
series of other nuclear weapon tests in Emu Field in South Australia in October 3 
1952.458 Amidst the existence of a legal framework in terms of the UN resolution on 
nuclear disarmament, what is the legal implications of the defiance of the former Soviet 
Union and the United Kingdom in their nuclear tests? The reason is not far fetched, 
absence of enforcement mechanisms and coercive force of the law on nuclear 
disarmament. 
Furthermore, the United States of America raised the tempo of the nuclear arms race 
by conducting the first hydrogen bomb test at Enewetak Atoll in the Marshall Islands 
in November 1 1952. This U.S. first hydrogen bomb test is said to be 500 times more 
powerful that the bomb used in bombing Nagasaki in Japan. Also, the U.S. exploded 
a-17-megaton hydrogen bomb code-named “Bravo” at Bikini Atoll in Pacific Ocean. 
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This massive “Bravo” test polluted a Japanese fishing boat called “Lucky Dragon” and 
had adverse effects on the inhabitants of Rongelap and Ultrik.459 
 
 
Sources: www.google.co.uk/search=images of atomic+hygrogen bomb  
As a result of the perceived horrific effects of nuclear weapons and the trend of 
continuous nuclear bombs detonation by some NWS, Bertrand Russell, Albert Einstein 
and other prominent scientists issued a manifesto on 9 July 1955, that warned of the 
impeding danger of nuclear war and  urged all governments to resolve disagreements 
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peacefully.460 In line with this manifesto, the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
(CND) was established in London in the United Kingdom and held its inaugural 
meeting on 17 February 1958.461 Still on the basis of disarmament, the Antarctic Treaty 
that banned all nuclear tests was opened for signature on 1 December 1959 in 
Washington DC. This treaty is surprisingly brief but effective. It prohibits nuclear 
explosions and all military activities such as establishment of military bases or 
weapons testing.462 
Contrary to expectations especially in the wake of the Antarctic Treaty which France 
is a signatory and the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolution on nuclear 
disarmament, France exploded its first atomic nuclear bomb in the Sahara Desert on 
13 February 1960. This atomic bomb had the yield of 60-70 kilotons. France 
periodically indulged in nuclear tests up till 1996 and moved the base of its tests to the 
South Pacific. As a surprise to world, the Soviet Union on 30 October 1961 detonated 
the largest and the most powerful bomb test ever. This bomb was a-58-megaton 
atmospheric nuclear weapon tagged the “Tsar Bomba”, conducted in Novaya Zemplya 
off Northern Russia.463 Obviously, this continuous periodic tests of France atomic 
bombs and the defunct Soviet Union successful conduct of “Tsar Bomba” without any 
international action undermine disarmament framework and process. 
In October 16-29 1962, there was the Cuba Missile crisis when the United States of 
America (USA) made a blockade of Cuba for 13 days.  The United States and the 
Soviet Union engaged in a tense political and military standoff for these 13 days over 
the installation of Soviet nuclear-armed missiles in Cuba just 90 miles from the shore 
of the US, discovered by the American surveillance aircraft in October 16 1962 that 
brought the world to the brink of nuclear war.464 Meanwhile, due to massive protests 
and demonstrations in Europe and America against nuclear testing, the Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Testing in the Atmosphere, Outer Space and Under Water, often 
abbreviated as either Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 
or Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) was opened for signature in Moscow on 5 August 
1963.465 
Regardless of the emergence of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, China conducted its first 
nuclear test on 16 October 1964 by exploding atomic bombs at the Lop Nor testing 
site in Sinkiang Province. A totals of 45 nuclear weapon tests were conducted by 
China: 23 atmospheric tests and 22 underground tests.466 China nuclear bomb 
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testsing lends crendence to the ineffectiveness of the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty and 
also undermines nuclear disarmament machamism. 
As a result of the unabated nuclear bomb tests around the world by some States 
exhibiting military capability and political hegemony and superiority, the Treaty 
Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco), also known as the Latin America Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (LANWFZ) 
was signed in Mexico City on 14 February 1967.467 The various countries in the Latin 
America and the Caribbean except Cuba unanimously came up with this treaty to 
declare their region to the world a-nuclear-free-zone. 
3.2.2 The Emergence of the Non-proliferation Era 
On 1 July 1968, the Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, generally 
referred to as the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was opened for signature.468 This a 
remarkable multilateral and international agreement among party States with the sole 
objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and technology, to promote 
cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving 
complete nuclear disarmament. However, the treaty recognised China, France, 
Russia, United Kingdom and the United States as Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and 
these States are also the five permanent members of the United Nations Security 
Council (UNSC), having undertaken legal responsibility for total nuclear disarmament. 
In spite of the legal responsibility for total nuclear disarmament by the NWS, 
disarmament efforts seem so slow and concept of non-prolferation of nuclear weapons 
tends to hold sway over nuclear disarmament. 
 
Not be a signatory to the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), on 22 May 1974, India 
conducted its first nuclear test in an underground test at Pokharan in Rajasthen desert 
code-named “the Smiling Buddha.” The Indian government tactically explained it was 
a peaceful nuclear device test not weapon and it has the technological capability to 
build a nuclear bomb.469 On 22 September 1979, there was a nuclear detonation test 
over the South Indian Ocean off the Cape of Good Hope. This test was carried out by 
South Africa government with the logistic and diplomatic assistance of the State of 
Israel.470 Worthy of acknowledgement, the secret of Israeli nuclear programme was 
revealed by Mordechai Vanunu, an Israeli nuclear technician, in September 30 1986. 
This revelation made experts to deduce that Israel might have up to 200 nuclear 
warheads produced prior to the revelation.471 However, the testings of nuclear bombs 
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by Indian and South African governments constituted a legal challenge to the 
effectiveness of the NPT. 
On 12 June 1982, one million people assembled in New York City’s Central Park in 
solidarity support for the Second United Nations Special Session on nuclear 
Disarmament.472 This gathering was the largest peaceful rally and anti-war 
demonstration in history.473 In July 10 1985, the flagship of the Greenpeace fleet 
known as the Rainbow Warrior (codenamed “Operation Satanic”) was sunk in the port 
of Auckland in New Zealand on its way to Murorua Atol to a protest against a French 
planned nuclear test by a special operation of France foreign Intelligence Services, 
the Direction Generale de la Securite Exrerieure (DGSE). French government initially 
denied responsibility, but two French agents were captured and charged by the New 
Zealand Police. As the truth was unravelled, the French defence Minister Charles 
Hernu resigned over this scandal.474 
 
On 6 August 1985 the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone (SPNFZ) of Rarotonga, 
commonly known as the Treaty of Rarotonga came into force.475 The treaty prohibits 
the manufacturing, stationing, possession and testing of nuclear weapons within the 
borders of the South Pacific zone. As a concerted effort to curtail the nuclear arms 
race, the defunct Soviet Union and the United States of America on 8 December 1987 
signed the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force Treaty (INF Treaty) in Washington DC. 
This bilateral agreement is officially entitled: The Treaty between the United States of 
America and the Union of the Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of their 
Inter-mediate-Range and Short-Range Missiles.476 While the efforts of the United 
States and the defunct Sovient Union are high acknowledged in terms of arms control 
and nuclear non-prolferation, France, China and the United Kingdom that comprise of 
the five NWS were not part of the INF Treaty. 
3.2.3 The Disarmament Age of the 21st Century 
As a welcome development, in July 10 1991, the Republic of South Africa acceded to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The South Africa government which publicly claimed to 
have manufactured six nuclear weapons have successfully implemented a 
disarmament process for the elimination of all its nuclear weapons.477 This gesture of 
the South African government demonstrate the peaceful existence of a State without 
recourse to nuclear deterrence programme. Is South African vulnerable to nuclear 
attacks as a result of giving up its nuclear weapons? Certainly not. The second 
remarkable event of the nuclear arms race in the 1990s was the December 15 1995 
South East Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (SEANWFZ) Treaty commonly call the 
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Treaty of Bangkok.478 The Treaty of Bangkok is a nuclear weapons moratorium 
agreement between the 10 South-east Asian member States. 
Also crucial to the history of the nuclear arms race was the 11th April 1996 emergence 
of the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty, also known as the Treaty 
of Pelindaba.479 Pelindaba is the South Africa main nuclear research centre serviced 
by the South African Nuclear Energy Corporation. 43 African nations signed this treaty 
in Cairo in Egypt, which prohibits the research, development, manufacture, stockpiling, 
acquisition, testing, control or stationing of nuclear explosive devices in the territory of 
parties to the treaty. In the same year (1st June 1996), Ukraine became a nuclear-
weapon-free state by transferring the last inherited Soviet nuclear armament to Russia 
for decommission.480 In a similar manner, Belarus returned its last nuclear warheads 
to Russia for dismantlement in November 27 1996.481 These States: South Africa, 
Ukraine, Belarus as well as Kazakhstan as pointed out in Chapter 5, session 5.2 have 
all undertaken disarmament process. This implies that nuclear weapons is not only 
possible but both plausible and freely achievable. 
Central to the legal concern and the general discourse on nuclear disarmament is the 
8th July 1996 historic and Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) 
on the Legality of the Threat or Otherwise of the Use of Nuclear Weapons. The ICJ 
established that the threat or use of nuclear weapons generally run contrary to the 
tenets and principles of international law.482 Still in 1996, the Comprehensive Ban Test 
Treaty (CTBT) was opened for signatures on 24 September.483 The CTBT is a 
multilateral treaty that was adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
ban all nuclear explosions in all environments either for military or for civilian purposes.  
The last episode of the nuclear arms race in the 1990s was the May 1998 India and 
Pakistan detonations of nuclear weapon tests. India conducted three underground 
tests, first of its kind after 24 years, one of which is a thermonuclear weapon. In 
response to the India tests, Pakistan also carried out six nuclear weapons 
subterranean explosions.484 In view of the global quest for nuclear disarmament, from 
the foregoing, the undercurrent is nuclear arms race which has also snowballed into 
the 21st century. 
3.2.4 The Nuclear Arms Race of the 21st Century      
As the world approach the 21st century, nuclear arms escalated with little progress on 
disarmament. However, the activities of the nuclear arms race in the 21st century 
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began with the Republic of North Korea conducting nuclear test in October 9 2006. 
The government of North Korea publicly announced its successful conduction of its 
first nuclear test and making it the total of 8 States that have detonated nuclear 
weapons as tests. On 25 May 2009, North Korea also exploded nuclear weapons as 
its second test.485 Following the same trend, in February 12 2013, North Korea 
exhibited its nuclear ambition and demonstration of nuclear weapon superiority by 
conducting a miniaturised hydrogen bomb test as its third nuclear weapon tests, aimed 
at intimidating other nations especially its South Korean neighbour.486 On 6 January 
2016, North Korea repeated this same detonation as its fourth nuclear weapons test. 
All these four North Korea nuclear testing actions that elicited international 
condemnation and sanctions are conducted underground.  
In defiance of international condemnations and the United Nations sactions, North 
Korea government from October 2006 till September 2017 have successfully 
conducted six nuclear weapons tests including Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) 
and Hydrogen bomb claiming of reaching the United States mainland. 
3.2.5 Continuing Efforts of the 21st Century to Disarament     
Remarkably, on 30 April 2007, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear weapon 
(ICAN) was launched in Vienna, Austria. ICAN is an organised global campaign 
coalition advocating for the disarmament of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, in 
continuing efforts in finding lasting solution to nuclear arms race and nuclear 
disarmament, the government of Norway hosted the very first inter-governmental 
conference to examine the humanitarian impacts of nuclear weapons on 4-5 March 
2013.487  
This conference brought together about 128 States represented by their diplomats and 
they exploit core issues associated with nuclear disarmament in the light of 
humanitarianism. On 14 February 2014, the Mexican government hosted the second 
phase of the conference on the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear weapons. This phase 
of the conference concluded that diplomatic process should be introduced in the 
nuclear weapon disarmament discourse. More so, the same conference on the 
Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons was hosted in Vienna, Austria on 9 
December 2014. In this conference, Austria made a challenging pledge to promote 
efforts aimed at stigmatisation, prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons.488 
3.3 The Use and the Horrific Devastation of Nuclear Weapons in the Second 
World War 
During the World War II (1939-45), The United States B-29 bomber named Enola Gay 
deployed and dropped the first atomic bomb code-named “Little Boy” on the Japanese 
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city of Hiroshima at approximately 8:15am in August 6 1945, instantaneously killing 
about 80,000 inhabitants, wiping out 90% of the city and tens of thousands more 
afterward dying of radiation exposure. Three days later, on 9 August 1945, the U.S. 
B-29 named Block’s Car dropped another plutonium implosion bomb code-named “Fat 
Man” on the city of Nagasaki that led to the death on estimated 40,000 citizens.489  
The bombing of these two cities occasioned by the Executive Order of the American 
President Harry S. Truman not only compelled Emperor Hirohito to acquiesce Japan’s 
unconditional surrender but remain the only usage of nuclear weapons in world 
history.490 President Truman’s order of America to use nuclear weapons against the 
defenceless population of the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki remains one 
of the most dispproportionated use of lethal weapons in the history of mankind.  
The perennial question of moral and strategic ambiguity embedded in the use of the 
atomic bombs on Japan elicits contemporary controversies and debates associated 
with the inherent dangers of nuclear weapons and their proliferations. Central to the 
nuclear weapons discourse is the legal concern and the position of the law on the 
acquisition or the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons and their use are 
impliedly prohibited in belligerency and warfare under existing International 
Humanitarian law (IHL) and customary international law. IHL has specified an 
approach to the use of weapons in warfare. The use of weapons that cause 
widespread, long term and catastrophic damage to human and the natural 
environment is highly outlawed.491  
However, the carnage of incendiary bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki clearly 
violates the principles of IHL. The city of Hiroshima during the World War II was 
Japan’s military headquarters and a major port, thereby made it a strategic target of 
the United States. The explosion of the “Little Boy” bomb was 1,900 feet above the 
city centre. The Crew members of the “Enola Gay” bomber jet used for the bombing 
of Hiroshima witnessed a thick fast rising smoke with intense spring of fires. The 
intensity of the temperature that covered the vicinity and the air, formed a fireball about 
840 feet in diameter which was calculated to reach over a million degree Celsius.492 
Within the duration of a second, the fireball which was seen more than five miles away 
was said to have exceeded the brightness of the sun tenfold. The wave of the 
explosion smashed windows for a distance as 10 miles and the impact was felt as long 
as 37 miles. Consequently, more than two-thirds (2/3) of the houses in Hiroshima were 
destroyed. Beyond the destruction of Hiroshima’s houses, hundreds of fires lighted by 
the thermal pulse joined to generate firestorm that incinerated everything with a radion 
of 4.4 miles of ground zero. Hiroshima was covered under thick churning foam of 
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flames and smoke that made Captain Robert Lewis, the co-pilot to exclaim “My God, 
what have we done?”493 
The chaotic condition of Hiroshima was made worst 30 minutes after the bombing by 
a torrential rain fall. This “black rain” as it is termed was full of dust, dirt, and soot with 
very many radioactive elements that sucked up into the air by the explosion. This 
heavy “black rain” caused serious contamination even in places that were remote from 
the explosion. As a consequence of the Hiroshima’s bombing, radio and television 
stations, were off air, telegraph system stopped working, transportation services 
abruptly stopped functioning, and military installations were shattered.494  
Like Hiroshima, the aftermath of the bombing of Nagasaki was horrific. About fifty 
percent of Nagasaki was destroyed. Hospitals were utterly demolished and as a result, 
care for the casualties was impossible. Schools, churches, homes, public buildings 
and transportation were flattened.495 The primary target for the bombing of Nagasaki 
was Kokura city arsenal but on reaching there, the American Air Men discovered it 
was covered by serious ground haze and smoke. Two years after the horrific bombing 
of Nagasaki, vegetation grew at ground zero, Sesame stalks produced 33% more 
seeds but about 90% of such seeds are sterile, human genetic aberrations occurred. 
Birth defects, rapid high rate of cancer and tumours affected the citizens of Nagasaki 
for decades.496 
These devastating impacts which have adverse effects more on the civilian population 
of the cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki are blantant violation of Rule 14 - 
proportionality in attack under the principle of distinction of International Humaniatrian 
Law. The rule of proportionality in attack is codified in Article 51(5)(b) of the the 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Convention and reinterated in Article 
57(2)(a)(iii).497 In the same vein, the rule of proportionality in attack is also contained 
in both Protocol II and Amended Protocol II to the Convention on Certain Conventional 
Weapons.498 The Rule of proportionality in attack of Additional Protocol I of the Geneva 
Convention is read thus: 
“Launching an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or combination thereof, which would be excessive in 
relation to concrete and direct military advantage anticipated, is prohibited”499 
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International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law are applicable to nuclear 
weapons, as they are to chemical and biological weapons, Anti-personnel Landmines 
and cluster munitions. Applying International Humanitarian Law implies enforcing the 
result of disarmament mechanisms and demands highly effective outcomes that would 
compel the NWS and other nuclear weapon-possessing States to comply with dictates 
of the law. 
The devastating bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki as well as any potential use of 
nuclear weapon clearly violate Rule 70 of the principle of distinction of International 
Humaniatrian Law. Rule 70 says, “The use of means and methods of warfare which 
are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering is prohibited.”500 
This prohibition is contained in numerous international treaties and instruments, 
inclusing the St. Peterburg Declaration501 and The Hague Declarations and 
Regulations.502 The chemical and biological weapons prohibition stipulated in the 
Geneval Gas Protocol originally motivated this rule. The reaffirmation of this rule in 
more recents treaties such the Additional Protocol I of the Convention of Certain 
Conventional Weapons and its Protocol II and Amended Protocol II,503 the Ottawa 
Convention Banning Anti-personnel Landmines504 and the Status of International 
Criminal Court505 all underscore its strong validity. 
3.4 The Use of Nuclear Weapons in Warfare and the Principles of International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL) 
Since the emergence of the nuclear arms race, the detonations of nuclear weapons 
has been denounced as contrary to humanitarian law and values. It is impossible to 
delineate how nuclear weapons would be compatible with the principles of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL). International Humanitarian Law also known as 
Law of War or Law of Armed Conflicts, are rules rooted in treaties, customs and 
general principles of law. These international humanitarian principles of law, which are 
set out in multilateralism, contribute to military manual on the law of armed conflict and 
the wide range of States practice.506  
Universally, there basic rules applicable as matters of customary international law and 
are consequently binding on all States irrespective of a State’s adherence to a 
particular treaty. IHL applies generally to all belligerent States, and aims to avoid 
cruelty, necessary to prevent suffering and destructions and ultimately to preserve the 
possibility of establishing an immediate and lasting peace.507 
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Customarily, the law regulating warfare is categorised into twofold: the law on the use 
of force – when States are compelled to engage in warfare (jus ad bellum) and the law 
on armed conflict – how war is conducted (jus in bello).508 For States to engage in war, 
they must demonstrate there is necessity for such a war, meaning, all other means of 
peaceful settlement have been exhausted and war is the only option of last resort. 
Necessity in the engagement in war is analogous to the conduct of military necessity. 
As codified in the Lieber Code: military necessity is grasped by modern civilised 
nations as consistency in necessity of those measures which are indispensable for the 
securing the ends of war and which also are lawful according to the modern law and 
usage of war.509 The concepts of jus ad bellum and jus ad bello run contrary to the 
doctrine of nuclear deterrence uphold by NWS to justify their rationale behind their 
nuclear armaments. The strategic aim of nuclear deterrence is to deter potential 
nuclear attacks for the prevention of at least a corresponding nuclear retaliation. 
Following the concept of military necessity, the principle of proportionality is a conditio-
sine-qua-non (necessary condition) in warfare. The principle of proportionality 
originates from an understanding of warfare as a catastrophic condition that requires 
the regulation of the law. Proportionality gauges the necessity of military action against 
the collateral damage, civilian objects and the environment caused by an attack. Not 
that it requires disproportionate action to the expected military advantage. 
Proportionality as a principle of IHL is codified in Article 51(5) (b) of Additional Protocol 
I and reaffirmed in Article 57.510  
In belligerency, proportionality can be evaluated in terms of both jus ad bellum (when 
countries can go to war) and jus in bello (how is war conducted). In their submission 
to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the Nuclear Weapons case and Nuclear 
Weapons and World Health Organisation (WHO) case,511 a good number of States, 
including States not, (or not at that time) party to the Additional Protocol I, invoked the 
principle of proportionality in their assessment of whether an attack with nuclear 
weapons would violate International Humanitarian Law. In its Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, the ICJ 
acknowledged the applicability of the principle of proportionality, emphasising that 
“respect for the environment is one of the elements that go toward assessing whether 
an action is in conformity with the principles of necessity and proportionality”.512 
Also, the ICJ in this Nuclear Weapons case addressed the principle of proportionality 
with specific allusion to the question whether proportionality could be applied to 
proscribe the use of nuclear weapons in war. Granted that nuclear war is associated 
with catastrophic devastation, most commentators will subscribe to the fact that the 
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principle of proportionality will mostly prohibits any use of nuclear weapons. However, 
the International Court of Justices adopted and maintained a balanced and qualified 
position “The Proportionality principle may . . . not in itself exclude the use of nuclear 
weapons in self-defence in all circumstance”.513 
Nevertheless, the ICJ clearly stated that it could not certainly conclude whether the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in the case of extreme 
necessity of self-defence, in which the very survival of a State would be at grave risk. 
Accordingly, Judge Fleichhauer of the ICJ succinctly expresses thus: 
Although recourse to nuclear weapons is scarcely reconcilable with humanitarian law 
applicable in armed conflict . . . recourse to such weapons would remain a justified legal option 
in an extreme situation of individual or collective self-defence in which the threat or use of 
nuclear weapons is the last resort against an attack with nuclear, chemical or bacteriological 
weapons or otherwise threatening the very existence of the victimized State.514 
In the light of the judgement of this case, the ICJ exhaustively examined how 
proportionality can inhibit the right of States to self-defence in the case of the United 
States and the Nicaragua515 as well as the case of Congo V. Uganda516 and the Oil 
Platforms case of Iran V. the United States.517 Article 51 of the United Nations (UN) 
Charter stipulates that States can act in self-defence if armed attack is taken against 
them.518 To determine the lawfulness of self-defence, the ICJ examines whether a war 
conducted in self-defence is lawful when viewed in the reasons that caused it (jus ad 
bellum) and whether the rule of proportionality was observed during the conduct of the 
war (jus in bello).519  
With reference to an attack against a State with nuclear weapons, what other 
circumstances can warrant the use of nuclear weapons for self-defence of a State? 
The answer to this question seems to have been provided by Judge Higgins of the 
ICJ: a State must desire to prevent the infliction of vast and severe suffering on its own 
population and there is no other available way to prevent a military attack.520 In 
acknowledging the difficulty associated with the application of the principle of 
proportionality to the use of nuclear weapons, other judges of the ICJ considered 
certain practical applications of nuclear weapons in conformity with the principle of 
proportionality.   
Judge Schwebel upheld that the application of the principle of proportionality to the 
use of nuclear weapons is difficult and the cases “at the extremes are relatively clear; 
cases closer to the centre of spectrum of possible uses are less so.”521 Consequently, 
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the use of nuclear weapons that will lead to “the death of many millions in 
indiscriminate inferno”522 is against the law. Furthermore, “the use of the tactical 
nuclear weapons against discrete military or naval targets so situated that substantial 
civilian casualties would not ensue”523 and would not be against the law. 
In the same vein, Judge Weeramantry dismissed any kind of proportionality in the use 
of nuclear weapons in armed conflict. In his dissenting opinion, he tenaciously opined 
that: with “nuclear war, the quality of measurability ceases. Total devastation admits 
of no scales of measurement. We are in territory where the principle of proportionality 
becomes devoid of meaning”.524 
Arguably, the use of nuclear weapons in warfare should be ispo facto be unlawful 
since there is much efforts and emphasis to limit the killing and suffering in 
conventional warfare and to regulate conventional weaponry. More so, for an action 
of self-defence to be proportionate it necessary implies that it must be restricted to 
repelling an attack and this position appears to support restrain in engaging in self-
defence with intuitive sense of proportionality.  
The legitimacy of engaging in warfare in response to proportionality must be judged 
based on the requirement of symmetry between the mode of the attack and the 
reaction to the attack. Jus ad bellum and jus in bello are distinct facts and facets of 
warfare. The politics of jus ad bellum (why a State should engage in warfare) should 
not override the legitimacy of jus in bello (how war is conducted).525   
In accordance with State practice, the prohibition on destroying or seizing property of 
adversary or attacking State unless required by imperative military necessity equally 
applies to the natural environment. The applicability of this rule to the natural 
environment is stipulated in the Guidelines on the Protection of the Enviroment in 
Times of Armed Conflict.526 This prohibition is adopted and supported by military 
manuals,527 national laws and official statements. The wanton destruction of the 
natural environment caused by the atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
amounted the violation of this rule of “… imprerative military necessity.” 
The 1996 International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion on the legality of the threat 
of use or otherwise of nuclear weapons posited that “respect for the environment is 
one of the elements that go to assessing whether an actions is in conformity with the 
principle of necessity.”528 Similarly, The Committee Established to Review the NATO 
Bombing Campaign against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia concluded that the 
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environmental impact of the bombing was “best consider from the underlying principles 
of the law of armed conflicts such as necessity and proportionality.”529 
Consequently, in the Fourth General Convention, extensive destruction of property 
“not justify by military necesiity is regarded as a grave breach of the law.”530 In 1992, 
the United Nations General Assembly in a resolution on the protection of the 
environment in times of armed conflict emphasised that “destruction of the 
environment by military necessity and carried out wantonly is at variant with existing 
international law.531 Also, the 1993 International Conference for the Protection of War 
Victims encouraged States to reaffirm as well as to ensure that the norms for 
international humanitarian law protecting the natural environment are respected.532 
Therefore, this implies that any potential use of nuclear weapons either advertedly or 
inadertedly will grossly violate the principle of imperative military necessity.   
International Humanitarian Law does not advocate for any violence, it prohibit infliction 
of unnecessary suffering and superfluous injury. Though the determination of these 
terms are not explicit in conventional warfare, the devastation of the use of nuclear 
weapons in warfare would unimaginably caused unecesary suffering and superfluous 
injury not only to combantants but also to the vast majority of the civilian population. 
The Principle of proportionality tends to protect potential harm to the cilivian population 
such that when harm occurs, it should be commensurate or proportional to the military 
advantage. However, given the catastrophic consequences associated with the use of 
nuclear weapons, it is virtually impossible that the principle can be applied to override 
protection or create an exception in nuclear conflict as proportionality is only applied 
when strike is launched against a lawful military target. The effective of nuclear 
weapons is indiscriminate and it does not delineate military target. 
3.5 Nuclear Fallouts and the Incidence of Global Nuclear Accidents: Imperative 
for Disarmament. 
One of the most likely factors that constitute nuclear fall out is through nuclear 
weapons testing. Also, in modern time, the most likely way for nuclear fall out to occur 
is through an attack by terrorist groups. The easiest way a militia group with unbridled 
inclinations for violence to unleash havoc in a society situated by nuclear power plant 
is to attack the nuclear installations for radiological fallouts and the contamination of 
the environment. After the Mumbai terrorist attacks in 2008 and 2011, the Indian 
government put in place extra security measures to safeguard its nuclear power 
plants. The Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions made provision for the 
prohibition of attacks on nuclear power stations: 
Works or installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes, and nuclear 
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object of attack, even where these objects 
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are military objectives, if such attack may cause the release of dangerous forces and 
consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other military objective located at or 
in the vicinity of these works or installations shall not be made the object of attack if such 
attack may cause the release of dangerous forces from the works or installation and 
consequent severe losses among the civilian population.533  
However, according to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), nuclear and 
radiation accident is clearly described as “an event that has led sto significant 
consequences to people, the environment or the facility.  Examples include lethal 
effects to individuals, large radioactivity release to the environment, or reactor core 
melt.”534 
The consequence of nuclear accidents has been a subject of endless controversy 
ostensibly since the construction and operation of the first nuclear reactor known as 
Chicago Pile-1 (CP–1) in 1942 and dismantled in 1954.535  
Historically, there have been 99 recorded global nuclear accidents at nuclear power 
plants. 56 out of the 99 nuclear accidents happened in the United States of America.536 
Amongst the deadly global nuclear accidents are: the SL – I accident (1961),537 the 
Three Mile Island accident (TMI - 2) (1979),538 the Chernobyl disaster (1986),539 and 
the Fukushima Daiichi nuclear disaster (2011).540 Similarly, nuclear-power submarine 
core meltdown and mishaps include: the K – 19 (1961), K -11 (1965), K – 27 (1968), 
K -140 (1968), K – 429 (1970), K -222 (1980), K – 314 (1985) and K – 431 (1985).541 
Some of the serious radiation accidents across the world are: the Kyshtym disaster in 
Russia,542 Windscale fire Northwest England,543 radiotherapy accident in Costa 
Rica,544 radiotherapy accident in Zaragoza, Spain,545 radiation accident in Morocco,546 
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Goiania accident in Brazil,547 radiation accident in Mexico City,548 radiotherapy unit 
accident in Thailand549 and the Mayapuri radiological accident in India.550 According 
to the International Atomic Energy Agency, a nuclear and radiation accident can be 
described as any event that lead to significant concequences on people, environment 
or facilities551. This may include lethal effects to individuals. However, radiotherapy 
accidents are errors or poor performance of radiotherapy which usually have severe 
concequences on patients. Thus, it is the effects of radiation accident that leads to 
radiotherapy. 
Nevertheless, between the durational frame of 16 July 1945 and September 1992 (47 
years) the United States of America continuously ran and maintained the programme 
of enthusiastic nuclear explosives testing,552 with a unilateral moratorium exclusion of 
November 1958 to September 1961. This unilateral U.S moratorium was predicated 
on the US, UK, and the defunct USSR informal moratorium observance agreement.553 
By official reckoning and documentation, the United States alone conducted a total of 
1,054 nuclear tests554 and the launching of two nuclear attacks, (the atomic bombing 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki). 
More than 100 of the U.S nuclear detonations were carried out in the Pacific Ocean,555 
over 900 nuclear explosions were conducted at the U. S. Nevada nuclear test site,556 
23 tests at Bikini Atoll557 and others on various sites in Alaska, Colorado, Mississippi, 
and New Mexico.558 Prior to November 1992, the bulk of the American nuclear tests 
were atmospherically conducted, (above the ground).559 Upon acceding to the Treaty 
Banning Nuclear Tests in the Atmosphere, in Outer Space and Under Water, 
abbreviated as the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) or 
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (NTBT) in August 1963, all American nuclear testing were 
restrained to underground for the prevention of the dispersion of nuclear fallout.560 
The continuous United States conduct of atmospheric nuclear testing during the 
aforementioned period hazardously exposed a vast majority of its population to 
nuclear fallout. The ascertainment of the exact estimate of people and the exact 
impacts has been fraught with medical uncertainty. Meanwhile, many Americans 
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especially the farmers and the citizens’ residence in the downwind cities of Nevada 
Test Site as well as U.S. military workers at miscellaneous tests, sued the American 
government for compensation and recognition of their exposure to the hazards of 
nuclear fallout.561  
Consequently, this led to the successful passage of the Radiation Exposure 
Compensation Act (RECA) of 1990 that provides for a procedural filing of 
compensation claims in respect to nuclear testing and for the employers of nuclear 
weapons facilities.562 According to official record of the Civil Division of the United 
States Department of Justice, over $1.4 billion has been paid in compensation with 
over $600 million was allocated to the downwind dwellers.563 
In the same vein, The United States government appropriated funds in 1964 to 
compensate the Marshall Islands victims who were exposed to the most disastrous 
nuclear fallout incident from the America nuclear testing programme of March 1 1954 
code-named “Castle Bravo” at the Bikini Atoll in Marshall Islands. Following this 
episode, the Marshallese government created the Marshall Islands Nuclear Claims 
Tribunal in 1988 to represent the interest of the affected Marshallese people claiming 
compensation from the American government.564 
The “Castle Bravo” an operation of American nuclear tests designed to develop 
deliverable thermonuclear weapons led to the detonation two and a half times 
magnitude than expected, reaching a yield of 15 magatons as result of technical error. 
The radioactive fallout seriously polluted the Japanese fishing vessel known as “Lucky 
Dragon”, which was sailing a long distance away of 145 kilometres downwind from 
ground zero. The 23 Japanese fishermen aboard the “Lucky Dragon” suffered from 
serious radiation poisoning that led the death of one crew member.565  
This incident of the “Castle Bravo” which is the largest nuclear weapon test ever 
conducted by the United States resulted in a deep diplomatic row between the United 
States and Japan that elicited international criticism of nuclear testing. The radioactive 
fallout from the test spread wider than 11,000 square kilometres. The traces of the 
radioactive materials were identified in Australia, India, Japan, the United States, and 
Europe.566  
The United States was one of the countries that quickly signed the Partial Test Ban 
Treaty (PTBT) in 1963 and the very first nation to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear 
Ban Treaty (CBTB) in 1996. Ironically, as 2017 at the time of writing this thesis it has 
yet to ratify the treaty, a pre-condition that is required for the CTBT to become 
enforceable international law.567  
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Given the potential of the legal validity of the CBTB and the global aspiration of total 
nuclear disarmament, there would be no need for any NWS or States with weapons 
programme to embark on nuclear testing. Therefore, the CBTB is both globally 
desirable and a prelude to nuclear disarmament. The aforementioned nuclear fallouts 
and the incidences of nuclear accidents are logically strong and valid arguments for 
nuclear disarmament as evidence exist that the vast majority of the global population 
are hazardously exposed to the consequences of such nuclear fallouts. 
3.6 The Nexus between Nuclear Energy and Nuclear Weapons 
The phrase nuclear energy which is interchangeably used as nuclear power has 
symbiotic interpretation with nuclear weapons since the beginning of the nuclear age. 
Globally, there are increasing numbers of people campaigning for nuclear weapons 
disarmament and at the same time these same people are in support of nuclear energy 
as a source of electricity generation.  Ironically, protest demonstrations against nuclear 
weapons have occurred in the front yards of nuclear power plants and campaigns 
against nuclear industry and technology have been misdirected as campaigns against 
nuclear weapons.568   
Nuclear technology uses the energy released by gashing the atoms of certain 
elements. The world produces as much electricity from nuclear energy today in 
comparison with the early years of nuclear power. Any State that has nuclear power 
plant has the potentiality of producing nuclear weapons. The nexus between nuclear 
energy and nuclear weapons dates back to the 1940s prior to the Second World War 
when nuclear technology was first developed in the famous “Manhattan Project”.569 
The Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) allows the transfer of nuclear technology and 
materials to State parties for the peaceful development of civilian nuclear energy 
programmes among signatories’ nations, in as much such nation(s) can prove beyond 
all reasonable doubt that their nuclear technology is not meant for the purpose of 
developing nuclear weapons. Article IV of the NPT stipulates that all the parties have 
the right to fully participate in the best possible exchange of equipment, materials, and 
scientific and technological information for the peaceful use of nuclear energy.570  
 
Factually, the technology for producing nuclear energy is the same as the technology 
for producing nuclear weapons. The conversion from peaceful to non-peaceful use 
only entails enriching the Uranium or simply reprocessing the fuel rods into 
plutonium.571 Uranium ore contains infinitesimally small (0.7%) of the fissile U235. 
Weapon grade uranium has to be enriched up to 90% of U235 (Highly Enriched 
Uranium – HEU), usually done through enrichment process. 
There are up to Thirty-eight (38) uranium working facilities in sixteen (16) nations in 
the world today. However, plutonium is a product of the chain reaction in nuclear 
reactors. It is separated by reprocessing the “spent” fuel that is highly radioactive but 
                                                          
568 Elli Louka, Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2011) 78 
569 Ibid 
570 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968, art IV 
571 Masahiko Asada, ‘The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and the Universalization of the 
Additional Protocol [2011] Journal of Conflict & Security Law 16(1), 3-34 
112 
 
no longer usable in the reactor in the fuel rods. The United Kingdom as at 2013 had 
the estimated stockpile of 112 tonnes of civil plutonium, the biggest in the entire world 
and only 2 – 10 kg of plutonium is needed to produce a nuclear bomb. In terms of 
global security, nuclear energy and nuclear weapons are the epicentre of military and 
political angst.572 One of the key challenges to nuclear disarmament is the NPT 
Provision of Article IV that allows nuclear energy for peaceful purpose. States tagged 
as Rogue or “Axis of Evil” cleandestinely use nuclear energy to develop nuclear 
weapons.  
3.7 The Institutional Perspective, Structure and Functions of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
The IAEA is an autonomous global organisation and the United Nations official nuclear 
watchdog that reports annually to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). 
When the need arises, the IAEA reports to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) in nuclear energy safeguards and security obligations in respect of instances 
of States’ non-compliance. The agency, which was established in July 29 1957,573 has 
its Secretariat in its headquarters in Vienna, Austria. Its regional offices are located in 
New York, United States; Toronto, Canada; Geneva, Switzerland; and Tokyo, Japan. 
The IAEA research laboratories are situated in Vienna and Seibersdorf, Austria; 
Trieste, Italy and the Principality of Monaco.574 
The IAEA operational safeguards system is principally enshrined in Article XII of the 
IAEA Statute,575 as well as in the Information Circular (INFCIRC/66)576 applicable to 
any State that has concluded Safeguards Agreement. Also, Information Circular 
(INFCIRC/153) is the framework for: The Structure and Content of Agreements 
between the IAEA and States requirements in connection with the Treaty on the Non-
proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT)577 and the various nuclear weapons zones 
multilateral treaties, which are: 
The treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco);578 the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty 
(Treaty of Bangkok);579 the Africa Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of 
Pelindaba);580 the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga);581 
and the Brazilian-Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials 
(ABACC).582 
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“With respect to any Agency Project, or other arrangement where the Agency is requested by 
the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall have following rights and 
responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement: (1) To examine the design 
of specialized equipment and facilities, including nuclear reactors, and to approve it only from 
the view-point of assuring that it will not further any military purpose, that it complies with 
applicable heath and safety standards and that it will permit effective application of the 
safeguards provided for in this article; (2) To require the observance of any health and safety 
measures prescribed by the Agency. ….”583 
Functionally, it is only the IAEA that regulates civil nuclear installations and materials 
in the world. Its ultimate priority is the promotion of nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes through developmental research and global practical application. 
Subsequently, the IAEA create and administer safeguards designs to ensure that such 
designs are not used to enhance military activities or actions.584  
Upon the request of any Member State of the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
and other international treaties on nuclear weapons, the IAEA apply safeguards to all 
consequential and miscellaneous activities; as well as mandatory comprehensive 
safeguards in Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) signatories to the NPT and 
sundry treaties on nuclear weapons.585  
In the discharge of its functions, the IAEA carries out its responsibilities in accordance 
with the purpose and principles of the United Nations (UN) Charter to promote peace 
and international cooperation, in conformity with policies of the UN for spreading the 
awareness of global disarmament through safeguards.586 
Under Safeguards Agreements, the IAEA has the mandate of verification. The agency 
inspectors customarily and regularly inspect nuclear facilities and records kept by 
States on the whereabouts of nuclear materials under their control; to monitor the IAEA 
installed instruments and surveillance equipment and ultimately to confirm the 
inventories of physical nuclear materials. These verification measures which are 
formal Safeguards Agreements between the IAEA and States ensure both the 
independent and international abiding commitments by governments towards the 
peaceful use of nuclear technology.587 
With the awareness of nuclear technological capability, the Non-proliferation Treaty 
(NPT) negotiators relied on the cooperation of States with nuclear technology to allow 
the IAEA verify their nuclear facilities to ensure compliance. But this possibility has 
been under strain after the 1991 Gulf War. For example, the UN mandated IAEA team 
of inspectors discovered that Iraq had clandestinely worked on the development of 
nuclear weapons in undeclared facilities, located adjacent to the facilities that had 
been declared to the IAEA under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement 
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(CSA).588 This is an obvious challenge not only to the IAEA but also to nuclear non-
proliferation and disarmament.   
 
There are four kinds and stages of inspection by the IAEA, they are: Ad Hoc inspection 
– this is initial nuclear report verification. Routine inspection – this is the common and 
regular routinely nuclear facilities verification. Special inspection – this is a 
supplementary IAEA inspections undertaken in the case of extreme necessity and the 
last is the safeguard inspection. The safeguard inspection is a verification visit to 
ensure, declare and confirm that nuclear facilities are in conformity with the safeguards 
design information.589  
However, the IAEA Additional Protocol is more elaborate and has a well developed 
structure of safeguarding, that permits expanded inspections with the most developed 
and contemporaneous practice. As a legally binding document, the Additional Protocol 
provides assurances for both declared and undeclared nuclear sites. There is a Board 
of Governors (BOGs) of the IAEA saddled with the responsibility of approving 
procedural Safeguards Agreements and the supervision of safeguards activities.590  
In practical procedure terms, when there is a case of non-compliance with safeguards 
commitment, the BOGs prevail upon the State in question to rectify the contentious 
issues. The process is not litigious. As a consequence, the Board decides on its 
referral on such issues to either or both the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
or the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).591 As at 2014, the IAEA Board of 
Governor have discovered and declared six States: Iran, Iraq, Romania, North Korea, 
Libya and Syria wanting in non-compliance with their Safeguards Agreement.592  
Nevertheless, the IAEA has fundamental functional limitations. The IAEA is not obliged 
by the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) to safeguard the five officially recognised 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS): China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the 
United States of America;593 which are also permanent members of the UN Security 
Council. This obviously elicits irrefutable criticism of the right on nuclear entitlement, 
sovereign inequality rational and the democratic deficit in the UN structure. The fact 
that the preponderance of nuclear installations and fissionable nuclear materials are 
in abundance in these five States further calls into question the IAEA lack of mandate 
to safeguards in the NWS. 
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Moreover, for more than two decades the IAEA did not discover the clandestine 
production of nuclear weapons by South Africa, Iraq and North Korea.594 Iraq and 
North Korea were Member States of both the NPT and IAEA; the inability of the IAEA 
to unravel their unbridled nuclear ambitions and nuclear facilities shrouded in secrecy, 
reveals the shortcomings of the Safeguards Agreements and the IAEA operational 
procedures. In European safeguards practice, the IAEA solely relied on the data and 
documentation of the European Atomic Energy Community (EAEC or Euratom).595 
Thus, Euratom may have undue advantage of safeguarding their own territory with 
possibility of compromise. On the other, the Euratom has an expanded mandate relied 
upon by the IAEA. 
The dual functional responsibility of the promotion of commercial use of nuclear energy 
and the safeguarding of peaceful use of nuclear energy of the IAEA generally known 
as “Atom for Peace”596 prioritises the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) over the NNWS. 
There is no civil nuclear industrial trade without the IAEA/NPT safeguards 
requirement. The IAEA exclusion by the NPT not to safeguard the five Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) supports the view of many developing nations over the years 
that the NPT is an attempt of the nuclear ‘haves’ to subjugate the nuclear ‘have-nots.’ 
A notable deficiency of the IAEA is the lack of its role to nuclear disarmament. The 
IAEA ough to have had an expanded mandate on nuclear disarmament and duly 
enshrined in its Statute.  
3.8 The Obstacles Pose by Nuclear-Proliferation to the Disarmament  
The challenge and concern of nuclear proliferation is global and as such, an effective 
response to ensure nuclear non-proliferation must have multilateral approach. The 
formation of the various universally recognised nuclear-weapon-free-zones in the 
various regions of both the southern and northern hemispheres stemmed from the 
codification of Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).597 The NPT is a 
multilateral legal agreement aimed at de-nuclearising and de-legitimizing the spread 
of nuclear weapons through non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy. These three fundamental elements constitute the basis of negotiations 
between the NWS and the NNWS.  
Article IX (3) of the NPT defines Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) as States that have 
“manufactured and exploded nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive device prior 
to 1 January 1967.”598 Therefore, all other States regardless of their nuclear 
technological capabilities or nuclear weapon possession are considered as NNWS. 
Regardless of the effect of the provisions of Article IX of the NPT which arguably 
polarise the nations of the world by legitimizing the status quo of five States: France, 
China, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States into the nuclear “haves” and the 
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rest of the world into nuclear “have nots”; the need to arrest the spread of nuclear 
fissionable materials and processes for nuclear disarmament was made possible in 
the contexts of the NPT. The aforementioned three fundamental elements of the NPT 
generally known as the three pillars explicitly explain the concept of the non-
proliferation order. 
Articles I, II, and III stipulate that the NWS are not allowed to transfer any nuclear 
weapon or material to any recipient, neither to assist, encourage, nor induce any 
NNWS to manufacture or acquire them.599 NNWS are prohibited from receive nuclear 
weapons from any transferor and are not allowed to manufacture nuclear weapons or 
acquire them.600 Also, NNWS are required to accept the IAEA Safeguards on all 
nuclear materials on their territory.601  
However, Article VI stipulates that all parties must pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures towards the cessation of the nuclear arms race and to promote 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict international control.602 However, the NPT does provide for the right of States to 
develop, produce and use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in Article IV, in as 
much as such activities are in conformity with Articles I and II.603 
Prior to the existence and the ratification of the NPT, the concept of non-proliferation 
and disarmament was envisaged in January 1946 by the very first United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution on the elimination of atomic weapons from 
national armaments.604 Non-proliferation as a global matter has received deserved 
attention in the recent past. In September 2009, the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) unanimously adopted Resolution 1887 that called for speedy efforts towards 
total nuclear disarmament.605 The facts that there are good numbers of existing UN 
resolutions on nuclear disarmament is in itself systematic of the limited effect of the 
law on nuclear disarmament.  
In a joint effort to consolidate the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, President 
Barack Obama of the United States of America and Dmitry Medvedev, the Prime 
Minister of Russia signed a legally binding New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty in 
April 2010 as a replacement of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty I (START I) and 
the Strategic Offensive Reduction Treaty (SORT) also known as Moscow Treaty that 
were moribund in December 2009. The New START which became forcefully 
operational in February 2011 is organised in three tiers and has additional rights and 
obligations to the basic rights that were contained in the two expired treaties. 
The global nuclear non-proliferation order witnesses the emergence of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty (CTBT) of 1996 which has been signed by 183 
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countries but yet to be operational until all 44 States with substantial military and 
civilian nuclear technological capabilities ratify it. As at 2017, States that have yet to 
ratify the CTBT include: The United States, China, Israel, India, and Pakistan. 
The CTBT is an expanded multilateral treaty aimed to replace the Treaty Banning 
Nuclear Weapon Test In The Atmosphere, In Outer Space And Under Water (the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty – PTBT or the Limited Test Ban Treaty – LTBT) of August 5 
1963, a tri-lateral agreement (tripartite pact) by the U.S., U.S.S.R. and the UK;606  and 
the Treaty on the Limitation of Underground Nuclear Weapon (Threshold Test Ban 
Treaty - TTBT), a bilateral agreement between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. in July 31 
1974.607 
To curtail the proliferation of unnamed nuclear weapons delivery system, the Missile 
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was formed in April 1987 by the G7 States of 
Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom and the United States.608 
The MTCR whose membership later grew to 34 countries in 2001 was supplemented 
in 2002 by the International Code of Conduct against Ballistic Missile Proliferation 
(ICOC) which later became known as The Hague Code of Conduct against Ballistic 
Missile Proliferation (HOCOC).609  
Some of the named nuclear weapons delivery system available to the Nuclear 
Weapon State (NWS) and other nuclear weapon possessing State since after the 
Second World War include: Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs); Multiple 
Independently Targetable Re-entry Vehicles (MITRVs); Sea Launched Cruise Missiles 
(SLCMs); and Submarine Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs).610 
In the light of the existence of the aforementioned nuclear weapons delivery vehicles 
and the intent to curb the ballistic missiles, the United States and the former Soviet 
Union signed the bilateral Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile System 
(ABM Treaty or ABMT) in May 26 1972.611 The treaty was terminated in 2002 following 
the withdrawal of the United States due to its National Security Council decision and 
the hitherto dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991. By and large, the non-proliferation 
order in itself is an obstacle to disarmament. 
3.9 The Indirect Contributions of the Five Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones 
(NWFZs) to Disarmament 
Practically, the willingness of many States especially the non-nuclear ones to 
continuously renounce the production and deployment of nuclear weapons that 
resonates in an ongoing effort in creating alternative security strategies in terms of 
regional and global policies is exemplified in the various nuclear-weapon-free-zones.  
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Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) according United Nations is based on as 
agreement, which a group of States has freely established by treaty, or convention 
that bans the use, development or deployment of nuclear weapons in a given area 
that has mechanism of verification and control to enforce its obligations. Any zone 
recognised by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), which any group of 
States, in the exercises of their sovereignty has established by virtue of treaty or 
convention whereby: (a) the status of total absence of nuclear weapons to which the 
zone shall be subject, including the procedure for delimitation of the Zone; (b) an 
international system of verification and control is established to guarantee compliance 
with the obligations of deriving from that Statute.612 
In the same vein, UNGA in 1975 recommended the following principles guiding the 
establishment of NWFZ: “(a) obligations concerning the establishment of NWFZs may 
be assumed not only by groups of States, including entire continents or large 
geographical regions, but also by smaller groups of States and even individual 
countries; (b) NWFZ arrangements must guarantee that the zone stay effectively free 
of all nuclear weapons; (c) the proposal for the establishment of a NWFZ must emerge 
from the States within the region and involvement should be of free will; (d) whenever 
a zone (NWFZ) desired to accept a region, the involvement of all militarily important 
States and preferably all States, in that region would enhance the effectiveness of the 
zone; (e) the zone arrangement must include an effective system of verification to 
ensure full compliance with the stipulated obligations; (f) the arrangements should 
promote the economic, scientific and technological development of the members of 
the zone through international cooperation on all peaceful uses of nuclear energy; and 
(g) the NWFZ treaty should have limitless duration.”613  
As a reiteration, Article VII of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) affirms the right of 
States to create Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) in their respective territory.614 
Pragmatically, in the 1995 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and Extension Conference 
(NPTREC), the State parties’ participants reaffirmed that regional de-nuclearisation 
measures enhance global and regional peace and security.615 Consequent upon this 
re-affirmation, the NWFZs have become conditio-sine-qua-non (necessary condition) 
for the nuclear non-proliferation order. Nuclear free zone means a zone that is free 
from nuclear weapons - bombs and nuclear warheads.616 How freely effective is a 
nuclear weapon free zone when it requires the free will of the States within its region 
to its formation? 
The universal recognition of the NWFZs will invariably or somewhat require the nuclear 
threshold States of India, Pakistan and Israel to establish de-nuclearised zones in the 
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South Asia region and the Middle East. There are presently five existing Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zones across the world (as at 2017). They are: The Treaty for the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of 
Tlatelolco);617 the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga);618 
the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (Treaty of Bangkok);619 the African 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (Treaty of Pelindaba);620 and the Central Asian Nuclear 
Free Zone (Treaty of Semipalatinsk).621 
The Treaty of Tlatelolco is a multilateral agreement for the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons in Latin American and the Caribbean. Latin American States except Cuba 
at Tlatelolco, a district of Mexico City, signed it on 14 Februar 1967. The treaty clearly 
provides for a comprehensive control and verification mechanism, regulated by the 
Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(OPANAL), headquartered in Mexico City. The treaty is annexed with two Additional 
Protocols. Protocol I binds all (overseas) nations (U.S., U.K., France and the 
Netherlands) to the terms and conditions of the treaty. Protocol II obliges all the NWS 
to desist from any form of undermining the nuclear-free-status of the region.622  
Does the exclusion of Cuba from the Tlatelolco NWFZ Treaty still make the Latin 
American and the Caribbean a nuclear Free Zone? Are there no enforceable 
mechanisms in place to ensure effective compliance? Do NWFZs exclude nuclear 
weapons in transit and their delivery vehicles such as nuclear submarines? These are 
pertinent questions seeking answers to ensure the Treaty of Tlatelolco is a NWFZ 
instrument in the Latin American and the Caribbean. 
In Article I, this treaty prevents and prohibits “testing, use, manufacture, production or 
acquisition by any means whatsoever of any nuclear weapons” as well as the receipt, 
storage, installation, deployment and any form of possession of any nuclear weapon” 
in Latin America and the Caribbean.623 For the purposes of clarity, Article 5 defines 
nuclear weapon as a device capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrollable 
fashion and possessing the characteristic suitable for warfare.624  
However, Article 18 allows, specifies, and provides for the procedures of testings of 
nuclear devices for peaceful purposes625 in as much such procedures are in conformity 
with the provisions of Article I.626 
The South Pacific Nuclear-Weapon-Free-zone (SPNFZ) Treaty generally known as 
the Treaty of Rarotonga is the second NWFZ treaty in the World. This treaty is a 
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multilateral pact and an official formalisation of Nuclear-Free-Zone in the South Pacific. 
The treaty was signed in April 6 1985 in Rarotonga, the capital city of the Cook Islands 
by the South Pacific States of Australia, the Cook Islands, Fiji, Kiribati, Nauru, New 
Zealand, Niue, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Island, Tonga, Tuvalu, Vanuatu and 
Western Samoa. The treaty has been ratified by all the State parties and has been in 
force since 1986 and these three States: the Federated States of Micronesia, Marshall 
Islands and Palau are eligible to accede to the treaty since 1987 but yet to join 627(as 
at 2017). 
This Treaty of Rarotonga whose duration is permanent in nature in line with the 1975 
UNGA guideline for NWFZ,628 remains in force indefinitely and has three Protocols 
signed by the five NWS with the exclusion of Russia which has no territory in the Zone. 
It is worth noting that China has not signed the Protocol I of this treaty. This South 
Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty is more stringent than the Treaty of Tlatelolco. In 
Protocol 3, the Treaty of Rarotonga prohibits possession, testing and the use of 
nuclear weapons within the borders of the zone.629 Similarly, in its Article 3, the treaty 
also prohibits receiving or requesting assistance in the manufacture or acquisition of 
nuclear explosive devices.630 
Furtherance to the prohibition of nuclear explosive devices in the region of the South 
Pacific, Article 1 (C) of the Treaty of Rarotonga defines a “nuclear explosive device” 
as “any nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, 
irrespective of the purpose for which it could be used.”631 Article 7 stipulates a ban on 
the dumping of radioactive materials at sea or anywhere within the South Pacific 
Zone.632 In line with this specific provision, the South Pacific NWFZ Treaty is appraised 
as “Nuclear-Free”, a notional connotation wider than “Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone” (it 
goes beyond banning nuclear weapons) that reflect the frequently advocated United 
Nations and other global organisations views on the complete nuclear disarmament. 
Another emergence of regional de-nuclearisation is the Southeast Asian Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty, simply known as the Treaty of Bangkok. The 
Treaty of Bangkok was signed on 15 December 1995 at a nuclear weapons 
conference in Bangkok, the capital city of Thailand by ten Southeast Asian member-
state of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The State signatories 
to the treaty are: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam.633 The treaty entered into force on 28 
March 1997 upon ratification634 and is to remain legally binding indefinitely.635 With the 
absence of China and North Korea, does the Southeast Asian still stand as a nuclear 
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free zone? Bearing in mind that China is a nuclear weapon state and North Korea has 
an open nuclear programme ambition resulting in its numerious nuclear tests. 
The Southeast Asian NWFZ Treaty includes the territories, continental exclusive 
shelves and the Executive Economic Zone (EEZ).636 The inclusion of the continental 
shelves and the EEZ is relatively novel concept introduced to this treaty. By “territories” 
the treaty implies: “land territory, internal waters, territorial sea, archipelagic waters, 
the seabed and the subsoil thereof and the airspace above them.”637 There is a 
protocol annexed to this Treaty of Bangkok upon which the five NWS officially 
recognised by the NPT accept the legal obligations to abide by the treaty and to avoid 
any contribution to the violation of its provisions; as well as not to use nuclear weapons 
or any threat of nuclear weapons against any member of treaty in particular and the 
zone in general. 
Like the treaty, the Protocol is permanently durational and each member of the 
Protocol, that is, the five the NWS: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom, and the 
United States or the treaty Member-States may withdraw from it. In the case of the 
Protocol, a party may withdraw if it feels that unusual events pertaining to the core 
subject matter of the protocol is detrimental to its best national interests. For the treaty, 
Article 22.2 provides for the right of withdrawal of any party with the giving of twelve 
months’ notice, consequent upon a breach by any other party at the expense of the 
objectives of the treaty.638  
The operation of the Southeast Asian Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone Treaty is reviewed 
10 years after its entry into force at a meeting of a Commission for the Southeast Asia 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone.639  “Amendments to this treaty and its protocol” ... can 
“be adopted by a consensus decision of the Commission”.640 
Based on the aforementioned provisions, any dispute arising from the interpretation of 
the Treaty should be amicably settled by the States party to the dispute. Within a 
month, if the parties to the dispute cannot “achieve a peaceful settlement to the dispute 
by negotiation, mediation, enquiry or conciliation” ... the dispute can be referred to 
arbitration or to the International Court of Justice.641 Judging from this scenario, if there 
is immanent danger of nuclear conflict or war would the States involve and their allies 
have the time to be patient enough to exhaust the mediation processes of negotiation 
and peace? 
The treaty ultimately prohibits the development, testing, manufacturing or acquisition, 
possession or having control over nuclear weapons both within and outside the 
Southeast Asian zone by its signatories. However, a party to the treaty may use 
nuclear energy for their economic advancement and social progression. Such usage 
including the use of nuclear weapon is not permitted by other States in the zone. 
According to the treaty, “nuclear weapon” is simply defined as “any explosive device 
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that is capable of releasing nuclear energy in an uncontrolled manner but does not 
include the means of transport or delivery of such device if separable from and not an 
indivisible part thereof.”642 
Before engaging in any peaceful nuclear energy programme in conformity with Article 
4.1, each State party as a matter of necessity must undergo the thorough nuclear 
safety evaluation in line with the safeguard requirements of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (IAEA) for the minimisation of danger and health protection.643  
As a super-power who alongside with the rest of the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 
double as permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the 
United State of America had shown concern (subscribed to) by other NWS that the 
extent of the Southeast Asian geographical zone is incoherent with the Law of the Sea 
Convention. That is, the normal movement of nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed 
naval vessels and aircraft through the Southeast Asian region will be constrained and 
regional security arrangement obstructed. China, had hitherto specifically objected to 
the inclusion of South China Sea in the geographical delineation of the Southeast 
Asian NWFZ. Given this China’s objection is the Southeast Asian region still viable is 
a NWFZ in its strict sense? 
The fourth globally recognised NWFZ is the African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone 
(ANWFZ) Treaty, generally referred to as the Treaty of Pelindaba. Pelindaba is the 
major Nuclear Research Centre in South Africa under the operation of the South Africa 
Nuclear Energy Corporation. It was in Pelindaba where South Africa manufactured 
and kept its Atomic Bomb in the 1970s. The ANWFZ Treaty was signed in Cairo, Egypt 
on 11 April 1996 and in July 15 2009 it became legally effective upon the ratification 
of 28 Party States. The African Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty covers 
the whole of the African continent as well as the island States and Archipelagos that 
are under the Africa Union.644 
The Treaty of Pelindaba like the Treaties of Tlatelolco and Rarontoga followed the 
procedure of NWFZ arrangements and its proposal was acknowledged by the United 
Nations on 12 December 1995. The ANWFZ Treaty bans the conduct of research, 
development, manufacture, stockpiling, acquisition, possession, control or stationing 
of nuclear explosive devices645 and the dumping of radioactive waste material within 
the territories of the respective African States that are signatories to the Treaty.646  
In Articles 3 and 5, the Treaty prohibits requesting, acceptance, encouragement or 
assistance of the aforementioned activities relating to nuclear explosive devices.647 
Article 1 (c) defines nuclear explosive device clearly in the same fashion, defined in 
the South Pacific Nuclear-Free-Zone Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). That is, any 
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nuclear weapon or other explosive device capable of releasing nuclear energy, 
regardless of the purpose of its uses.648 
With specific reference to the verification of the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), Article 6 of the ANWFZ Treaty requires the dismantlement and the 
disarmament of any nuclear device manufactured before the emergence and the 
coming into force of the treaty. Furthermore, all nuclear installations and facilities as 
well as their conversion to peaceful use should also be destroyed. All of these 
dismantlement, disarmament and destruction must be under the supervision of the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).649  
This operation is to dismiss all persisting doubts about some hidden nuclear materials 
and clandestine nuclear activities are still in operation in South Africa. This provision 
of Article 6 of Treaty of Pelindaba stands as a precedence or yardstick of measurement 
for future nuclear-weapon-free-zone agreements involving the participation of nuclear 
threshold States for disarmament. In view of Article 6 cited above, nuclear 
instatallation may have been situated in an African country which is not a signatory to 
the treaty and this may an obstacle to such a country as its nuclear facility is not 
allowed to be used for peaceful purposes. 
Article 12 obligates the African Commission on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE), 
headquartered in South Africa to ensure compliance of the verification of the uses of 
nuclear energy which are to be carried out by the IAEA as enshrined in Annex II;650 
and in conformity with the provisions of Article 9 (C) that require Parties to the treaty 
may supply nuclear materials or equipment to Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) 
in as much the parties must adhere to full scale safeguards.651 More so, Article 10 
obliges the parties to the treaty to adhere to international law regulating the security 
and physical protection of nuclear materials and facilities for the prevention of theft for 
unlawful purposes.652  In the same vein, Article 11 out rightly forbids any calculated 
action of conventional armed attack or otherwise aimed at nuclear installation in the 
African Zone.653  
The de-nuclearisation provisions in Article 3 to 10 of the African Nuclear-Weapon-
Free-Zone (ANWFZ) Treaty, the inspection mechanisms of the African Commission 
on Nuclear Energy (AFCONE) in collaboration with the IAEA, and the recognition of 
archipelagos under the African Union (AU) by the treaty make Africa as a continent to 
stand out against nuclear proliferation. The Treaty of Pelindaba has unlimited life 
span654 and is not subject to reservation. A party to the treaty may withdraw its 
membership at 12 months notice, upon unexpected occurrence(s) that may endanger 
its ultimate interest.655 The withdrawal clause in the ANWFZ treaty is less cumbersome 
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compare to the Treaty of Rarotonga which allows withdrawal only in the case of 
material violation of the treaty. 
The fifth and the most recent NWFZ in the world was put in place in the Central Asian 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Semipalatinsk. The 
treaty was signed in Semipalatinsk Test Site, Kazakhstan, in September 8 2006 by 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan656 and it was 
ratified by all the five member-States in March 21 2009. 
Under the basic obligations of this treaty, the member-States legally undertake in 
Article 3 (1b) not to conduct research, develop, manufacture, stockpile, acquire, 
possess, or have any control over any nuclear weapon or other nuclear device by any 
means anywhere.657 Article 3 extensively highlights the provisions of the basic 
obligations of the Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty. The treaty 
prohibits Member States from seeking, receiving, assisting or encouraging the 
aforementioned actions in Article 3 (1b). Essentially, every member-State solemnly 
declares not to conduct nuclear weapon tests or any other nuclear detonation at any 
place under its jurisdiction.658 
Consequently, the Central Asian State parties of the Treaty of Semipalatinsk equally 
pledge to conclude arrangements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) 
and ensure the enforcement of a Safeguard Agreement and Additional Protocol within 
a year and six months of the treaty entering into force.659 Parties to the treaty are 
required to exercise export control not to provide or be a source of any fissionable 
material or associated equipment to any NNWS that has not finalised comprehensive 
safeguards agreement and Additional Protocol with the IAEA.660 
In Article 9, the Treaty provides for the member-States to maintain physical protection 
of nuclear material, facilities and equipment that are outlined in the IAEA 
recommendations and guidelines by the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear 
Material (CPPNM).661 The Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty in its 
entirety lends credence to the non-proliferation order. However, the treaty does not 
have provision for the establishment of a regional Commission or Organisation to 
enforce implementation on compliance or oversee verification as provided for in the 
Treaties of Tlatelolco, Bangkok and Pelindaba. 
Remarkably, the Treaty of Semipalatinsk provides for consultative meeting to review 
compliance in Article 10.662 In this provision, there is no interface between the 
responsibility of the consultative meeting and the function of the IAEA on safeguards. 
The Central Asian Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty is the first NWFZ agreement 
that require its member-State full compliance with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test 
Ban Treaty.  
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The above five nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) treaties encompass the entire 
territories of Latin America and the Caribbean (Treaty of Tlatelolco, 1967); the South 
Pacific (Treaty of Rarontoga, 1985); Southeast Asia (Treaty of Bangkok, 1995); Africa 
(Treaty of Pelindaba, 1996); and Central Asia (Treaty of Semipalatinsk, 2006). All 
these regions combined amount to 115 full fledge sovereign States, comprising of 60% 
of the entire United Nations Member States and a large covering of the southern 
hemisphere.663 
  
 
Source: United Nations office for Disarmament Research 
www.un.org/disarmament/wmd/nuclear/nwfz  
The various NWFZ treaties, albeit structured and drafted differently, all have the 
fundamental characteristic of banning nuclear weapons in their respective regions with 
a strong emphasis as strong basis for the development and out right international 
prohibition of nuclear weapons. Divergently, they are deficient in the convergence of 
non-proliferation obligations in respect of verification, compliance, time, space, and 
implementation. The following are the lacuna associated with the various regional 
denuclearisation postures: 
(1) None of the NWFZ treaties has provision or indicates its validity or invalidity 
in the time or situation of war. This brings to question what if a member state 
comes under nuclear or conventional war attacks what would NWFzs do. 
This underscore the need for self defence or nuclear deterrence within the 
NWFZs. And at best, the NWFZs should have exception in times of nuclear 
threats or attacks 
(2) Apart from the African Nuclear Weapon Zone Treaty (ANWFZ), no other 
NWFZ treaty categorically prohibit attacks on nuclear facilities.  
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(3) It is only the ANWFZ and the SPNFZ that explicitly prohibit nuclear explosive 
devices both in assembled and partially assembled forms.  
(4) None of the NWFZ treaties outlaws nuclear weapon installations or nuclear 
weapon related support facilities such as nuclear weapons delivery 
vehicles. 
(5) Of all the five NWFZ treaties, only the treaties of Tlatelolco and Bangkok 
have the provision for denuclearisation of maritime zones adjacent to 
territorial waters of coastal States. 
(6) The membership withdrawal clause: the “Supreme Interest” provision 
contained in the treaties of Tlatelolco and Pelindaba are too flexible and 
permissive in comparison to the treaties of Rarotonga and Bangkok that 
allow for the withdrawal of member States upon a material breach of parties’ 
obligations. 
(7) The obligation of the NWS to respect the treaties of the Nuclear Weapon 
Free Zones (NWFZs) has not codification or provision for effective 
verification.  
(8) Assurances of the NWS not to use nuclear weapons against any member 
of the different NWFZs are not unconditional.  
(9) It is only the Treaty of Bangkok that seems to prescribe an action for the 
violation of obligation assumed by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 
(10) Unlike the New Zealand Single-State Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SS – 
NWFZ) that proscribe transit of nuclear weapons through its territory, all the 
NWFZ treaties overlook the transit of nuclear weapons through their 
respective territories including sailing of foreign warships and aircraft 
conveying nuclear weapons. 
 3.10  The Single-State Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones  
(SS - NWFZs) in the Context of Disarmament Debate 
 
Besides the aforementioned Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaties spreading across 
115 States, individual States like New Zealand and Mongolia have enacted their 
autonomous Nuclear Free Weapon Zones (NWFZ) Acts. This is in conformity with 
UNGA Resolution 3261 F adopted on 9 December 1974 which emphasises that 
“obligations relating to the establishment of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones may be 
assumed not only by groups of States including entire continents or large geographical 
regions, but also by small groups of States and even individual countries.”664 
Following the above UNGA Resolution, the parliament of New of Zealand in 1987 
passed the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament, and Arms Control Act.665 
This stipulate that the territorial sea, inland waters, internal waters, land, and airspace 
within the territorial boundaries of New Zealand became a nuclear Free Zone since 
1987. In addition to the Act prohibiting the acquisition, stationing and testing of nuclear 
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explosive devices on New Zealand territory, ships entering into the internal waters of 
New Zealand within 12 nautical miles (22.2 km/13 – 13/16 status miles) radius and 
whose propulsion is wholly or partly dependent on nuclear power are banned.666 
Notably, the New Zealand Nuclear Free Zone, Disarmament and Arms Control Act 
does not proscribe nuclear power plants, nuclear research facilities, radioactive 
isotopes use and other land related nuclear activities. Also, the Act gives the Prime 
Minister the prerogative to permit foreign warship into New Zealand’s territorial waters 
upon satisfaction that such a warship does not carry any nuclear explosive devices.667 
In the same vein, the Prime Minister may allow foreign military aircraft when satisfied 
that such aircraft is not carrying nuclear explosive devices into New Zealand’s 
territory.668 
Meanwhile, this New Zealand de-nuclearisation posture appeared unreceptive and 
unacceptable to the United States of America. As a consequence, the American 
government abandoned its naval activities with New Zealand, suspended its security 
undertakings and abrogated its long terms intelligence cooperation. The reason put 
forward by the United States government for these actions is that New Zealand has 
jeopardised the collective capacity of the 1952 Australia-New-Zealand-United States 
(ANZUS) Treaty to resist armed attacks in the pacific area.669 The New Zealand’s SS-
NWFZ is a commendable Act of a sovereign State determination to ensure the 
abolition of nuclear weapons at least in its territory. This SS-NWFZ should be viewed 
as a means and method of nuclear disarmament especially in the context of 
emergence of many States with nuclear capabilities. 
In September 1992, the Mongolian President, Punsalmaagiin Ochirbat in his address 
to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) declared Mongolia a-Single-State 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SS –NWFZ). Mongolian is a republican State 
conterminous with the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China (both 
of which are Nuclear Weapon States and Permanent UN Security Members).670  
Mongolia became globally recognised as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone State by the 
UNGA Resolution 53/70 adopted on 4 December 1998.671 This recognition was 
consolidated by the presentation of the document detailing the Mongolian de-
nuclearisation status to the United Nations by Mongolian Ambassador to the United 
Nations Jargalsaikhan Enkhsaikhan in February 28, 2000. 
Mongolia’s anti-nuclear posture entered into force on 3 February 2000 and covers the 
entirety of Mongolian territory. This include: airspace, land, waters and the sub-soil. 
The obligations of the Mongolia Single State Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (SS – NWFZ) 
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Act has tripartite dimensions as it pertains to any individual, legal person, or foreign 
States prohibited in committing, initiating, or participating in the following activities 
relating to nuclear weapons: (I) developing, manufacturing, acquiring, possessing or 
having control over nuclear weapons; (II) stationing or conveyance of nuclear weapons 
by any means; and (III) dumping or disposing of nuclear weapons radioactive waste 
material.672 
In ensuring substantial compliance and verification, the Mongolian government shall 
implement the relevant law in conjunction with international organisations such as the 
IAEA. In the case of violation or suspected violation, the individual or State shall be 
held liable in accordance with Criminal Code (in the case of individuals) as well as 
relevant legislation of Mongolian government in conformity with the appropriate 
international treaty and the precepts of international law.673 A pertinent question here 
is: why is Mongolia not a State party or signatory to the Treaty of Bankok? For 
whatever reason Magolia chose not be a signitaory to the Southeast Asia NWFZ, it 
could be deduced that Mogolia set the pace for the emergence of the treaty of Bankok 
as Mogolia’s SS-NWFZ was declared by its President in the UNGA in 1992, 3 years 
before the existence of the Treaty of Bankok. 
Essentially, the establishment of the SS-NWFZs of New Zealand and Mogolia is a 
practical means of promoting nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. These SS-
NWFZs are institutionalised global legal frameworks on nuclear weapons aimed at a 
more secure and safe world, particularly in the sovereignties of these two States. More 
States are encouraged to independently adopt the Single State Nuclear Weapons 
Free Zone to demonstrate their sovereign commitements to nuclear disarmament. 
3.11 The Contemporary Global Threats and the Challenges of Nuclear 
Terrorism: A Rationale for Disarmament 
The fall of the Soviet Union precipitate an international apprehension of possibly 
available “loose nukes” from different nuclear weapon facilities, nuclear reactors, and 
radioactive waste site scattered all over the defunct Soviet Union territory. To install 
radiation detection equipment across the borders of the States which formerly 
comprised of the Soviet Union was the initial global challenge. Globally, there is a 
genuine concern that nuclear materials and equipment can possibly fall into the hands 
of terrorist groups.674 Terrorist group like Al Qaeda have repeatedly demonstrated that 
they seek to acquire nuclear weapons.675 Such demonstration have mainly taking the 
form of attemps to acquire radioactive materials to produce dirty bombs or Improvised 
Explosive Devices (IED). 
There are two major access ways terrorist groups can acquire nuclear weapons: either 
acquiring them directly through Nuclear Weapons State(s) (NWS) especially through 
the defunct Soviet Union’s old stockpiles676 or by illicitly procuring nuclear materials to 
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manufacture improvised nuclear devices.677 The danger associated with these 
possibilities is more real than imagined. A successful explosion of an improvised 
nuclear device by a terrorist group in city will definitely result in thousands of deaths 
besides unfathomable economic, social and political consequences. Fundamentally, 
the major global responsibility is to by all means prevent terrorist groups from have 
access to nuclear weapons or the fissile material that is infused into nuclear weapons. 
With no access to fissile material, which terrorists on their own cannot produce,678 the 
threat of nuclear terrorism is minimal.  
As a consequence of this danger, the IAEA has been monitoring since 1995 an Illicit 
Trafficking Database (ITDB). This database contained 336 incidents of unauthorised 
acquisition, possession, and transfer of nuclear materials involving 15 illegal trades 
and criminal activities around Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) and plutonium from 
January 1993 to December 2008. The ITDB also contained 421 cases of theft of 
nuclear materials and 724 incidents of unauthorised disposal of radioactive materials. 
Presently, nuclear materials which can be used to manufacture nuclear a bomb are 
located in many countries power plants and nuclear reactors.679  
Obviously, the combination of clandestine nuclear network and the potential 
availability of loose nukes is literally fatal. Since the 1980s there has been in existence 
an illegal network of nuclear materials that crucially aided the development of the 
clandestine nuclear programmes of Libya, Iran and North Korea. This network was 
officially destroyed in 2004. However, there are fears that other illicit networks can 
easily be created in replacement of the hitherto dismantled clandestine one. 
Clandestine nuclear networks have been largely successful because their operators 
quickly take on new techniques suitable to their needs.680  
The emergence of illegal nuclear networks used in clandestine nuclear programmes 
has formidable ideological origins. For instance, the Cold War politics categorised the 
world into States that have nuclear capability and States that did have them.681 Some 
leaders of the Arab countries were concern about acquiring bombs that will serve as 
deterrent against any attack from the West and the State of Israel and as such they 
condoned the manufacturing of the first Islamic bomb in Pakistan in the 1970s.682 
Pakistan firmly believes that its nuclear programme stands for national pride and also 
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an attainment of global prominence.683 The main personality of Pakistan’s nuclear 
programme is Abdul Qadeer Khan.684  
Khan masterminded illicit nuclear network in the late 1980s with the connivance of 
some top Pakistani military and bureaucratic elites.685 In 2008 there was revelation 
about Abdul Qadeer Khan Network with a Swiss family – the Tinners, who have been 
in contact with this nuclear network since its inception.686 In a chain of supply, the 
Tinners purportedly sold illegal nuclear equipment to a Malaysian firm that produced 
parts for sale in Libya. Following an investigation, the Swiss government destroyed 
the weapon plans, emphasising that doing so was to prevent such nuclear weapons 
plans from falling into the terrorists hands.687 However, there was a classified 
speculation that the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) clandestinely used the 
Swiss family as informants to elicit all the secrets of Abdul Qadeer Khan illicit nuclear 
network.688  
Meanwhile, after the terrorists’ attacks of 11 September 2001 in the United States, the 
United Nations Security Council (UNSC) adopted Resolution 1373 on 28 September 
2001689 commonly called “Counter-Terrorism Code”. The term is a derivative of the 
fact that the resolution establishes legal obligations for the 192 Member States of the 
United Nations.690 The resolution is predicated on Chapter VII of the United Nations 
Charter entitled: “Action with Respect to the Threat of Peace, Breaches of Peace and 
Acts of Aggression”;691 and as such all decisions reflected on this Resolution 1373 are 
legally binding on all UN Member States. 
In the same vein, the UNSC passed Resolution 1540 in April 2004 to prevent terrorists 
and criminal organisations froming obtaining Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). 
That is, Biological, Chemical, and nuclear weapons. The resolution obligates all States 
to ensure effective measures to reduce vulnerability of many legitimate activities to 
misuse in ways that would foster proliferation of WMD and means of delivery to non-
state actors.692  
In its continuous on counter-terrorism efforts, the UNSC unanimously in its 5609th 
meeting on 22 December 2006 adopted Resolution 1735693. This was in solidarity with 
the mandate of the Analytical Support and Sanctions Monitoring Team (ASSMT) of 
the UNSC (Resolution 1267) Committee on Al-Qaida/Taliban Sanctions,694 for 
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additional durational extension of 18 months. This resolution held and substantiated 
the hitherto existing sanctions against members of Al-Qaida, the Taliban and all 
amorphous entities and individuals associated with them, as documented in the 
relevant sanctions list of the United Nations Security Council (UNSC).695 
Consequently, all UN Member-States were obliged to comply in forging international 
cooperation mechanism in activities related to terrorism such as nuclear terrorism 
against these terrorist groups. 
Within the expanded global legal framework in tackling nuclear terrorism, the 
International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism (ICSANT) 
is a fundamental universal legal instrument adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) in April 2005 to counter terrorists’ threats.696 The Convention 
reaffirms the United Nations unequivocal condemnations of nuclear terrorism with 
provisions for a broader coverage of possible terrorist targets such as nuclear power 
plants and nuclear reactors. It encourages States to cooperate in preventing terrorist 
attacks by sharing information and assisting each other in connection with 
investigations and extradition proceedings. Under its provisions, the alleged offenders 
must either be prosecuted or extradited. Furthermore, the Act stipulates that any 
confiscated nuclear or radiological material is kept in accordance with International 
Atomic Energy Atomic (IAEA) safeguards.697  
Similarly, the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombing 
(ICSTB) signed in New York on 15 December 1997 and entered into force in May 23 
2001 is an international treaty designed to enhance international cooperation amongst 
States in devising and adopting effective and practical measures for the prevention of 
the acts of terrorism (especially nuclear terrorism) and for the prosecution and 
punishment of their perpetrators.698 
Prior to the aforementioned International Conventions to suppress nuclear terrorism 
and bombing, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) 
was signed in Vienna and New York respectively on 3 March 1980. This Convention 
is the only international legally binding agreement in regard to physical protection of 
nuclear material. It provides for measures related to the prevention, detection and 
punishment of nuclear material related offenses.699 To amend and strengthen the 
provisions of this Convention, a diplomatic conference was convened in July 2005. 
The Amended version of the Convention makes it a legal obligation for States to 
protect nuclear facilities and material during peaceful domestic use, storage and 
conveyance. Essentially, it provides for expanded cooperation between and among 
States with quick measures to locate and recover stolen or smuggled nuclear 
materials, mitigate any radiological consequence of sabotage for the prevention of 
terrorist related offenses.700  
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As an existing mechanism of counter-terrorism, the Terrorism Prevention Branch 
(TPB) of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNDOC)701 collaborates with 
States in need of legislative guidance in drafting of statute that reflect the obligations 
of the UNSC Resolution 1373 against terrorism.702 States are required to implement 
feasible measures in their national laws in preventing and countering nuclear 
terrorism. Nuclear terrorism is complex to fight against especially with States that have 
no technical measures to tackle hazardous and radioactive materials.703 
With the recognition of the complexity of the fight against nuclear terrorism, the Global 
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) was initiated on 26 May 2014 by the United States 
in a consultative meeting with officials of the IAEA as a comprehensive global 
framework to consolidate nuclear security all over the world. The GTRI is devised to 
reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism by tackling the problem of loose nukes and 
proliferation posed by increasing numbers of nuclear facilities spread across the 
world.704 Substantially, the rationale behind the initiative is practically to “minimise as 
quickly as possible the amount of nuclear material that could be used for nuclear 
weapons. It also seeks to put into place mechanisms to ensure that nuclear materials 
and related equipment – wherever they may be in the world – are not used for 
malicious purposes.”705 
In consolidation of the GTRI, the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism 
(GICNT) was launched on 15 July 2006 in St. Petersburg, Russia by President George 
Bush Jnr. of the United States of America and Vladimir Putin of Russia. The aim of the 
GICNT is to “expand and accelerate the development of partnership capacity to 
combat the global threat of nuclear terrorism.” Presently, more than 80 States together 
with the (IAEA) are involved in the partnership of the GICNT.706 Consequently, all 
Partner States of this initiative have adopted a “Statement of Principles” and “Terms 
of Reference for Implementation and Assessment” as well as the creation of Points of 
Contact (POC) for facilitation and coordination among themselves.707 
In continuity of the fight against the global threat and challenges of nuclear terrorism, 
President, Barack Obama in his 2009 Prague speech unequivocally made the 
prevention of nuclear terrorism a top foreign policy priority of the United States. 
Credence to the U.S. foreign policy priority against the challenges of nuclear terrorism 
is the Nuclear Security Summit Process.708 This include: the  summit event of head-
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of-State, where over 50 world leaders and international organisations convened to 
brain storm on the threats of nuclear terrorism with the commitment of addressing 
them. As at the time of writing this thesis (2017) four Nuclear Security Summits have 
been held in Washington DC (2010), Seoul (2012), The Hague (2014), and in 
Washington DC (2016). These summits have achieved commendable progress in 
safeguarding against nuclear materials and enhancing stronger international 
institutions in the area of nuclear security.  
However, there is an identifiable gap between the UNSC resolutions to prevent the 
occurrence of nuclear terrorism and some of the global initiatives adopted against 
international terrorist attacks. These global initiatives which addressed aspects of the 
problem are driven with the overlapping goal of ensuring global nuclear security. The 
measures taken thus far to address nuclear security is lopsided because it has not 
considered insider threats. Illicit transfer or theft of fissile or nuclear materials is 
possible with the cooperation and coordination of staff working at nuclear facilities.  
However, breaching of security abound in the nuclear world as well as both in the 
national and international security agencies against the background of trust and 
betrayal. If Mordechai Vanunu the former Israeli nuclear technician can reveal Israel 
nuclear weapon programme and Edward Snowden a former American Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) personnel can leak classified information, invariably, it 
necessarily follows that there is the possibility that any corrupt nuclear facility 
personnel with or without lucrative offer from terrorist organisation can do away with 
weapon-usage-nuclear-material without authorisation. This possibility is very 
worrisome especially with the existence of the so called “rogue States.” What is the 
moltivation of rogue States nuclear ambious programmes? Where does North Korea 
get their nuclear materials from? Which State(s) is aiding and abating North Korea on 
its nuclear programmes? These questions speak volumes about the complexities and 
inter-state allainces associated with nuclear weapons ambitions. 
The threat of nuclear terrorism is a rationale for nuclear disarmament. It is important 
for the international community to be alertive to the existing growing threat of nuclear 
terrorism, in whatever potential form it may take, ranging from explosion or detonation 
of ‘dirty’ bomb by terrorists to the destruction of nuclear installations or full-fledged 
attacks on nuclear facilities. Therefore, the constant awareness of the threats of 
nuclear terrorism reinforces the need for nuclear weapons disarmament.  
3.12 Global Advocacy and Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament 
Nuclear weapons proliferation both by States and their potential acquisition by non-
State actors remain a global security theat. Besides the five nations of China, France, 
Russia, United Kingdom and the United States recognised by the NPT as NWS, States 
like India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan are strongly believed to possess nuclear 
weapons. In addition, more than 35 countries including Germany, Japan, and South 
Korea have the technological capability to produce them.709 
In recent past, campaigns founded on global political and diplomatic consensus in view 
of substantial nuclear arms reduction toward the realisation of complete disarmament 
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has increasingly taken place. In the light of this, the UNSC in September 2009 
unanimously adopted Resolution 1887, which called for States and International 
Organisations to make concerted and accelerated efforts toward total nuclear 
disarmament.710 
In the same vein, the UNGA in December 2015 re-established the Open-Ended 
Working Group (OEWG) with a special mandate to develop “legal measures, legal 
provisions and norms for achieving a nuclear-weapon-free world”.711 The OEWG’s 
special mandate is aimed at developing the findings and conclusions of the 
“Humanitarian Impact” of the Nuclear Weapons conferences in Oslo, Norway 2013 
and Nayarit, Mexico 2014712 alongside with the “Humanitarian Pledge” adopted on 7 
December 2015 by the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 70/48.713 The 
“Humanitarian Pledge”714 is a commitment by 120 Member-States of the United 
Nations to fill the obvious legal gap of nuclear weapons as the only weapons of Mass 
Destruction (WMD) not explicitly prohibited under international law.715  
The emergence and mandate of the OEWG is an indication that decade of 
international debates on nuclear disarmament legal frameworks and measures are not 
yielding the expected results. There would be no need for the OEWG if the NPT, 
NWFZ treaties and the the UN resolutions on disarmament and multilateral arms 
control negotiations and treaties are comprehensively allowed to work without States 
political, diplomatic and military resevations. 
In the continuous quest for nuclear disarmament under international law, the 
International Association of Lawyers against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) works for the 
elimination of nuclear arms through the strengthening of international law and the 
development of effective mechanisms toward total nuclear disarmament. The IALANA 
was founded in Stockholm, Sweden in 1988 and has grown to be an international 
professional’s organisation with consultative status with the United Nations.716  
As a consultative organ of the United Nations, the IALANA had formed collaborative 
alliances with other reliable non-state actors committed to the idea of criminalising 
nuclear weapons threat or use under any guise.717 Consequently, the IALANA affirms 
                                                          
710 United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1887 on Non-proliferation, Adopted on its 6191st 
Meeting, September 24 2009 
711 The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution L.13/REV.1 of the Seventieth Session of the First 
Committee on General and Complete Disarmament: Taking Forward Multilateral Nuclear Disarmament 
Negotiations, October 29 2015 
712 Heather Williams et al, “The Humanitarian Impacts of Nuclear Weapons Initiative: The ‘Big Tent’ in 
Disarmament” Research Paper in International Security March 2015 
713 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 70/48 on Humanitarian Pledge for the Prohibition and 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons, Adopted on the Report of the First Committee (A/70/460), December 7 2015 
714 Ibid  
715 John Kierulf, Disarmament Under International Law (Mc Gill-Queens’s Press, 2017) 112 
716 International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) http://www.en.ialana.de accessed 8 
May 2016 
717 Siddaharth Mallavarapu, Banning the Bomb: The Politics of Norm Creation (Pearson Longman, 2007) 43 
135 
 
and emphasises that the use of nuclear weapons violates international law and 
constitutes as both crime against humanity and crime against peace.718  
Crime against peace was first declared at the 1946 Nuremberg International Military 
Tribunal as “planning, initiating, or waging of aggressive wars. This according to the 
tribunal constitute ‘the supreme international crime.’719 Meanwhile, similar to the crime 
against peace is being considered today at the international Criminal Court as ‘crime 
of aggression.’720 Therefore, in the view of the IALANA, any form of nuclear weapons 
explosion either in testing or actual use would amount to ‘crime against peace’ or 
‘crime of aggression’. 
The non-state actors which have affiliation with the International Association of 
Lawyers’ Against Nuclear Arms (IALANA) include: the Australian Lawyers for Nuclear 
Disarmament (ALND),  
Bangladesh Lawyers Association Against Nuclear Arms (BLAANA);  
India Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (ILANA), Movement of Lawyers for the 
Elimination of Nuclear Weapons (MLENW) in Japan;  
New Zealand Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament (NZLND);  
Swedish Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms (SLANR); 
 Lawyers for Nuclear Disarmament (LND) in the United Kingdom, and the  
Lawyers Committee on Nuclear Policy (LCNP) in the United States721 amongst others 
countries.  
Significantly, the doggedness of the International Association of Lawyers Against 
Nuclear Arms (IALANA) in its advocacy for nuclear disarmament led to the historic 
July 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on the Legality 
of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The ICJ Advisory Opinion was precipitated 
by the “World Court Project”. The IALANA in conjunction with the International Peace 
Bureau (IPB) and the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War 
(IPPNW) forged a united cause in 1992 known as the “World Court Project” aimed at 
bringing nuclear weapon to the international legal arena. Thus, Lawyers, Peace 
Activists and Health Professionals influenced the World Court through the UNGA 
request on the legality and use of nuclear weapons.722 The ICJ Advisory Opinion on 
nuclear weapons is analysed in details in Chapter 4, section 4.7 
In advancing their collective supports for global advocacy and campaign for nuclear 
disarmament, four leading international organisations in the health sector: the [World 
Medical Association (WMA)], the [World Federation of Public Health Associations 
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(WFPHA)], the [International Council of Nurses (ICN)] and the [International 
Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW)] jointly submitted their 
contributions on 2 March 2016, in a document entitled “The Health and Humanitarian 
Case for Banning and Eliminating Nuclear Weapons” to the United Nations. The 
documents called for the establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) 
designated with the mandate for legal measures for nuclear disarmament.723  
This health professionals’ document on nuclear disarmament emphasised that the 
possibility of nuclear war with the existing nuclear armaments would kill more people 
in few hours than were killed during the entire Second World War. Furthermore, this 
document is the first international federation of health professionals’ contributions to 
the dangers of nuclear weapons as a common voice and it allured to the fact the 
thousands of nuclear weapons in the world largest arsenals could trigger a global 
ecological collapse.724  
Still on the contributions of professional’s advocacy and campaigns for nuclear 
disarmament, the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against 
Proliferation (INESAP) is a global non-governmental association established in 1993 
and driven by critical analysis of technical, scientific, and political issues associated 
with nuclear disarmament and other Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) for 
disarmament. The core objective of the INESAP is the promotion of non-proliferation 
and disarmament.725  
Arguably, engineers and scientists’ contributions to nuclear disarmament debate are 
crucial in view of the fact that science and technology are the intertwined forces behind 
the manufacturing and existence of nuclear weapons and as such, their continuing 
contributions should be held in high esteem. The INESAP utilises an integrated, 
interdisciplinary and international approach to combine research and actions in 
establishing a closer interface between nuclear science and disarmament policy726 
and expanding the horizons of the international community and policy makers of its 
networks. 
The International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation (INESAP) 
has implemented a project known as: The Independent Group of Scientific Experts 
(iGSE) on the detection of clandestine nuclear-weapons-usable materials production 
in May 2006. This project concentrates on the most significant gap and the largest 
challenges for the verification of non-proliferation. Extensively, the iGSE has 
developed and demonstrated novel technologies and procedure controls for 
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environmental sampling methodologies for the detection of clandestine nuclear 
activities.727  
From 1995, two years after its inception, the INESAP has been participating and 
contributing as a non-state in the Non-proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee and 
Review Conferences. In 1996, the INESAP alongside with the IALANA and the IPPNW 
orchestrated and drafted the model for the proposed Nuclear Weapons Convention 
(NWC).728 The aformentioned international noble professional bodies of Engineers 
and Scientists, Lawyers, and Doctors clearly outlined the Model Nuclear Weapon 
Convention (MNWC) with the potentiality of ascertaining a nuclear-weapons-free 
world. Thus, their professional contributions to the legal framework on nuclear 
disarmament is not only worthwhile but also influencial and imperative. 
In 1997, the government of Costa Rica in appreciative obsession forwarded the draft 
of the MNWC to the United Nations Secretary General (UNSG) and it is gazetted as 
UN Doc. A/C.1/52/7.729 As a reiteration, the governments of Costa Rica and Malaysia 
jointly submitted a revised version of the MNWC to the United Nations General 
Assembly (UNGA) on 17 December 2007 and it is documented as UN Doc. 
A/62/650.730 The revised version takes into cognizance relevant technical, political and 
legal developments surrounding nuclear weapons.  
Essentially, the global concern for nuclear disarmament is exemplified in two 
significant publications: “Global Publications” and “Against Proliferation – Towards 
General Disarmament” made the International Network of Engineers and Scientists 
Against Proliferation (INESAP) to stand out in its global campaign for nuclear 
disarmament. There are also two other international groups: the Global Network 
Against Weapons and Nuclear Power in Space founded in 1992 in the Unted States 
and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility 
(INES) who are also campaigning and advocating for the prevention of nuclear 
weaponisation in the globally and outer space.731  
There are international organisations specifically concerned with nuclear disarmament 
campaign. These include the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapon 
Weapons (ICAN), the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation and the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (CND). The International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) 
is a coalition of global campaigners with the aim of inspiring, persuading and 
pressurising their governments to initiate and support negotiations for a treaty banning 
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nuclear weapons. The ICAN was launched in 2007 with more than 400 collaborating 
partners in 95 countries.732 
Similarly, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation is a nonpartisan and non-profit 
international organisation founded in 1982 and committed to a world free of nuclear 
weapons through its mission of education and advocation for peace and empowering 
peaceful leaders. Like the IALANA, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation also has a 
consultative status with the United Nations. It has a horizontal organogram comprising 
of more than 750,000 individuals and groups across the globe that have a vision of 
the imperative for peace in this Nuclear Age. Through its education programmes, the 
Nuclear Age Peace Foundation explores the instrumentality of international law to 
challenge the rationale of countries that justify their reliance upon nuclear deterrence 
at the expense of potential war of mass annihilation.733 
The Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) was founded in February 1958 on the 
advocacy of unilateral nuclear disarmament – the proposal that British should take the 
initiative and get rid of its own nuclear weapons, irrespective of the actions of other 
countries. The CND is a United Kingdom based organisation, commited to a non-
violent achievement of British nuclear disarmament. Its mission includes calling for the 
abolition of the Trident nuclear weapon system and the prevention of its replacement. 
The CND also vehemently opposes the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 
nuclear polices and nuclear power. The CND firmly stands for the prevention and 
cessation of wars in which nuclear weapons may be used.734 
As the only country that has experienced nuclear bombings in the cities of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki, Japan735 is calling for a nuclear-weapon-free world. Addressing a 
cosmopolitan crowd in the commemoration of the 70th anniversary of the first atomic 
bombing in the Japanese city of Hiroshima, Japan’s Prime Minister Shinzo Abe 
succinctly states that: “we have to continue our effort to achieve a world without 
nuclear weapons, it our responsibility and it is our duty”.736 Japan’s advocacy for 
nuclear disarmament is predicated on humanitarian value and security principles. The 
Humanitarian and security dimensions have equal importance to the Japanese 
government. Japanese public opinion expects the government to take initiatives to 
promote humanitarian goal through disarmament and as such, the government have 
made disarmament one of the pillars of Japanese diplomacy since the end of the 
Second World War.737 
From the foregoing, global advocacy and campaigns for nuclear disarmament have 
immersely contributed to the debate for nuclear disarmament by sensitisation and by 
creating the awareness for the need for disarmament. The various professional bodies 
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have clearly posited that nuclear weapons pose unimaginable global dangers to 
humanity and as such, the best solution to the disastrous impacts of nuclear weapons 
is disarmament through the total commitment and political willingness of all States to 
comply with existing international legal framework on nuclear disarmament. 
3.13 The Legal and Humanitarian Imperatives for Nuclear Disarmament 
The legal imperative for nuclear disarmament revolves around the legal instruments 
that both explicitly and implicitly regulate the activities concerning nuclear weapons. 
On the one hand, the explicit legal instruments include: the newly emerged Treaty on 
the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), the Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT), the 
various Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (NWFZ), Treaties, the Partial Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty (PNTBT), the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), Nuclear 
Terrorism Convention, the United Nation Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 1540, 
amongst other United Nations (UN) resolutions and multilateral treaties on nuclear 
disarmament. On the other hand, the implicit instruments are: International 
Humanitarian Law (IHL), International Human Rights Law, International Environmental 
Law, and International Criminal Law. 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) which has emphasis and specific regulations on 
the conduct of hostilities, armed conflicts, or belligerency is consequentially applicable 
to the use of nuclear weapons. Notably, the IHL does not categorically outlaw nuclear 
weapons but their use in warfare is prohibited by the IHL rules on distinction, 
proportionality,738 precaution in attacks and protection of the natural environment739. 
IHL also probibits the cause of superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering to 
combatants.740  
From the foregoing, there is no legal vacuum or legal gap in view of nuclear 
disarmament as exponentially upheld by the concept of “Humanitarian Pledge”;741 
rather, there is a gap in the absence of substantive law and a gap in compliance742 
with the provisions of the various nuclear weapons treaties. The devastation and scale 
of casualties arising from any use of nuclear weapon stretches the compatibility and 
codification of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) also known as the Law of War on 
nuclear weapons into the most conceivable circumstances.743 Therefore, in 
consolidating the humanitarian principles in International Humanitarian Law (IHL) on 
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armed conflicts in the light of nuclear weapons, emergences the concept of 
“Humanitarian Initiative.”744        
The emergence of the “Humanitarian Initiative”745 – is an intensified global discourse 
of the unacceptable and unmanageable humanitarian consequences of nuclear 
weapons debacle, in terms of the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the 
posing potential dangers associated with the present nuclear armaments in the world; 
the NNWS and non-state actors have continually and unequivocally stood for de-
legitimization, de-nuclearization, and disarmament of nuclear weapons. The 
proceeding Section of this Chapter: “Global Advocacy and Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament” underscores this truism against the backdrop of the legitimacy of 
nuclear weapons deterrence politics upheld by the Nuclear Weapon State (NWS). 
The “Humanitarian Initiative” implies the lens of analysis focusing on the humanitarian 
consequences of nuclear weapons in view of reframing nuclear disarmament and non-
proliferation agenda.746 The current focus on the humanitarian consequences of 
nuclear weapons is a derivative of the 2010 Non-proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference Final Document which legally underpin the humanitarian nuclear doctrine. 
This conference document specifically emphasises on the “Catastrophic Humanitarian 
Consequences that would result from the use of nuclear weapons.”747  
From 2010 to the time of the writing-up of this thesis, four joint statements on the 
humanitarian dimension of nuclear disarmament with significant universal support 
were officially submitted in organised international fora: two submissions were made 
to the UNGA and the other two were submitted at consecutive sessions of the 
Preparatory Committee (Pre/Comm) of the 2015 Non-proliferation Treaty Review 
Conference (NPTRC) at the United Nations Headequarters in New York.748  
Attestations to the support of humanitarian nuclear doctrine were the enormous 
participations at the Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapon (HINW) conferences. 
The HINW conference held in March 2013 in Oslo, Norway has 127749 countries 
besides civil society organisations (non-state actors) in attendance. The February 
2014 Mexico hosted Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapon (HINW) conference750 
in Nayarit recorded 146 participations of States and broad spectrum of non-state 
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actors. While the Vienna, Austria December 2014 HINW conference was attended by 
158 States751 as well as various international organisations. 
The legal and humanitarian imperatives for nuclear disarmament are embedded in the 
deep concern on non-compliance with applicable international law, such as 
International Humanitarian Law and international treaties on nuclear weapons as well 
as the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons. 
However, States especially the NWS have officially reaffirmed the necessity to comply 
with all laws applicable to nuclear weapons but progress on nuclear disarmament has 
been so slow despite their commitments. Consequenly, more proactive and pragmatic 
efforts are required to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament. 
The table below explain some key humanitarian concepts relating to nuclear 
disarmament: 
Humanitarian Concepts 
Relating to Nuclear Weapons 
and Disarmament 
           Meaning   
 
Catastrophic Humanitarian 
Consequences of Nuclear 
Weapons 
The Catastrophic Humanitarian Consequences of 
Nuclear Weapons was acknowledged in the 2010 
document of the NPT Review conference that any 
use of nuclear weapons would result in catastrophic 
humanitarian consequences, stressing that States 
have the obligations to comply with international 
humanitarian law. 
 
 
 
Humanitarian Pledge 
Humanitarian Pledge is a commitment by States to 
fill the unacceptable “legal gap” associated with 
nuclear weapons. The Humanitarian Pledge was 
launched on 9 December 2014 at the conclusion of 
the Vienna Conference on the Humanitarian Impact 
of Nuclear Weapons and it offers a platform from 
which States can and must launch negotiations on 
a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons.  
 
 
 
Humanitarian Impact of 
Nuclear Weapons 
 
The Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons 
was the theme of the nuclear weapons 
conferences which began n Oslo, Norway from 4-5 
March 2013 attended by 128 States, UN agencies, 
international organisations, and civil society 
groups to address the immediate catastrophic 
effects of nuclear weapons on human societies, 
environment and health as well as the wider 
impact and long-term consequences, tending to 
outweigh the humanitarian preparedness and 
response capacity. 
 
 
Humanitarian Initiative 
Humanitarian Initiative is a commitment by group 
of governments and non-government 
organisations working within the framework of the 
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Non-proliferation Treaty to reframe the debate on 
nuclear disarmament that gave rise to the 
negotiating process and the emergence of the 
Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons. 
 
3.14 Conclusion 
Multilateral humanitarian discourse associated with nuclear weapons began as soon 
as nuclear weapons were used on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in Japan. The usage of 
this weapons on these cities, on two separate occasions during final stages of the 
Second World War in 1945, as well as nuclear detonations in form of testing by all the 
NWS and other States with nuclear capabilities form the basis of the humanitarian 
consequences encapsulated in the concept of humanitarian initiative. Obviously, 
nuclear weapons do not maim, kill people and wantonly destroy the environment on a 
daily basis, albeit the subsisting cases of victims of explosions of nuclear radiation. 
However, from humanitarian point of view, the argument for nuclear disarmament is 
compelling on the devastating impacts of the use of nuclear weapons. Disarmament 
may be precautionary and anticipatory measure.     
Unarguably, the nuclear disarmament posture which has hidden complexities seems 
to have been overridden by the optimism of global disarmament campaign 
mechanisms and the conglomeration of multilateral and international conferences, 
strategies, and statutory codifications. On the other hand, nuclear disarmament is 
more problematic especially with views of the NWS. 
In supporting the argument and the need for nuclear disarmament, the principles of 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) hold sway. Nuclear weapons cannot be used 
without violating all the principles of IHL. This is not only as a result of collateral 
damage beyond proportion and military necessity but also on the principle of humanity 
which implies respect and care for human life. Consequently, many States and regions 
are determined in promoting nuclear disarmament. This determination resonates in 
the various Nuclear Weapons Free Zones as regional legal instruments banning 
nuclear weapons. 
In ensuring nuclear disarmament, the nuclear non-proliferation framework provides for 
States to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and to negotiate for complete 
disarmament. The non-proliferation as a multilateral concern has received deserved 
global attention for disarmament. Based on the potential devastating effects of nuclear 
weapons and the nuclear era heralded by the use of atomic bombs in Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, nuclear disarmament is not only globally desirable but also achievable. 
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CHAPTER FOUR    
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS AND DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCES ON THE 
 LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
The nuclear age heralded with the atomic bombings of the Japanese cities of 
Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945752 have spurred many States to conduct their 
international affairs with cautious diplomacy. The political implications of the nuclear 
revolution indicate how nuclear weapons have fundamentally changed the strategic 
pattern of international politics.753 There is no concurrence or consensus view on 
sovereign equality of States or States entitlement to possess nuclear weapons as well 
as the rationale for the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. On the one hand, proponents 
of nuclear deterrence and the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) unanimously concurred 
that nuclear weapons have made the world safer. On the other hand, opponents 
vehemently differ by upholding that nuclear weapons pose unacceptable dangers of 
planetary cataclysm.  
The history of nuclear diplomacy analogously elicits these divergent opinions. During 
the devastating Korean fratricidal war (1950 -1953) and there are arguments and 
counter arguments about the United States as a principal force, making nuclear threats 
as way to achieve diplomatic aims. Consequently, the efficiency of explicit or implicit 
nuclear threats becomes both politically and diplomatically controversial.754 More 
recently, North Korea has imploy similar strategy in its nuclear weapons programme. 
With the passage of time, the South and the North Korean countries in 1992 bilaterally 
established the Joint Declaration on Denuclearization on the Korea Peninsular755 as a 
diplomatic collaboration to minimise nuclear threat.  
In the light of this background, this chapter is strategically designed to analyse the 
political implications and explore the diplomatic influences on the legal framework for 
nuclear disarmament. Prominent amongst its aims are: the question of sovereign 
equality, including the rationale for the dichotomous classification of Nuclear Weapons 
States (NWS) and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) by the NPT, an appraisal 
of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence – is it a military military illusion or does it provide 
political solution?  
In order to provide effective answers to the controversies raised by the disarmament 
debate, this chapter equally examines the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties in the light of a framework for nuclear weapons treaties especially the new 
emerged Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear weapons (TPNW). In undertaking this 
task, the 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of 
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the Threat or Otherwise of the Use of Nuclear Weapons as well as both the UNGA 
and UNSC Resolutions on nuclear disarmament will be viewed as yardsticks of 
measurement on nuclear disarmament mechanisms.  
Consequently, this chapter also examines the achievements of the legal framework 
and the campaign for disarmament, strategies for nuclear disarmament and 
enforecement of non-proliferation, the United Nations disarmament institutions and 
resolutions on nuclear disarmament as well as the challenges and hindrances of 
nuclear disarmament. This chapter adresses the first research objective in connection 
with the third rsearch question in section 4.4: the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. 
Military illusion or political solution? Rationale for nuclear disarmament. In the same 
vein, this chapter equally examines part of the third research objective linked to the 
first research question in section 4.11: Stategies for nuclear disarmament and 
enforcement of nuclear non-proliferation. The bane of nuclear disarmament is the 
interface of international politics on the enforcement of the legal framework on nuclear 
disarmament. 
4.2 Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and their Positions on Nuclear Disarmament 
from the Perspective of International Politics 
Categorically, there are nine subsisting States756 that are universally known to possess 
nuclear weapons by virtue of their productions and detonations and five of these 
States are officially recognised and legitimised in Article IX (3) of the 1968 NPT as 
Nuclear Weapon States (NWS).757 The nine States that have manufactured, tested, 
and possess nuclear weapons in order of their year of detonation are:  
The United States of America (1945); 
The defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republics [now fully acquired by Russia] (1949), 
The United Kingdom 1954;  
Israel (Israel initiated its nuclear programme in the 1950s but still concealing its nuclear 
status through the policy of opacity or strategic nuclear ambiguity),  
France (1960), China (1964),  
Pakistan (1972), India 1974, and  
The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (formerly and commonly known as North 
Korea) (2006).758  
The five States recognised by the NPT as NWS which are concomitantly the five 
permanent members of the UNSC are: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and 
the United States. Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea are the four de facto States 
possessing nuclear weapons not recognised by the NPT.759 South Africa the 10th 
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nuclear possessing State eliminated its nuclear armaments in 1991 but did not 
publicise it until 1993. Similarly, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine all former republics 
of the defunct Soviet Union ceded their nuclear weapons to the Russia Republic after 
the official dissolution of the USSR in December 31 1991.760 There are 183 Non-
nuclear Weapon States (NNWS) in the world today,761  including countries with nuclear 
ambitions and nuclear capabilities most notably the Islamic Republic of Iran, Iraq, and 
Libya.762  
There is a long history of the all the five de jure NWS and the four de facto nuclear 
possessing States commitment in principle to nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the 
NPT obliges the five NWS as a matter of public international law: “to negotiate in good 
faith on effective measures relating to the cessation of the nuclear arms race at an 
early date and to nuclear disarmament.”763 As a corollary, the 1996 ICJ Advisory 
Opinion on the on the Legality of Threat or Otherwise of the Use of Nuclear Weapons, 
interpreted the obligation of the NPT Article VI as a requirement to actualise the 
negotiation on nuclear disarmament to a successful conclusion.764 
The principles and perspectives of commitment of all nuclear weapons or nuclear 
possessing States are predicated on national and foreign policy statements.765 In 
reality, nuclear possessing States have not yet seriously and conscientiously focused 
on practical procedural steps required for negotiation of complete nuclear 
disarmament as a unified policy goal.  
Nevertheless, there is an extensive and appreciative precedent of the United States 
of America and Russia (the former USSR) in bilateralism regarding arms control since 
1969. Both the USA and Russia have been strategically limiting their nuclear 
capabilities by reducing their nuclear armaments through bilateral treaties. These 
mutual agreements began with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT), held from 
1969 to 1972766 which characteristically limited only Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles 
(ICBMs) and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles (SLBMs)767 and resonated in the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty of 1972 that prohibited nationwide strategic missile 
defence.768 However, for reasons of its homeland security, America eventually 
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withdrew from the AMB Treaty on 13 June 2002 and thus consequently abrogated the 
treaty.769  
In the of course of the Cold War and the attendant increase of warheads and the 
limitations on the numbers of deployed launchers associated with START I, II and III, 
the United States and Russia negotiated and enacted the Strategic Offensive 
Reductions Treaty (SORT) in 2002. The SORT under its Obligations provides for 
significant reduction of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to a range of up to 1,700 
– to the maximum of 2,200.770 Conversely, the SORT has suffered from the 
deficiencies on verification and compliance reminiscence of the START I regime. The 
absence of verification and inefficiency in its compliance consequently led to the 
signing of the New START Treaty on 8 April 2010 which subsequently entered into 
force on 5 February 2011.771 This New START Treaty limits the United States and 
Russia to no more than 1,550772 deployments of warheads and 700 launchers by 
2018.773  
The United States and Russia which still hold over 95% of the world’s nuclear weapons 
amounting to a total of 19.000 units774 are consciously reducing the size of their 
nuclear armaments. However, the general view among other nuclear and non-nuclear 
states alike is that these two nuclear super powers should still reduce the deployment 
of their nuclear warheads from thousands to hundreds to demonstrate the seriousness 
of disarmament process. Consequently, other states will equally take significant steps 
toward nuclear disarmament.775  
The United States Nuclear Posture 
On 5 April 2009, in Prague, Czech Republic President Barack Obama of the United 
States publicly declared that the United States was committed to seeking “the peace 
and security of a world without nuclear weapons. He specified this commitment by 
stating clearly, “this goal will not be reached quickly – perhaps not in my life lifetime”776. 
Essentially, he underscored the America position on nuclear weapons thus: “as long 
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as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective 
arsenal.777 
The report of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) of the Obama Administration was 
officially released in April 2010, formalising this perspective by establishing a goal of 
nuclear disarmament, but contradictorily with a commitment to retain the U.S. triad of 
nuclear-weapon delivery system. This implies a life extension for more than one 
thousand nuclear warheads and the modernisation of the U.S. nuclear weapon 
production complex.778  
In its specific direct reference to nuclear disarmament, the Nuclear Posture Review 
(NPR) provide for “initiating a comprehensive national research and development 
program to support continued progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons, 
including works on verification technologies and the development of transparency 
measures.”779 Significantly, the Obama Administration’s NPR posits that the United 
States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS that are party 
to the NPT and in compliance with nuclear non-proliferation obligation.780 
Russia Nuclear Posture 
On 1 April 2009, Russian President Dmitry Medvedev joined President Obama in a 
meeting of mutual interest ahead of the G20 summit in London on nuclear 
disarmament in expressing support for “a nuclear weapon free world.” However, in 
principle Russia tenaciously holds that “the prevailing view in Russia’s political-military 
leadership is that nuclear weapons play a key role in ensuring Russia’s security.781  
Practically, Russia is presently replacing its aging strategic nuclear weapon delivery 
system by the process of modernising and recapitalising its entire arsenal.782 In 
February 2011, Vladimir Popovkin, Russia’s First Deputy Minister of Defense 
announced that Moscow would spend about $70 billion on Russia’s Strategic nuclear 
force between 2011 and 2020.783 The former President Medvedev reaffirmed that the 
process will continue and Russia’s national shield will always be effective and 
sufficient for protecting its national interest.784 
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The United Kingdom Nuclear Posture 
The United Kingdom’s relationship with nuclear weapons dates back to June 1942 
when British scientists collaborated with American and Canadian scientists in the 
famous Manhattan Project.785 The current United Kingdom’s nuclear forces are 
entirely sea-based, consisting of four Vanguard-classed ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBNs), each carrying up to 16 Trident II D-5 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile 
(SLBM).786 The UK’s strategic submarine fleet is domiciled at Her Majesty’s Naval 
Base in the Clyde, Scotland, and its operational nuclear warheads are store in 
Coulport Ammunition Base.787 
In December 2006, the UK parliament through the former Prime Minister Tony Blair 
presented a White Paper entitled: Future of the United Kingdom Nuclear Deterrent. 
The White Paper estimated replacing all four submarines would amount to a cost of 
between GBP 15 – 20 billion and the current Vanguard-class SSBNs will most likely 
be leaving service in 2024.788 
In March 2007, the United Kingdom in a parliamentary decision adopted the twin track 
strategy of laying the ground-work for replacing its Trident nuclear weapon system 
while committing to foster positive conditions for global abolition of nuclear weapons. 
However, there is the existence of deep-seated opposition to nuclear weapons in 
Scotland and in the Labour Party in Britain; in challenging the cost and rationale 
associated with the building of ballistic missiles and submarine-based nuclear system 
to replace the Trident.789  
In February 2009 David Miliband (the then UK foreign and Commonwealth Secretary) 
issued an official study entitled: Lifting the Nuclear Shadow: Creating the Conditions 
for Abolishing Nuclear Weapons. This study laid out a perspective on moving towards 
disarmament.790 Antithetically, the UK continues to invest in upgrading its nuclear 
warhead R&D and production complex. In 2016, the “Main Gate” spending decision 
on the replacement of the UK Trident was delayed to 2019 and upon approval, the 
new submarine-based nuclear system is expected to enter into service in 2028.791 
The UK nuclear armaments are purely sea based. They include the four Vanguard – 
class ballistic missile submarines (SSBN) and the four submarine launchered ballistic 
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missiles (SLMB). Various factors most likely792 influenced the UK government 
resolution to pursue an automomous nuclear weapons programme. These include the 
perceived diminish military and economic strength after the world wars and as well as 
the cold war. Ultimately, the UK considered nuclear weapons as a means of 
maintaining the status of world power and as self-defence and deterrent against 
possible nuclear attack. 
France Nuclear Posture 
France has been a strong supporter of an early start of negotiations on the Fissile 
Material Cut-off Treaty (FMCT).793 Between 1990 and 2008, France completed a 50-
percent unilateral reduction of its nuclear armaments to less than 300 warheads.794 
Consequently, France combines a significant and exemplary disarmament record and 
a reluctance to subscribe to total elimination as the ultimate objective of the 
disarmament process. Therefore, French policy on disarmament tends to create mixed 
perception if not misperception795 vis a’ vis the genuiness to the commitments to 
nuclear disarmament. 
The unique nuclear history and policy developed in the last 50 years by France has 
an established robust “French Nuclear Exception” characteristic of strong political and 
public support for continuation of current nuclear policy. It is a nuclear policy deeply 
rooted in history emphasising nuclear independence and the relevance of deterrence; 
and an ambivalent but evolving approach to nuclear disarmament, combined with a 
perceived proactive commitment to non-proliferation.796  
In July 2009, France joined the United States, the United Kingdom, Russia and other 
G8 nations in a joint statement declaring, “We are all committed to seeking a safer 
world for all and to creat the conditions for a world without nuclear weapons.”797 In 
April 2013, France’s White Paper on Defence and National Security statement that 
France must maintain its nuclear deterrent to prevent any state from infringing on its 
national vital interest.798 
China Nuclear Posture 
China has long history of involvement negotiating an international legal instrument on 
complete prohibition and destruction of nuclear weapons with a view of achieving a 
nuclear free world. China holds that “Nuclear disarmament should be a just and 
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reasonable process of gradual reduction towards a downward balance such that any 
measure of nuclear disarmament should follow the guidelines of promoting global 
strategic balance and stability, upholding the principle of undiminished security for 
all”.799  
In 2006, China stated in its White Paper: The Fundamental Goal of China’s Nuclear 
Strategy that its purpose for developing nuclear weapons was to guard itself against 
nuclear coercion and blackmail.800 In 2009, Beijing’s White Paper on National Defence 
called on all NWS to make an unequivocal commitment to the effective destruction of 
nuclear weapons, undertake to stop research and develop new types of nuclear 
weapons and reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security policies.801 
In the same vein, China joined the other Permanent members of the UNSC on 24 
September 2009 in Security Council Resolution 1887 on Non-proliferation 
commitment to seek safer world for all and to create the condition for world without 
nuclear weapons.802 
China is the first NWS to adopt a nuclear No First Use (NFU) – a policy and an official 
pledged not to use nuclear weapon against NNWS.803 In May 2004, China joined the 
Nuclear Supplier Group (NSG).804 Also, China became the first NWS to ratify the 
Additional Protocol of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in March 
2002.805 In its 2013 White paper on Defence, China reaffirms its commitment on its 
current nuclear posture that focuses on survivability and maintaining second-strike 
capability.806 
China nuclear posture is quite clear, it promised not to use nuclear weapons unless 
nuclear weapons are used against it. This seems to be the most advanced nuclear 
weapons deterrence policy and its worth commending. 
Israel, India and Pakistan, the trio nuclear possessing states that are not party to the 
NPT807 and North Korea which withdrew its membership from the Treaty in 2003808, 
have directly or indirectly indicated support for the attainment of total nuclear 
disarmament. Israel, the only nuclear weapons possessing State in the Middle East 
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views nuclear weapons elimination in regional security terms, as a vision of the Middle 
East evolving into a zone free of nuclear weapons as well as ballistic missiles.809 In 
2003, Israel deployed submarine launched nuclear armed cruise missiles together with 
land-based missiles and nuclear capable fighter jet delivery system, creating its own 
nuclear triad.810 From the regional perspective, Israel has no basis of having nuclear 
weapons as the only nations that posess nuclear weapons in the Middle East. 
Indian and Pakistan Nuclear Posture 
India, in spite of an earlier clear position for a time-bound process for nuclear 
disarmament, India has chosen to maintain a nuclear armament until there is universal 
global disarmament.811 Also, Pakistan has clamoured for total disarmament of nuclear 
weapons with a specified time frame, but with the reservation it will retain its nuclear 
weapons as long as India does. Both India and Pakistan are still in the process of 
producing fissile material for additional nuclear weapons and the developing of longer-
range delivery systems such as ballistic missiles and cruise missiles.812 
North Korea Nuclear Posture 
North Korea’s position on nuclear disarmament has been wrapped up in its 
relationship with the United States of America. Since 2003, North Korea has 
established a six-party dialogue with South Korea, Japan, China, Russia and the 
United States on the denuclearisation of the Korean Peninsula. This dialogue was 
suspended in April 2009. The perceived uncertainties about North Korea’s nuclear 
programme after the death of Kim Jong Il and its dispute with the US over the long 
range missile tests have been ongoing.  North Korea launch of a rocket in April 2012, 
and declared all hitherto agreements with the US void and conducted a nuclear test in 
February 2013. Thus far, North Korea has conducted multiple missiles and nuclear 
weapons tests including in 2006, 2009, 2013, 2016 and 2017. In September 2015, 
North Korea publicly announced that all its nuclear facilities were in normal operation 
with ongoing mission to improve the quality and quantity of its nuclear stockpile.813 
4.3 The Dichotomy between the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States (NNWS): The Question of Sovereign Equality  
The dichotomous differentiation of NWS and NNWS is codified in Article IX(3) of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) thus: ...“For the purposes of this Treaty, a nuclear 
weapon State is one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other 
nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967.”814 The five States that have met 
this provisional conditionality by virtue of their manufacturing and years of testing of 
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nuclear weapons are: The United States of America (1945), Russia – the former Soviet 
Union (1949), the United Kingdom (1954), France (1960) and China (1964).815 
Alhough, the NPT legitimizes these nations as NWS, it also establishes in Article VI 
that they are to:  
“Pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of 
nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament”.816 This presupposes 
that they are not required to build and maintain their nuclear armaments in perpetuity. 
By virtue of the NPT, official recognition of the above five States as NWS, all the other 
159 States of the NPT817 and the rest of the world regardless of their nuclear 
capabilities, ambition and possession after 1 January 1967, are classified as NNWS. 
The classification of the rest world as NNSW against the backdrop of the five NWS 
resonates in the dual concepts of “Positive Security Assurance” (PSA) and Negative 
Security Assurance” (NSA). On the one hand, Positive Security Assurance is a 
guarantee by a NWS that it will come to the aid of a NNWS if it is attacked by another 
State with nuclear weapons.818 On the other hand, Negative Security Assurance is an 
undertaking by a NWS not use or threatens to use nuclear weapons against a Non-
Nuclear Weapon State NNWS.819 
Fully aware of the effects of the dichotomy between NWS States and NNWS, the 
UNSC in 1968 adopted resolution 255: “Question Relating to Measures to Safeguard 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States” parties to the NPT”.820 This resolution underscores the 
PSA to the NNWS that were concerned that by joining the NPT which prohibits their 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, such membership would put them at risk of possible 
nuclear attack.  
The Resolution 255 and its PSA posture was designed to encourage NNWS to joined 
the NPT. In the same vein, the UNSC in 1995 adopted Resolution 984 which reaffirms 
that NNWS would receive assurance that “the Security Council, and above all its NWS 
permanent members will act immediately in accordance with relevant provisions of the 
Charter of the United Nations” to protect NNWS against attacks or threats of 
aggression relating to use or potential use of nuclear weapons.821 As a result of the 
collaborative security benefits attached to these resolutions, other NNWS who are not 
State party members of the NPT began to lobby for international legally binding 
instrument(s) supporting Negative Security Assurance which they considered as more 
encompassing. 
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The Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco) Additional Protocol of 1968 was the first legally binding 
instrument that lends credence to NSA. This Treaty covering Latin America and the 
Caribbean as a Nuclear Weapon Free Zone (NWFZ) was strongly supported by the 
United States of America. The U.S. signed an undertaking, promising not to use, or 
threatened to use nuclear weapons against signatories to the Treaty with the 
conditional exemption that, if any signatory of the Treaty is working in conjunction with 
any other Weapon NWS.822 This exemption is applied when a signatory of the treaty 
enter into an alliance with any other NWS. 
In recognition of the quest for NSA, the 1978 Final Document of the First Special 
Session of the UNGA on Disarmament, made representations unbehalf of the NNWS 
by asking the NWS to “pursue efforts to conclude appropriate, effective arrangements 
to assure non-nuclear weapon states against the use or threat of use of nuclear 
weapons”.823 
The sharp disparity created by the NPT between the five Nuclear Weapon States NWS 
who are concomitantly the five Permanent Members of the UNSC and the rest of the 
world as NNWS, raised the fundamental research question of, what is the sovereign 
equality implications of this classification? Sovereign equality is a concept under 
positive law embedded in the UN charter which every independent State (member of 
the UN) posses the same rights and obligations as any other indepentdent State in 
international law.824  
Based on this legal truism, many developing countries who are of course NNWS, 
perceived the NPT as promoting hegemony of the States NWS to the NNWS. This 
assertion is exacerbated by the perceived reluctance and the insignificant progress 
made on nuclear disarmament by the NWS; with the obvious absence of proscriptive 
sanctions contained in the NPT. Thus, undermining the principle of sovereign equality.  
Fundamentally, a group of 120 countries of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), NNWS 
and mostly from the Asia and Africa continents, representing political, economic and 
cultural interest of the developing countries, made a proposal of an action plan to the 
NWS in the 2010 NPT Review Conference, for the elimination of all nuclear weapons 
in an irreversible and verifiable procedure in tripartite successive phrases: first phase 
2015 – 2020; second phase 2020 - 2025; and third phase 2025 - 2030.825  
It could be argued, if the five NWS have right of entitlement to possess nuclear 
weapon, under the concept of sovereign equality, inferentially, it necessarily follows 
that every other nation in the world should also have the same right of entitlement to 
possess nuclear weapons. Consequently, the reality of the five NWS as concomitant 
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Permanent Members of the UN Security with decisive veto power on global security 
matters is contrary to the legal maxim: Nemo judex in causa sua (no one should be a 
judge in his own cause). This further re-emphasise the democratic deficit in world 
governance and of the UNSC, security architectural structure. The whole idea of 
sovereign equality under the UN chater seems to be an illussion 
4.4 The Doctrine of Nuclear Deterrence: Military Illusion or Political Solution? 
Rationale for Disarmament 
Prior to the fall of the Berlin Wall,826 the dissolution of the defunct USSR827 and the 
appearance of asymmetric warfare and nuclear terrorism828 as prototypes of armed 
conflict, nuclear deterrence was not a fashionable and contemporaneous public 
discourse. The concept of nuclear deterrence which is paramount to the nuclear age829 
follows the rationale of the first use principle: States reserve the right to use nuclear 
weapons in self-defence against an armed attack threatening their vital security 
interests.830 Intrinsically, it implies that the role of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
deterrence is neither limited nor principally intended to deter the use of nuclear 
weapons, rather it deters nuclear war itself.831 
Nuclear deterrence is the rationale used by the NWS to justify their possession and 
maintenance of their nuclear warheads and armaments.832 Their argument holds that 
if a nation has nuclear capability to launch a nuclear attack by inflicting catastrophic 
and collateral damage on another, the later will be deterred from doing so by refraining 
from attacking the former. Consequently, proponents of nuclear deterrence claim that 
it is responsible for the fact that there has been no nuclear war between the NWS.833  
Due to the strategic nature of nuclear deterrence, the whole global population is 
unwittingly subject to the abeyance of a tense peace fraught with danger. Any peace 
perceived to have been created by the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is analogous to 
a peace existing between two people, holding guns to each other’s heads with their 
fingers on the triggers. The fact remains that since there has been no nuclear war for 
more than seventy years after the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, 
there is no guarantee that nuclear war cannot happen before the next fifty or one 
hundred years in spite of the persuasive arguments in favour of nuclear deterrence. 
Only a single failure of deterrence therory is enough to ignite nuclear war and obliterate 
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hundreds of millions of people with unimaginable economic and envoronmental 
damage to planet earth.  
For nuclear deterrence to continue work effectively, NWS and States with nuclear 
capabilities have to engage in rational behaviour. Successful deterrence requires 
rational opponents who dread the devastating effects of nuclear war and therefore act 
to prevent nuclear war which could end humanity.834 
Throughout the period of the Cold War, the whole of humanity lived with the palpable 
threat of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD). Today, after decades of the Cold War, 
humanity is living in another dimension of MAD – Mutually Assured Delusions.835 The 
dimension of fear embedded in the delusion of deterrence doctrine, that nuclear 
weapons provide protection against nuclear attacks and the reliance on nuclear 
armaments for security in the 21st century. Certainly, nuclear deterrence cannot work 
for the NWS and the rest of the world against terrorist organisations that could come 
into the possession of nuclear weapons. The concept of Matually Assured Delusions 
is what give rise to the military illusion of nuclear deterrence doctrine. 
Reciprocating the exercise of nuclear deterrence is not enough to deter nuclear conflict 
for two reasons. First, nuclear deterrence must be proportional to the contention of a 
given conflict, as nuclear deterrence is not credible without the contemplation of the 
actual use of nuclear weapons.836 This consequently raises the second reason of 
possible circumvention of nuclear deterrence.837  
The later reason was a subject of intense and protracted debate in NATO (North 
Atlantic Treaty Organisation) military doctrine and resulted in the change in Alliance 
Military Doctrine from massive retaliation to flexible response. The doctrine of flexible 
response was formalised at the 1962 Athens Summit and became official doctrine of 
MC 14/3 by the (Military Committee) in 1967.838 Its effective basic principle held that 
NATO’s deterrent posture has to put a potential aggressor in the position to determine 
whether to escalate conventional weapon aggression to nuclear attack.839 
To avoid any nuclear war, NATO has to put in place sufficient and efficient 
conventional forces capable of resisting any aggressor of the 1955 Warsaw Pact. 
Obviously, Western nuclear deterrence is an amount to an encouragement of 
prudence on the side of countries desiring to upset regional or global balance through 
the use or threat of military might.840 
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There is new order of military might or an extended nuclear deterrence which 
expresses or implies a promise made by the NWS to other NNWS to bring their 
deterrent forces to bear in order to guarantee their security against blackmail, threat 
or aggression from third parties.841  
This extended order underpins the military and political dimensions of the entire gamut 
of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence. The deterrence dynamism of a political nature 
and its military role of the use of nuclear weapons is a puzzling and serious problem. 
Rhetorically, what sort of advice would a political leader get from a military authority or 
adviser experienced in nuclear defence system in a nuclear crisis? The ultimate 
determination of nuclear deterrence happens in crisis situation. Nuclear deterrence is 
a complex political process involving nations ruled by democracy,842 not a military 
confrontation between two States. History shows that during crisis situations, 
opponents often misunderstands each other’s intention, despite clear messages been 
conveyed.843 
Arguably, nuclear deterrence strategies are deeply rooted on socio-political and 
psychological dimensions in ways global security issues are perceived and solved. 
From a scientific perspective, it buttresses military Research and Development (R&D). 
The interface between a military establishment sustaining military R&D and political 
bureaucracy constitute the driving force behind the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, 
contemporary global consequences for peace and war.844  
From the foregoing, is obvious that deterrence is predicated upon a nation being able 
to dissuade its adversary from possible nuclear attack by the corresponding threat of 
overwhelming retaliatory counter-attack. Reliance on nuclear deterrence to prevent 
strategic attack is not only dangerous in creating a gap in trust the middle of an 
escalationing crisis but also undermines nuclear disarmament in its entirety. It 
encourages nations to reserve the right to use their nuclear weapons pre-emptively, 
either in the case of ‘First Strike’ or ‘Second Strike’ capability. 
It could be argued, nuclear deterrence is not a recognised legal norm in international 
law; and nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are not effective instruments of 
State policy.845 Viewed from the perspective of International Humanitarian Law, both 
nuclear weapons and nucler deterrence constitute instrumentalities of international 
lawlessness846 and ambitious global political hegemony of the Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS). In the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) on Nuclear 
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Weapon, the ICJ ruled that the threat stands or falls on the same legal grounds as 
actual use.847 
Unambiguously, the World Court unanimously upheld that: “a threat of the use of force 
by means of nuclear weapons that is contrary to Article 2, paragraph 4, of the UN 
Charter and fails to meet all requirement of Article 51 is unlawful.”848 Similarly, the 
threat or use of nuclear weapons must be in conformity with the principles of applicable 
international humanitarian law with specific obligations under international and 
multilateral treaties which out rightly deal with the undertakings on nuclear weapons.849  
Therefore, the combinations of military and political elements embedded in nuclear 
deterrence contravene the legal conditionality on nuclear disarmament. There is no 
circumstance, not even retaliation, upon which the use of nuclear weapons would be 
prudent, moral or legal under international law. The only prudently, morally, legally and 
politically acceptable policy on nuclear weapons would be a concerted effort to achieve 
their universal and total elimination. 
Nuclear deterrence doctrine obviously promotes nuclear proliferation with the 
justification of national defense system against nuclear attacks. States with nuclear 
ambitions and capabilities such as India, Pakistan and North Korea are justifying their 
nuclear programmes on the basis of deterrence and self-defence.   
4.5 The United Nations Disarmament Institutions and Resolutions on Nuclear 
Disarmament 
The UNGA in 1952 by Resolution 502 (VI) established the United Nations 
Disarmament Commission (UNDC) subsumed under the United Nations Security 
Council UNSC with a general mandate on nuclear disarmament discourse and 
questions.850 The UNGA has held three Special Sessions devoted to Disarmament 
(SSOD):  In 1978 SSOD –I,851 in 1982 SSOD – II,852 and in 1988 SSOD – III.853 In 
2007, by Resolution A/16/60, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) 
established an Open-Ended Working Groups that discussed the possibility and the 
agenda of establishing a preparatory committee for an SSOD –IV.854 These sessions 
and deliberations of the UN are in conformity with Article 11 of the United Nations 
Charter that says: 
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“... the General Assembly may consider the general principles of cooperation in the 
maintenance of international peace and security including the principles governing 
disarmament and regulations of armament.”855 
For the purposes of actualising the principles governing disarmament, the UNDC, 
comprised of all the Member States of the United Nations make recommendations in 
all aspect and facets of disarmament. The UNDC also, follows up on the various 
decisions and recommendations on the Special Session of the UNGA.  
Since its inception, the UNDC formulates consensus principles and guidelines on 
nuclear disarmament and is substantively serviced by the United Nations Office for 
Disarmament Affairs (UNODA) under the auspices of the UNGA in collaborations with 
the United Nations Institute for Disarmament Affairs (UNIDIR).856 Following the 
recommendation of its First Committee on Disarmament and International Security, 
The UNGA had adopted 57 Resolutions and 6 Decisions on nuclear weapons and 
disarmament.857 Note worthy amongst these is the very first Resolution of the UNGA 
unanimously approved in January 1946, which stipulated “the elimination from national 
armaments of atomic weapons and of all other major weapons adaptable to mass 
destruction.” 858 
Under the provisions of the UN Charter, the UNSC has the primary responsibility to 
ensure and maintain international peace.859 All UN member States are under un-
negotiated obligation to comply with all the decisions of the Security Council.860 
Essentially, the UNSC takes the leads in determining the existence of a threat to peace 
or act of aggression in any part of the world.861 Fundamentally, it is the responsibility 
of the Security Council to call upon all parties to conflicts to settle by peaceful means, 
by initiating and recommending procedures or terms of settlement.862  
In isolated cases, the Security Council can impose sanctions or even authorise the 
use of force as a last resort to maintain or restore international peace. As a 
consequence of the enormous responsibilities reposed on the UNSC in maintaining 
international peace, the Council in 2004 unanimously adopted Resolution 1540 in 
conformity with Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, obliging States to refrain 
from supporting non-States actors from developing, acquiring, manufacturing, 
possessing, transporting, transferring or using nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons and their delivery systems.863  
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On 24 September 2009, the UNSC affirmed its commitment by a U.S. Sponsored 
Resolution 1887, on the non-proliferation and the prevention of spread of Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMD) in the world, for the ultimate aim of attaining the goal of a 
world free of nuclear weapons.864 Consequent upon this Resolution, the UNSC formed 
an elaborate thematic framework for reducing global nuclear danger, in an 
unprecedented high-level Summit meeting presided over by President Barack Obama 
of the United States of America.865  
In the same vein, the Security Council re-affirmed its commitment on 19 November 
2008, in an organised open thematic debate on strengthening collective security 
through general regulation and reduction of nuclear armaments.866 Prequel to this 
thematic debate, the Security Council passed Resolution 1835, on 27 September 2008 
which was sequel to an earlier negotiated solution to the Iranian nuclear programme 
and urged Iran to comply with its obligations and cooperation with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).867 
With all these Resolutions, the UNSC desires a peaceful and safer world for all and to 
make provisions for the achievable possibility of a world without nuclear weapons in 
conformity with the set goals of the NPT. In the light of the principle of undiminished 
security for all, the UNSC encourage all nations in the world to adhere to their 
obligations in way that promote international security and stability. The United Nations 
has demonstrated its commitments to nuclear disarmament by encouraging all States 
to ensure their commitments to a peaceful and safer world. As a result of the United 
Nations commitments, so far, no non-State actors have acquired nuclear weapons. 
This underscores the truism: prevension is better than cure. Thus, the United Nations 
approach have prevented non-States actors for acquiring nuclear weapons. 
4.6 Nuclear Disarmament: Challenges and Hindrances 
In the face of the need for any government to pursue its supreme security interest 
within the ambit of international law868 and the conspicuous threats that presently exist 
as a consequence of an active international terrorist coordinated clandestine 
network869, the path toward a world without nuclear weapons has been unequivocally 
well marked. This path has been further developed and agreed upon in the multilateral 
nuclear weapons treaties and review processes linked to the NPT.  
However, the prevailing actions in actualising disarmament are obviously 
unprecedentedly slow.870 The NWS and their allies as well as other nations with 
nuclear ambition and capabilities are consciously shifting the focus from disarmament 
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to non-proliferation.871 The 1996 Advisory Opinion of ICJ holds that the threat and use 
of nuclear weapons was generally illegal but does not clarify whether the illegality is 
applicable “in extreme circumstances of self-defence in which the very survival of a 
State would be at stake”.872 
The first and the major identifiable challenge hindering nuclear disarmament is 
embedded in the NPT. The codification of Article VI of the NPT specifies that each 
parties including the de jure NWS:  
“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on 
effective measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms race at an early date to 
nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under 
strict and effective international control”.873  
The disarmament requirement of this provision has not worked and the 183 party-
signatories are in formal non-compliance with this obligation by not pursuing the 
required negotiations on a treaty on general and complete disarmament. Arguably, in 
as much as it promotes non-prolferation, the NPT is the mainstay global legal 
instrument on nuclear weapons; therefore, unanimous violation of its essential 
provisions by all its signatories is a legal disservice to the entire disarmament 
negotiations.  
Disarmament requires nuclear non-proliferation and non-proliferation is a pre-
condition for nuclear disarmament in the sense that it renders the existence of nuclear 
weapons unecessary. In practical procedure terms, the development of non-
proliferation regime is durably affecting disarmament as disarmament is perceived as 
pervasive with deep-seated suspicion that it is not immediately realisable in 
contradistinction to non-proliferation as ultimately reliable. All the Nuclear Weapon 
States (NWS) to a very large extend have contingency votes of varying vast sums of 
money to modernise, upgrade and expand the size and lethality of their nuclear 
armaments and their vehicular delivery systems.874  
Presently, progress on nuclear disarmament is at a standstill and at the risk of being 
overkaken by some States such as North Korea expressed ambition for acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. The delegation on the Conference on Disarmament (CD) and the 
Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on disarmament, acknowledged there are no 
existing legally binding restrictions on the nuclear developments of the four de facto 
non NPT nations (India, Israel, Pakistan and North Korea) 875 with nuclear capabilities, 
actually possess nuclear weapons. 
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Also, from the information publicly available, there are no on-going bilateral or 
multilateral negotiations curtailing or regulating the reduction of the stockpiles of the 
five de jure Nuclear Weapon States NWS. The OEWG initiative “to fill the legal gap for 
the prohibition and elimination of nuclear weapons” has not produced a unified, 
realistic diplomatic and political proposal for halting nuclear competition or starting 
multilateral disarmament discourse.876 
Ostensibly, an important treaty like the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) as at 
the time of writing up this thesis has not yet entered into force,877 apparently as a result 
of political division and inaction by the Nuclear Weapon States (NWS). The current 
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) strategic Concept for a new approach to 
nuclear weapons and its deterrence doctrine, portray nuclear weapons as being 
“essential to preserve peace”,878 This is synonymous to the logic of nuclear deterrence 
theory uphold by the NWS. However, it could be argued that this NATO’s position 
presents an unacceptable risk to humanity. The principle of nuclear weapons 
elimination, not their retention that is essential to security, but in reality it is vice versa. 
The United States official policies to research a nuclear earth-penetrating weapon for 
use as a bunker buster and to reduce the frequency of repeating underground 
testing,879 to develop smaller and more usable nuclear weapons880 and its doctrine of 
pre-emptive war881 have imaginably raised the possibility of future nuclear wars. These 
U.S. policies and State practice on nuclear posture have been deemed provocative to 
countries that the American government classified as the “Axis of Evil”882 (e.g. North 
Korea). This phrase designates countries that constitute potential threats to the United 
States of America. Consequently, most of these countries seem to have developed 
unbridled inclination for acquisition of nuclear weapons as deterrent for retaliatory 
strike capabilities in the face of what they percieved U.S. intimidation and threats. 
The insistence of the United States retaining and maintaining nuclear weapons option 
spur the whole world, especial nations with nuclear ambition and capabilities in 
reinforcing their reluctance to push for necessary steps towards non-proliferation and 
nuclear disarmament. The United States as the militarily and economically the most 
powerful country in the world as well as the first nation that manufactured nuclear 
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weapons and the only country that have used them, has the special task to lead in 
achieving its obligations for nuclear disarmament under international law.883 
4.7 The 1996 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the 
Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons 
On 8 July 1996, the ICJ delivered two separate advisory opinions on two different 
requests received from the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations 
General Assembly (UNGA) respectively on the question of the legality of nuclear 
weapons under international law.884 The ICJ also known as the World Court is the 
principal judicial organ of the United Nations885 and its Statute constitutes an integral 
part of the United Nations Charter.886 The ICJ is consists of 15 judges representing 
the various regions and principal legal system of the world.887 In addition to its 
fundamental function of delivery judgments in contentious cases submitted to it by 
States, the ICJ is obliged under Article 96(2) of the United Nations Charter to offer 
advisory opinion at the request of any UN organ or specialized agency.888 
On December 20 1994, the UNGA requested the World Court to give an advisory 
opinion on the legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons in any circumstance 
permitted under international law.889 First of all, the ICJ acknowledged the UNGA 
competence to submit such an important request, arising from the UN Charter and the 
UN’s longstanding position on nuclear disarmament.  
The ICJ affirmed that the request was related to a legal question within the confines 
of Article 96(1)890 of its Statute and the UN Charter, and that there were no persuasive 
reasons to refuse the request, regardless of the fact that the question did not related 
to any specific dispute and was couched in abstract terms.891 
In the determination of the legality or otherwise of the threat or actual use of nuclear 
weapons, the ICJ decided that the most directly relevant applicable law governing the 
United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) are:  
1. The provision of the United Nations Charter relating to the threat or use of force. 
2. The Principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) that form part 
of the law applicable in armed conflict and the law of neutrality, and  
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3. Any relevant specific treaties on nuclear weapons.892 
In applying any of these laws, the ICJ opined that it is crucial to take into consideration 
certain characteristic features of nuclear weapons, particularly their annihilating 
capacity that can cause unthinkable human suffering for future generations.893  
In view of the United Nations Charter relating to the threat or use of force, the ICJ 
considered Article 2(4) – generally prohibiting the threat or use of force;894  
Article 51 – recognising every State’s inherent right of individual or collective self-
defence in the event of an armed attack;895 
 and Article 42 – authorising the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) to take 
military enforcement measure.896  
These provisions do not prohibit or refer to any specific weapons and as a result, the 
World Court held that the provisions apply to any use of force, irrespective of the kind 
of weapon employed, and “a weapon that is already unlawful per se whether by treaty 
or custom cannot become lawful by reason of its being used for a legitimate purpose 
under the UN Charter”.897  
Furthermore, ICJ held that whatever the means of force used in self-defence, the dual 
customary conditions of necessity and proportionality and the applicable law in armed 
conflict apply to Article 51, including an additional consideration as to the very 
character of nuclear weapons and the devastating risks associated with their use.898  
In spite of the undisputed applicability of the principles and rules of IHL and the law of 
neutrality, the ICJ was aware that the conclusions to be deduced from this applicability 
would be controversial. Consequently, the Court admitted in its ruling that the unique 
characteristics of nuclear weapons and their use are in fact scarcely reconcilable in 
view of the legal dictates of the applicable law of armed conflicts.899  
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The ICJ examined and explained Article VI of the NPT that obliges negotiation in a 
good faith towards complete disarmament.900 All the judges unanimously held that the 
provision enshrined in Article VI implies an obligation to achieve precise result-nuclear 
disarmament in all its facets and aspects by adopting a particular course of conduct, 
that is, to pursue and conclude negotiations in conformity with the basic principle of 
good faith with the official involvement of all the 183 member States signatories to the 
Treaty which constitute the vast majority of the international community.901 
The essence of this distinctive ICJ Advisory Opinion on the question of the legality of 
the threat or use of nuclear weapons is determinative to this research. It underlies the 
global judicial propriety that is not only essential but provide a yardstick of 
measurement that supports analytic exposition of international law and treaties relating 
to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament.  
Clearly speaking, the ICJ considered the legality of nuclear weapons in the context of 
environmental902 and principles of humanitarian law.903 The ICJ opined that the threat 
or use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to all international law regulating the 
conduct of warfare. The World court did not enact any new law concerning nuclear 
weapons but made references to certain existing principles of IHL regulating the 
methods and conduct of war such as principles of necessity and proportionality.904  
The ICJ acknowledged that the characteristic features of nuclear weapons are 
immensely destructive and cannot be contained in either space or time thereby making 
their use inherently incompatible with the rules of armed conflict.905 In negating the 
argument that nuclear weapons use are not prohibited under any specific treaty, the 
ICJ made reference to Marten clause (named after the Russian foreign minister) at the 
1889 first Hague Peace Confernce. The Marten Clause provides that cases not 
covered by international agreement, both combantants and civilians are protected on 
the basis of the principles of international law derivable from customary principles of 
humanity and public conscience.906 The Advisory Opinion is encapusaluted on Article 
VI of the NPT that stipulate the disarmament obligation through negotiations in good 
faith the process and legal instrument for complete nuclear disarmament.907  
In line with the violation of the principles of IHL and the customary principle of 
humanity, any use of nuclear weapons in warfare would amount to war crime under 
the provisions of Article 8 of the 2002 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. 
This Article covers a wide range of war crimes ranging from attacks interntionally 
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directed against the civilian population in Article 8(2)(i)908 and attacks on prohibited 
weapons used on undefended dwelling places which are not military objectives in 
Article 8(2)(b)(v).909 Most of the provisions of Article 8 are applicable to international 
armed conflict. Consequently, the use of nuclear weapons as a result of their inherent 
and indiscriminate destructive nature constitute world crime and gross violation of 
armed conflict law. Therefore, nuclear weapons as weapons which usage are 
prohibitive on warfare should be eliminated through disarmament. 
4.8 The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT): A Framework 
for Nuclear Weapons Treaties 
The 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is the main international 
legal instrument that regulates all other treaties contracted between States.910 The 
VCLT defines a treaty and relates it to how other treaties are contracted, operated, 
amended, interpreted, and terminated. It does not aim to create specific substantive 
rights and obligations on the engagements of parties.911 However, the VCLT governs 
all treaties regardless of their subject matters or objectives.912 
 
The VCLT was adopted on 22 May 1969 and opened for signature on 23 May 1969 
by the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties.913 The Conference was 
convened pursuant to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions 
2166 (XXI)914 of 5 December 1966; and 2287 (XXII)915 of December 6 1967. The 
Conference held two sessions, both at the Neue Hofburg in Vienna. The first session 
was held from 26 March to 24 May 1968 and the second session was held from 9 April 
to 22 May 1969. In addition to the Convention, the UN Conference adopted the Final 
Act and certain declarations and resolutions, which are annexed to that Act.  
 
The 1969 Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) entered into force on 27 January 
1980 and has been ratified by the total of 144 States till date. Some States that have 
not yet ratified the VCLT acknowledge it as a restatement of Customary Public 
International Law that has binding effect upon them.916 States that have not yet ratified 
the VCLT include the United States of America, Islamic Republic of Iran, Pakistan, 
Cambodia, Co’te d’Ivoire, El Salvador, Ethiopia, and Kenya. Others are Ghana, 
Luxembourge, Madagascar, Nepal Pakistan, Trinida, and Tobago.917 
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The VCLT Article 7(1) obliges a State representative to exercise full powers in 
adopting the text of a treaty as well as to make an exception which recognises that 
States more often than not, agree to dispense with full power.918 This provision is 
analogously applicable to all the nuclear weapon treaties, especially the Nuclear 
Weapon Free Zones (NWFZs) treaties; whereby the rules are mainly outstanding, 
leaving the operational practice of treaty in the hands of States. 
 
The VCLT is deemed as a framework for the newly emerged Treaty on the Prohibition 
of nuclear weapons (TPNW). The TPNW was adopted by the UNGA Resolution 
71/258 on 7 July 2017,919 as a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear weapons. 
The TPWN was opened for signature on 20 September 2017 with an indefinite 
durational life span. As at the time of writing this theis (December, 2017) the Treaty 
has 53 signatories and 3 ratifications. The TPNW requires at least 50 ratifications and 
enter into force 90 days after such ratifications.920 
 
The TPNW has its roots on the Humanitarian Initiative, a push for nuclear disarmament 
on the basis of severe humanitarian consequences that would arise from any nuclear 
war. A total of 160 States supported the Humanitarian Initiative at the 2015 NPT 
Review Conference.921 When come into force, the TPNW would invariably supersedes 
the NPT.  
 
4.9 The Adoption of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) 
by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA): A Timely Emergence and 
Milestone Development to this Present Research 
Background to the Emergence of the Treaty 
The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) as stated above was 
adopted on 7 July 2017 by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), in a United 
Nations Treaty conference to negotiate a legally binding instrument to prohibit nuclear 
weapons, leading towards total disarmament.922 The adopting of the TPNW was a 
follow up to the UNGA Resolution A/RES/71/258 - “taking forward multilateral nuclear 
disarmament negotiations” on 23 December 2016,923 and the recommendations of the 
UN Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG) on “talking forward multilateral disarmament 
negotiations” pursuant to UNGA Resolution on 7 December 2015. The sole mandate 
of the OEWG was the review of concrete legal measures, legal provisions and norms 
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that would need to be concluded to attain and maintain a world without nuclear 
weapons.  
The legal roots of the adoption of the TPNW are traceable to the provision of Article 
VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which says:  
“Each of the State party to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith 
on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date 
and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament 
under strict effective international control”.924 
The continuous consensus on the legal obligation – to pursue nuclear weapons 
disarmament has not been reflected in action, inspite of efforts of many States over 
many decades in the United Nations General Assembly and in the Conference on 
Disarmament. This apparently led to a renewed momentum in the United Nations 
General Assembly, in which turn led to the Assembly mandate for the negotiations and 
adoption of the TPNW. 
The total of 124 States participated in the conference, 122 States voted for the 
adoption of the treaty, one (the Netherlands) voted against the adoption, and one 
(Singapore) abstained.925 The TPNW which is the first multilateral legal instrument 
prohibiting nuclear weapons was opened for signature on 20 September 2017 in the 
United Headquarters in New York926 in conformity with Article 13 which says: “This 
Treaty Shall be opened for signature to all States at the United Nations Headquarters 
in New York as from 20 September 2017.”927 The TPNW is open for any UN member 
State irrespective of their participation in its negotiation processes.  
In line with its Article 15(1), the TPWN “… shall come into force 90 days after the fiftieth 
instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession has been deposited.”928 
Up to the time of writing this thesis (December 2017) the TPNW has 53 signatories 
and only three State parties (Guyana, The Holy See and Thailand) have ratified it on 
the same day it was opened for signature.929  
The Non-participation of the Nine States Known to Possess Nuclear weapons 
on the Treaty NegotiationProcess 
All the five NWS (United States, United Kingdom, China, France and Russia) and the 
four States (Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea) known to possess nuclear 
weapons were consistently absent through the negotiations of the TPNW, including 
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the UNGA debates, the formal treaty negotiations process and the voting on the final 
text. Justifying the boycott of the United States from the entire treaty negotiating 
process, the United States Ambassador to the United Nations Niki Haley said “in this 
day and time we can’t honestly say that we can protect our people by allowing the bad 
actors to have nuclear weapons and those of us that are good, trying to keep peace 
and safety, not to have them”.930  
In the same vein, the United Kingdom Ambassador to the United Nations, Matthew 
Rycroft equally justified the British non-participation in the treaty process by saying 
“The UK is not attending the negotiations on a treaty to prohibit nuclear weapons 
because we do not believe that those negotiations will lead to effective progress on 
global nuclear disarmament.”931 Furthermore, the United Kingdom believes that the 
best way to achieve the goal of global nuclear disarmament is through gradual 
multilateral disarmament, negotiated using a step-by- step approach and within 
existing international legal frameworks, especially the NPT.932 
Regardless of the non-participation of the above named States known to possess 
nuclear weapons on TPNW process, the States that negotiated the TPNW have clearly 
expressed the view that the possession and potential use of nuclear weapons is an 
existential threat to humanity which cannot be over looked as a result of the fact that 
few States that possess nuclear weapons are not willingly to take proactive steps to 
get rid of their nuclear armaments. However, without the participation of the States 
possessing nuclear weapons especially the five NWS, the TPNW may stand as a mere 
idealistic statement similar to the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty which has 
not entered into force for more than two decades after it was opened for signature. 
Also, the disapproval of the five NWS on the TPWN who are the five permanent 
members of UNSC may adversely affect the TPNW coming into force bearing in mind 
their veto power on global security issues and their enormous influence over many 
other States who are their allies on possible non-ratification of the TPNW.   
The Legal Arguments and the Potential Impact of the Non-participation of the 
Nine States Known to Possess Nuclear Weapons on the TPNW 
The five officially recognised Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) and the four other nuclear 
possessor States have expressed two main legal arguments against the adoption of 
the TPNW. The first argument is, the TPNW stand the risk of undermining the NPT, 
which they consider as the cornerstone of the nuclear weapons legal framework.933 
Significantly, the TPNW reaffirmed the NPT in its preamble as the cornerstone 
instrument on nuclear disarmament.934 Their second agument is the TPNW cannot 
have any normative impact in any given time because it was negotiated without the 
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input from them, the States evidently known to possess nuclear weapons and it would 
not be ratified by any of them.935    
However, basic international legal analysis does not support either of these 
arguments. The TPNW would not undermine the NPT, rather it would complement it. 
According to the 1969 Veinna Convention on the Law of Treaties, when two treaties 
deal with overlapping subject matter, and when the parties to the later treaty do not 
include all the parties to the earlier treaty, the later treaty does not affect or disrupt the 
existing treaty relationship for States not joining the new treaty.936 In line with these 
provisions, the TPNW cannot be viewed to undermine the obligations and provisions 
of the NPT. 
To ensure that the TPNW does not in any way undermine the NPT or ther any other 
legal instrument on nuclear disarmament, Article 18 of the TPNW provides that its 
implementation “shall not prejudice obligations undertaken by States parties in regard 
to existing international agreements, to which thet are party, where those obligation 
are consistent with the Treaty”.937 
Concerning the the argument on normative impact of the TPNW without the nuclear 
weapons posseing States, practice have shown that normative development is 
possible even without the involvement of specially concerned States. Treaties do and 
can shift international expectations and result in change of policy over time irrespective 
of the States that have remain outside a particular legal instrument. In the absence of 
the involvement of most powerful States, treaties can make remarkable impact over 
time such as the TPNW that is widely supported but not universally accepted.938     
United States Position on the TPNW 
According to the official statement of U.S. Department of States, Diplomacy in Action, 
the United States did not participate in the negotiations of the TPNW and will not 
support the Treaty.  
“Over many years and under various Administrations, we have made clear our 
willingness to work together with all States to improve international security and reduce 
the risk of nuclear war. However, this proposed treaty – which ignores the current 
challenges that nuclear deterrence necessary – will not result in the elimination of a 
single nuclear weapons, nor will it enhance the security of any State. No State that 
possess nuclear weapons participated in these negotiations, and no U.S. ally that 
relies on extended nuclear deterrence supported the final text.”939 
In the view of Ambassodor Robert Wood, the U.S. permament respresentative to the 
Conference on Disarmament, the TPNW “is a bad idea, prohibiting nuclear weapons 
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would not make the world a safer place or reduce stockpiles by even one”. 
Ambassador Wood warned that the treaty would exacerbate division that already exist 
in the non-proliferation and disarmament communities.940 In the same vein, Christ 
Ford, Special Assistant to President Trump and Senior Director for Weapons of Mass 
Destruction and Counter-proliferation on the U.S. National Security Council said, “The 
TPNW is ineffective at best and may in fact be deeply counterproductive”941 
Furthermore, the United States officially maintained that it would never become a party 
to the treaty banining nuclear weapons because: 
“Nuclear disarmament cannot take place in a vacuum. It require a transformation of 
the international security environment, consensus-based approaches that include 
States that possess nuclear weapons as well as those that do not, rigorous verification 
and swift and sure enforcement against potential violation. We call on all States to join 
us in intensifying our efforts to address the real security challenges the international 
community would need to overcome…”942 
The United States consider the TPNW a distraction from the real-world effort to make 
the world a safer place and at worst; it will deepen political division as well as 
undermine alliance relationship that would make the world more secure. The United 
States also believe the TPNW will make it harder for the international community to 
work together in devising and implementing effective measures that will let meet these 
challenges together.943 
United Kingdom Position on the TPNW 
Just like the United States, the United Kingdom did not participate in the TPNW 
negotiation processes. Following the conclusion of the negotiations and the adoption 
of the treaty by the United Nations, the United Kingdom officially made it clear that it 
would not sign, ratify or become a party to the TPNW. 
“As we have previously made it very clear, we do not believe that this treaty will bring 
us closer to a world without nuclear weapons. This reaty fails to address the key issues 
that must first be overcome to achieve lasting global nuclear disarmament.It will not 
improve the international security environment or increase trust and transparency. The 
unpredictable international security environment we face today demands the 
maintaince of our nuclear deterrent for the near future. And we cannot rule out further 
shifts in the international security context which would put us, or our NATO allies, 
under grave threat.”944 
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The United Kingdom strongly believe that the TPNW would undermine and weaken 
the NPT, which has played a significant role in curtailing the nuclear arms race. As a 
responsible Nuclear Weapon State, the UK reaffirmed it commitments ro continue to 
work with international partners towards creating the condition for a world without 
nuclear weapons.945    
The firm believe of the UK is that the best way to achieve a world without nuclear 
weapons is through gradual multilateral disarmament negotiated using a step-by-step 
approach, within existing international frameworks. The United Kingdom have 
expressed that it would not accept any argument that the TPNW can constitute to a 
development of customary international law binding on the United Kingdom.946  
Russia Position on the TPNW 
Russia has officialy declared that the TPNW which was passed in the United Nations 
is contrary to Russia’s national security interests. The Director of the Russian Foreign 
Ministry’s Department for Non-Proliferation and Arms Control Mikhail Ulyanov 
expresses that: 
“it (TPNW) contradicts Russia’s national interest and our vision of how to move toward 
nuclear disarmament. We have always confirmed that we share the goal of creating a 
nuclear-free world, joined a number of politically binding declarations on this matter, 
but we have repeatedly emphasised that this is a long term goal, the way to which 
should be phased, and that the network in this direction should be pursued in terms of 
strenhthening strategic stability and taking into account the national security interests 
of all countries, including of course, Russia”947. 
The Russian government believe that it is irresponsible to call for complete destruction 
of global nuclear arsenals in the current political environment characterised by 
unpredictability, violence and conflict. Like the United States, Russia is of the view that 
reduction of nuclear weapons does not happen in a vacuum, but in a modern world 
that is very far from being perfect. A world that is becoming more turbulent, conflict-
ridden and unpredictable.948 
Similar to the United States, Russia, therefore, call on all States for a more sober and 
realistic approach to the task of nuclear disarmament. Russia believe that under 
current conditions, it is not serious, even irresponsible to raise the issue of total 
destruction of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons are objectively one of the 
guarantors of international security.949 
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China Position on the TPNW  
Like the rest of the five Nuclear Weapon States, China boycotted the negotiations on 
theTPNW but it was the most responsive of the five Nuclear Weapon States. China 
was the only one of these five States that did not vote against the commencement of 
the TPNW in the United Nations General Assembly. As expressed by the Foreign 
Ministry Spokesperson of China, Hua Chunying: “final comprehensive ban on and total 
destruction of nuclear weapons was fundamentally in line with the purposes of the 
negotiation on nuclear weapons ban treaty”950 
However, at a point in time, the TPNW appeared unacceptable to China as China 
possesses and stockpiles nuclear weapons and maintain the policy of nuclear 
retaliation after a nuclear strike by a State enemy. China made it clear that it cannot 
adhere to the core prohibition of the TPNW but it shares much of the spirit behind the 
treaty. Certain principle of the treaty align with both foreign and domestic Chinese 
policies.China believes that the TPNW would not undermine its existing nuclear 
policies as long as it does not sign it.China is dispose to actively angage with the 
TPNW as a non-State party and would continue to promote nuclear disarmament951. 
France Position on the TPNW  
France like the other Nuclear Weapon States boycotted all the negotiation processes 
of the TPNW and as such does not recognise and accept the treaty. France consider 
the TPNW as a text unsuited to the international security context, characterised by 
growing tension and the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as shown inter 
allia by North Korea nuclear threat.952  
“France’s security and defence policy just like those of its allies and other close 
partners is based on nuclear deterrence. Deterrence aims to protect our country from 
any State-led aggression against it vital interests, of whatever origin abd in what ever 
form.” The international situation permits no weakness. In this respect, a treaty 
banning nuclear weapons risks affecting the security of the Euro-Atlantic region and 
international stability”953. 
France also believe that nuclear disarmament is not achieved by degree. It must be 
built. France remained determined to implement the concrete stages in nuclear 
disarmament in accordance to its commitments under the NPT. Furthermore, the 
government of France expresses thus:  
“France has alrealdy taken concrete, substantial disarmament measures in particular 
by halving its nuclear arsenals, stopping nuclear tests, ratifying the Comprehensive 
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Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and irreversibly closing its facilities which produce fissile 
material for nuclear weapons. We shall also continue our efforts to promote 
international security and stability, including when it comes to combating the 
proliferation of Weapons of Mass destruction”.954 
France is categorical in saying the TPNW “does not bind us and it does not creat new 
obligation.” It is France’s believe that the decision of a large number of state – Nuclear 
Weapon States and other States possessing or not possessing nuclear weapons –not 
to participate in the negotiations, in Europe and Asia in particular, cogently illustrate 
this disparity.955 
Legal Analysis and Conflict of NATO Nuclear Posture and the Interpretations of 
the TPNW Obligations 
There are numerous legal issues associated with the TPNW. These issues include the 
disparity existing between the NATO nuclear weapons commitments derived from 
Article 5 of the 1949 Washington North Atlantic Treaty and the provisions and 
obligations of the TPNW. NATO defence policy has a longstanding commitment to 
nuclear weapons sharing arrangements. Currently, five NATO States have 
agreements with the United States on the basis that the United States nuclear 
armaments are stationed in their territories and to be used by the host States’ military 
in an event of any armed conflict. These States are the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Germany, Italy and Turkey. This explains the Netherlands uncharacteristic vote 
against the adoption of the TPNW. It is believed that 180 United States B-61 
thermonuclear weapons are presently residual in these States; the largest of these 
nuclear armouries are stationed at the Aviano Air base in Italy and Incirik Air base in 
Turkey.956 
Contrary to the NATO defence policy of nuclear sharing agreement, Article 1(g) of the 
TPNW provides that no States party shall “allow any stationing, installation or 
deployment of any nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices in its territory 
or at any place under its jurisdiction or control.”957 This provision closes the loophole 
in Article II of the NPT upon which NATO predicated their nuclear arrangements .The 
TPWN does not have provisions for safeguards or verification and compliance 
obligations. The TPNW requires each State party to conclude or maintain its existing 
safeguards agreements with the IAEA in its Articles 3(2) and 4(3). This lack of 
safeguards obligation in the TPNW is contentious and fraught with implications of non-
verification and substantial non-compliance. 
NATO has a long-standing opposition to the TPWN. It opposes the TPNW on the 
ground that it undermines the long-term gradual disarmament process through the 
existing instrument of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and abolishes the 
international security dynamics that support the reliance on nuclear deterrence 
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doctrine.958 In its official statement released after the TPWN was opened for signature 
on the 20 September 2017, NATO expressed that the TPWN did not only “disregards 
the realities of the increasingly challenging international security environment” but also 
seriously undermined the NPT by “creating divisions and divergences at a time when 
a unified approach is required more than ever”959. 
However, NATO cannote continue to undermine the reality of the TPNW. On the one 
hand, many non-nuclear weapon NATO States are in dilemma between their 
commitment to NATO on its nuclear weapons posture and their national aspirations 
and obligations on nuclear disarmament. On the other hand, these non-nuclear 
weapon NATO States consider internal government security interest over and above 
their foreign public policy statements. All NATO States have interacted differently on 
diferent treaties over time. This obviously have wider implications for their alliance to 
NATO and by extension the alliance of the non-nuclear weapon NATO States to NATO 
on the TPNW in the long term. 
Non-Nuclear Weapon NATO States and their Interests on the TPNW 
The conflict of alliance of the non-nuclear weapon NATO States that are strong 
supporters of the TPNW yet maintain close defence and security cooperation with 
NATO is a determining and deciding factor on the long-term NATO position on the 
TPNW. For Example, Sweden is a country closely intergrated with NATO in its 
operations, yet has commenced a comprehensive review to determine whether it is on 
its national interest to sign and ratify the TPNW. Similarly, Austria and Ireland have 
strong supports for nuclear prohibition at the same time maintain their security 
cooperations with NATO.960 
From these indications, the TPNW is having difficult but necessary supports within 
NATO. NATO member States, which have divided interests between the organisation 
and the TPNW should collectively decide how to balance their engagement with the 
treaty as well as to continue to their commitements with NATO on nuclear deterrence. 
NATO States by reason of their alliance where nuclear weapons constitute part of 
mutual defence would invariably be violating the provisions of Article 1 of the TPNW.  
Article 1(a) and (d) include prohibitions on the development, production, testing, and 
use of threat of nuclear weapons. Article 1(e) further prohibits States from assisting, 
encouraging or inducing any State in any way in enageing in any activity prohibited by 
the treaty.961 These provisions directly affect the non-nuclear weapons NATO States 
that host the United States nuclear weapons in their territorial lands. These countries 
includes the Netherland, Germany, Belgium, Italy and Turkey. Specifically, Article 1(g) 
prohibits “any stationing, installations or deployment of any nuclear weapons”962 in the 
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territory of any signatory to the treaty. Consequently, in as much as nuclear weapons 
remain a central focus to NATO’s mission and defence, membership of the alliance 
will definitely be incompatible with the norms of the TPNW. 
Political Analysis and Interpretation of the TPNW in the Context of the NPT 
The TPWN will most likely have tremendous impact on the international politics 
associated with nuclear weapons diplomacy surrounding the NPT. The NPT Review 
Conference is scheduled for every five years and the next conference is in 2020. It is 
expected to see how the State parties to the TPNW desire to bring the treaty into 
existence in replacement of the NPT considered fraught with limitations. No doubt, the 
TPNW stands as an implementation of Article VI of the NPT and the TPNW State 
parties would want it to be acknowledged as such in the next NPT review conference. 
However, the NPT Review Conference final document are usually unpredictable, and 
if there is a sharp political division between the State parties to the TPNW and the 
nuclear weapons possessing States who are obviously against the TPNW on a 
consensus on the emergence of the TPNW in the next NPT conference, it would be a 
major political and a potential disservice to the TPNW.  
The TPNW stands as an envisaged replacement of the NPT political division of the 
world into ‘nuclear haves’ and ‘nuclear have not’ by forcefully putting disarmament into 
front and centre of international nuclear diplomacy and the longstanding frustration of 
the NPT State parties on non-compliance of the NWS with Article VI of the NPT. The 
nine possessing nuclear weapons States can continue to avoid signing and ratifying 
the TPNW but it will be difficult and almost impossible for them to negate the fact of 
the expressed will of the international community that nuclear weapons should be 
banned and their development, possession and use are prohibited under international 
law. 
Textual Structure of the TPNW 
The Preamble 
The TPNW has a comprehensive preamble that put into cognizance the catastrophic 
consequences of nuclear weapons, acknowledging the ethical imperatives for nuclear 
disarmament based on principles and rules of International Humanitarian Law. The 
preamble also expresses concern on the slow pace of nuclear disarmament and the 
continued reliance on nuclear weapons in military and security concepts, as well as 
recognising that a legally binding prohibition of nuclear weapons constitute an 
important contribution towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of 
nuclear weapons.   
The TPNW is the first global and multilateral legal instrument that specifically frame 
nuclear weapons as a threat to humanity and contrary to international humanitarian 
law. The preamble expresses the humanitarian case and stressing the concern for the 
catastrophic humanitarian consequences nuclear weapons. Consequently, the 
preamble portray the treaty as a legal instrument establishing a powerful norm against 
nuclear weapons and generating pressure for the need for disarmament through 
“disarmament education”, raising awareness and and dissemination of its principles 
and norms. The preamble clearly clarifies that the TPNW solely deals with nuclear 
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weapons but recognising States inalienable right to peaceful uses of nucear energy, 
a derivative of the NPT Article IV. 
Article 1: Categorical Prohibitions 
TPNW has a total numbers of 20 Articles with its essential obligations caterogically 
prohibiting nuclear weapons contain in Article 1, as follows: 
Each State party undertakes never under any circumstance to: 
a) “Develop, test, produce, manufacture otherwise acquire, possess or stockpile 
nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosives devices; 
b) Transfer to any recipient whatsoever nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices or control over such weapons or explosive devices directly 
or indirectly. 
c) Receive the transfer of or control over nuclear weapons or other nuclear 
explosive devices directly or indirectly, 
d) Use or threaten to use nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; 
e) Assist, encourage or induce, in any way, anyone to engage in any activity 
prohibited to a State party under this treaty; 
f) Allow any stationing, installation or development of any nuclear weapons or 
other nuclear explosive devices in its territory at any place under its jurisdiction 
or control”.963  
Articles 2 - 4: Provisions for Declarations, Safegaurds and Total Elimination of 
Nuclear Weapons by Nuclear Weapons States and their Allies  
Though the TPWN was successfully negotiated by only the Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States (NNWS) there are provisional frameworks for the Nuclear Weapon States 
(NWS) and their allies to join the treaty. The treaty provides two pathways for States 
with nuclear weapons either to destroy their nuclear stockpiles before joing or join 
before starting a timebound disarmament process. As a requirement, Article 2 provide 
that all States joining the treaty shouls make a declaration regarding whether they 
have ever “owned, possessed or controlled any nuclear weapons.”964 However, Article 
4 offers States with nuclear weapons the opportunity to join the treaty with their nuclear 
weapons in their possession (or stationed in their territory), as long as the weapons 
are immediately removed from operation status and agree to “legally binding, time-
bound plan for the verified and irreversible elimination” approved by the treaty member 
States965. 
To ensure that nuclear weapons are being destroyed and to verify nuclear materials 
are kept safe and to prevent their diversion, Article 3 requires all signatories to the 
treaty to adopt safeguards supervised by the International Atomic Energy Agency.966 
The TPNW allows safeguards to become stronger over time and prohibit weaking of 
                                                          
963 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017, art 1,  
964 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017, art 2 
965 Ibid, art 4 
966 Ibid, art 3 
177 
 
safeguard regime. (Articles 3 & 4). These provisions prevent States from “forum-
shopping” between the TPNW and the NPT.  
Articles 5: Delegitimisation of Nuclear Weapons and National Implementation 
To ensure that the treaty has a legitimate and administrative force, Article 5 which has 
just two paragraphs requires all the treaty membem-States, to put in place, …all 
appropriate legal, administrative and other measures, including the imposition of penal 
sactions, to prevent and suppress any activity prohibited to a State Party under this 
Treaty undertaken by persons or on territory under its jurisdiction or control.967 This 
particular provision addresses the potential harms of nuclear weapons and 
underscores the legal basis for their prohibition and enforcement.  
Articles 6:  A Provision for Victims’ Assistance and Environmental Remediation 
Following the moral arguments that arose from testimonies of survivors of nuclear 
weapons testings and detonations that necessitated the treaty negotiating process, 
civil society campaigners pressed hard to ensure that the treaty final text has 
normative provisions for the assistance of nuclear weapons victims as well as for the 
remediation of the contimanated environmentarising from the explosion of nuclear 
weapons.  
Consequently, Article 6.(1) stipulates that all the treaty signatories “… with respect to 
individuala under its jurisdiction who are affected by the use of testing of nuclear 
weapons, in accordance with applicable international humanitarian and human rights 
law, adequately provide age-and gender-sensitive assistance, without discrimination, 
including medical care, rehabilitation and psychological support, as well as provide for 
their social and economic inclusion”.968 
In the same vein, Article 6.(2), clearly requires “each State party, with respect to areas 
under its jurisdiction or control contaminated as a result of activities related to testing 
or use of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, shall take necessary 
and appropriate measures towards the environmental remediation of areas so 
contaminated”.969 
Concerning the aforementioned provisions, there was a substantial debate about who 
should be liable and responsible in addressing the harm caused by the explosions of 
nuclear weapons. Many States wanted it very clear and simple, the governments that 
caused the harms to victims and the environment should be held liable and 
responsible such harms by helping the victims. However, the delegate from Ecuador 
during a plenary meeting have very different and distinctive view by saying “if a car 
hits me walking across First Avenue and drives away, I hope you don’t wait for the 
perpetrator to call the ambulance before giving me help”.970 
                                                          
967 Ibid, art 5(b) 
968 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 7 July 2017, art 6(1) 
969 Ibid, art (2) 
970 Matthew Bolton, ‘A Brief Guide to the New Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty’ (Just Security, July 14 2017) 
www.justsecurity.org/43004/guide-nuclearweapons-ban-treaty accesed 30/07/2018 
178 
 
In line with applicable international humanitarian and human rights law, and in 
accordance with the principle of State sovereignty, the treaty accorded primary 
responsibility and control for assisting victims of nuclear weapons as well as 
remediating the contaminated environment affected by nuclear explosions. This is 
consistent with Article 6 (3) which says “the obligations under paragraphs 1 and 2 
above shall be without prejudice to the the duties and obligations of any other States 
under international law or bilateral agreements”.971  
Articles 7: International Cooperation and Assistance 
Since the TPNW consider nuclear weapons as a collosal threat to humanity, it 
neccasrarily provides that addressing the devastating concequences associated with 
nuclear weapons is a global duty of all governments and all people. Article 7 therefore 
gives a substantial range of responsibility to each States party of the treaty.This 
requires mutual and international cooperations amomgst the treaty member States. 
These cooperations include technical, material and financial assistance as contained 
in Article 7(3) to help “State parties affected by nuclear weapons use or testing”.972 
Furthermore, in Article 7(5) these assistance and cooperation is further extended to 
the United Nations, regional, national and international organisations or institutions 
including non-governmental organisations such as the international Committee of the 
Red Cross and other civil society groups.973 
Meanwhile, Article 7(6) clearly expresses that States joining the treaty which have 
used or tested nuclear weapons “have a responsibility to provide the adequate 
assistance to affected Sates parties.”974 Article 7 in its entirety offer opportunities for 
States and international organisations that are not signatories to the treaty to engage 
with its norms. This engagement include provision of assistance of foereign aids to the 
victims of nuclear weapons on humanitarian basis. 
Articles 8 – 12: Mechanisms for Meetings of States Parties, Costs, Amendments 
Settlement of disputs and Universality of the Treaty. 
The quest for the achievement of nuclear disarmament has been fraugt over the years 
with lack of compliance and political differences on the recommendations and reports 
arising from the multilateral forums mandated to negotiate it. The Conference on 
Disarmamen, the United Nations Security Council and the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
Reveiew Conferences for decades allow the Nuclear Weapon States to block all 
attempts to implement nuclear disarmaments measures. Article 8(2) of the treaty 
provides for a biennial meetings975 and Article 8(4) requires the treaty review 
conference to be held every six years after the period of five years following the treatie 
entry into force.976 
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To ensure the smooth operations of the treaty mechanisms, Article 9 is entirely on the 
cost of paying for the meetings of the State parties of the treaty including the cost of 
implementation of verification measures.977 Consequently, Article 10 is on provisions 
for the State parties to adopt amendments to the treaty and to adapt new 
challenges.978 Article 11 clarifies how States will peacefully resolve disputes “relating 
to the interpretation or application of the treaty”979. Significantly, Article 12 stipulates 
that all State parties to encourage non-member States of the treaty’s regime to join for 
the purposes of the “goal of universal adherence”980 
Articles 13 – 20: Validation and Consolidation the Treaty. 
Articles 13 to 20 of the TPNW substantially cover the legal validation and consolidation 
of the treaty. These include how states can join the treaty by being signatories (Article 
13),981 by ratification, acceptance, approval or accession (Article 14)982 and when the 
treaty come into force 90 days after 50 states must have ratified it (Article 15).983 Article 
16, which is the shortest of all the treaty’s articles which says: “The Article of this Treaty 
shall not be subject to reservations” clarifies that States cannot attach reservations to 
their signature on the treaty984. 
According to Article 17(1), the treaty is designed and intended for unlimited duration.985 
Essentially, as required by Article 18, the implementation of the treaty “shall not 
prejudice obligations undertaken by States Parties with regard to existing international 
agreements, to which they are party, where those obligations are consistent with the 
treaty”.986 In Article 19, the treaty establishes the United Nations Secretary General as 
its official depositary987. Importantly, Article 20 the treaty final article codified Arabic, 
Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish languages as the authentic texts of 
the treaty.988 These languages are as well as the official languages of the United 
Nations. 
Legal Intricacie of the Treaty 
Apparently, the conclusion of the TPNW seems less captivating than its preambulatory 
elements. The treaty’s preamble constitute both the legal and humanitarian 
imperatives for nuclear disarmament. In relation of the TPNW to other nuclear arms 
control instruments such as the NPT and the CTBT, the treaty negotiators ensure that 
it does not undermine these other legal instruments. The preamble reaffirms the full 
and effective implementation of the Non-ProferationTreaty, “which serve as a corner 
stone of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime”. It further recognises 
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the very importance of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban-Treaty and its 
verification regime as a core element of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation 
regime.989Article 17(3) provide for the right of State party to withdrawal from the 
treaty990.  
When the withdrawal clause was debated during the treaty’ negotiation process, the 
vast majorty of States were strongly in support of deleting or totally prohibiting 
withdrawal from the treaty. The withdrawal clause scaled through, through the 
insistence of few States such Algeria, Bangladesh, Egypy, Iran, Philippines and 
Sweden. The withdrawal clause in the TPNW was strongly condemned by the civil 
society campaigners. They argued that allowing withdrawal would undermine the 
seriousness of universal and categorical prohibition the TPNW seeks to 
achieve.991However, almost every treaty including disarmament instruments such as 
the NPT have withdrawal clauses. The phrasing of Article 17(3) makes more strigent 
to withdraw from the TPNW than the NPT and the conventions prohibiting chemical 
and biological weapons.     
The TPNW Article 10(1) provides for its amendments, and any State party may 
propose an amendment to the treaty at any time after it has entered into force.992 The 
TPNW conference will be reviewed after a period of five years after coming into force 
and its subsequent review conferences would be convened every six years as 
specified in Article 9(4).993 Fundamentally, the TPNW has unlimited durational life span 
as stipulated in Article 17(1).994 And Article 17(2) says “Each State party shall in 
exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it 
decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the Treaty have 
jeopardised the supreme interests of its country”.995 The text of the TPNW is concise 
and precise to its specific obligations. When it come into force, the TPNW is expected 
to take precedence over the NPT and fill the seemingly unacceptable “legal gap” 
associated with the debate and discourse on nuclear weapons disarmament. 
In expressing the support of Ireland to the TPNW, its delegate explained thus: “it 
demonstrate our abiity to change the world one step at a time”.996 Novertheless, due 
to the non-participation of the treaty’s negotiation process by the nuclear weapon 
possessing States, the aspiration of a nuclear free world the TPNW stands for would 
not be achieved anytime soon. The TPNW articulately places the human and 
environment damage nuclear weapons would cause at the centre of its conversation. 
The emergence of the TPNW stand to creat political pressure on those States 
overwhelmingly not ready for nuclear disarmament. States such as Germany, 
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Netherlands, Norway, Japan and Australia that are diplomatically sympathetic to 
nuclear disarmament and not pursuing nuclear ambition with ignite the global moral 
ethical and legal consensus needed for the treaty to ratified. 
Global Perceptions on the TPNW by Nuclear Experts 
The global supports that follow the emergence of the TPNW underscore the need for 
the delegitimisation of nuclear weapons and reinforce the global norms against their 
existence. However, without the support and the participation of the NWS and other 
States known to possess nuclear weapons on the treaty negotiations, there is a 
reservation that the TPNW might be ineffective. Similarly, there is also a concern that 
the TPNW as a multilateral legal instrument that solely centres on the complete 
prohibition of nuclear weapons could undermine the NPT, which is regarded as the 
bedrock of international efforts to stem the spread of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
technology. 
The emergence of the TPNW underlines the evidence of the worrying polirisation of 
States. A polirisation arising from the perception of complacency amongst the States 
known to possess nuclear weapons and their obvious unwillingness to take serious 
steps towards disarmament. In this section, the views of five nuclear experts across 
the globe on the TPNW as a global legal nuclear disarmament instrument is presented. 
Views of Irma Arguello, Head of Secretariate, Latin American and Carribean 
Leadership Network (LALN) and Chair, NPS Global Foundation 
According to Arguello, the TPNW is a symbolic milestone that reflects the fact that 
many countries view the prohibition of nuclear weapons as the only path to total 
nuclear disarmament. This is NWS have over time have rejected the path to 
disarmament and the TPNW stands as a strong moral statement, more rather than an 
instrument of practical application. Arguello is of the view that  several major flaws in 
the draft text of the treaty should be fixed before its entry into force. These flaws 
include the inconsistences with the international law of armed conflict and issues 
relating to verification and safeguards. Arguello, emphasised that the treaty must avoid 
confusion and prevent any erosion to the NPT. In her view, the current process of bi-
annual meeting and review of the TPNW would add a significant diplomatic burden for 
States.997 
Considerably, the priority of all States should be to work together comprehensively on 
global nuclear risk reduction, particularly reducing the risk of potential use of nuclear 
weapons. This requires more intensive work on arm control measures, declaratory 
policies of Nuclear weapon States and enhancing the nuclear security regime to 
reduce risks posed by non-State actors. Furthermore, Arguello explained that 
disarmament verification must be become a global endeavour, with active participation 
of international community. Any strategy to for reducing the risks associated with 
nuclear arms will require active participation of all Nuclear weapon States and States 
known to posess nuclear weapons. Arguello is of the strong opinion of the vital 
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visionary leadership of the United States, Russia and China to work reached a 
common view about how to reduce global nuclear insecurity.998 
View of John Carson, Member of the Assia Pacific Leadership Network (APLN) 
and Counselor to the NTI, Former Director-General of the Australian Safeguards 
and Non-proliferation Office 
In the view of John Carson, the TPNW should have been a landmark treaty but its 
political and historical significance is undermined by major problems in the text 
especially on vital issue of safeguards and verification. Carson acknowledged that 
disarmament depends on rigorous and universal verification standards. However, the 
TPNW discriminate amongst parties, setting different requirements depending on 
party’s circumstances. This and other problems reflect that the treaty was negotiated 
in only foue weeks, an unprecendented pace for a treaty of such importance. Carson 
believe that if the United Nations General Assembly do not fix this problem, it will 
become a testbook case on how not to negotiate a treaty. However, depiste the TPNW 
shortcomings, its message cannot be ignored.999 
He stressed that two-third of the international community have made it clear the 
Nuclear Weapon States must stop making excuses for lack of progress on nuclear 
disarmament. The cirumstances might not be right for complete disarmament in the 
near term, but there are many steps that can and should be taken now ro reduce 
disarmament. This is essential not only to meet the world expectations but also for 
global survival.1000    
Views of Andrea Berger of the James Martin Centre for Non-Proliferation Studies 
Andrea Berger is of the view that the TPNW is likely to further polorise the non-
proliferation community, a development that both the proponents and opponents of 
the nuclear threat initiative share responsibility for. This is corroborated by the sharp 
dissenting Statesments issued by the US, the UK and France on the TPNW. 
Nevertheless, the TPNW arrives at a time when major challenges to the wellbeing of 
the NPT already exist. The crisis in US –Russia arm control and President Trump’s 
apparent interest in unravelling the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran are  
extremely concerning.Andrea also expresses her concern on the nuclear programmes 
in East Asia that are proceeding along similar worrying trajectories. Against this 
backdrop, she said the TPNW seems likely to become one ingredient in a recipe for 
multilateral gridlock, acting as a focal point for wider frustrations for all.1001  
Views of of Lewis A. Dunn, Independent Consultant and Former United States 
Ambassordor to the 1985 NPT Review Conference 
Lewis Dunn is of the opinion that the TPNW reflect deep frustration on today’s nuclear 
disarmament stalement and fear of the use of nuclear weapons. He described the 
treaty as a wake-up call for State-parties of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, he 
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noted that the TPNW still generate greater polarisation and questions about the NPT’s 
value in reducing nuclear danger. This will accelerate the treaty’s loss of credibility and 
legitimacy. Furthermore, sooner than later, the TPNW effectiveness in supporting the 
security interests of the NPT Nuclear Weapon States will be undermined. In his view 
of the TPNW supporters, Article VI of the NPT remains the only legal obligation to 
advance nuclear disarmament. Their claim that the TPNW will lead to rethinking 
reliance on nuclear weapons is but a long-term hope.1002 
In the immediate term, the TPNW will not reduce today’s nucear dangers or 
reinvigorate a moribund nuclear disarmament process. The challenge for all State 
parties of the NPT is the agreement on a share vision of the nuclear future and 
commitments to build the condition for its realisation. “The strategic elimination of 
nuclear weapons as means of statecraft, security, and power by 2045, one hundres 
years after the use of these weapons, is my proposed vision. The road to complete 
physical elimination runs inexorably through their strategic elimination.”1003  
Views of Oliver Meier, German Institute for International and Security Affairs 
Oliver expressed that the hastily drafted TPNW is a hybrid treaty. While it helps 
strengthen the norms against nuclear weapons possession and use, the treaty also 
include elements that could undermine the global non-proliferation regime. Oliver gave 
example that the TPNW potentially opens the door to State “cherry picking” between 
provisions in the NPT and the TPNW. According to Oliver, the TPNW lack definitions 
of terms and provisions, particularly on verification and lack of compliance procedures 
which make the TPNW difficult to implement and enforce. Oliver went further to make 
a suggestion to form a group of “friends of the nuclear order” that would work to 
advance the normative agenda of the TPNW, while minimising the potential risk of the 
NPT, the IAEA and the broader safegurds and verification regime1004. 
This group of “friends of the nuclear order” should consist of States, which have not 
joined the TPNW because of their alliance relationship to the treaty member States, 
which are supportive of a world free of nuclear weapons but have concerns over 
certain elements of the treaty and are interested in building bridges toward non-State 
parties. Oliver further explained that this group could advance joint paralle initiative at 
the NPT meeting of member States within the IAEA and during the future meeting of 
the TPNW member States with the view of reducing the contradictions and tessions 
between the TPNW and the NPT.1005  
The TPNW Emergence: A Milestone Development to this Present Research 
The emergence of the TPNW is a milestone development to this present research 
because it is the first legally binding multilateral and international agreement 
comprehensively prohibiting nuclear weapons with the goal of leading towards their 
total elimination. The TPNW was adopted and opened for signature at the same period 
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this present research was in progress of its write up. The entire provisions of the TPNW 
complement this research efforts and arguments for nuclear disarmament with the call 
for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law in line with the 
principle of humanity and the dictates of public conscience.       
4.10 The Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): Retrospect and Prospect 
The Treaty on the Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, generally referred to as the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is a multilateral and international agreement among 
party States; with the sole objective of preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and 
technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to 
further the goal of achieving general and complete nuclear disarmament.1006  
 
The NPT, which was opened for signature in July 1, 1968, became operationally 
effective and enforceable in March 5, 1970 with 43 member States as parties.1007 
Presently, the 190 member States have joint the treaty. However, the treaty 
recognises five States that also double as the five permanent members of the UNSC 
as NWS: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States.1008 
Meanwhile, these four nations which are not member States of the NPT: India, 
Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel are known to have nuclear weapons. India, Pakistan 
and North Korea have openly tested and declared that they own nuclear weapons,1009 
while Israel has had a policy of opacity regarding it nuclear weapons programme.1010 
  
Regrettably, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) [North Korea] that 
acceded to the NPT in 1985 but never maintained substantial compliance, withdrew 
its membership in January 20031011 in conformity with the provision of Article X.1012 
Nevertheless, more member States have strictly adhered to the treaty than any other 
arms limitation and disarmament agreement. This underscores the significance of the 
NPT.1013 
 
The NPT is made up of a preamble and eleven articles. The issues of non-proliferation, 
disarmament and the right to peacefully use nuclear technology are strongly regarded 
as the three pillars of the treaty. Though, the concept of the word ‘pillars’ is not 
articulated anywhere in its articles, the aforementioned concepts of non-proliferation, 
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disarmament and the peaceful use of nuclear technology constitute the pillars of the 
treaty.1014 
 
The NPT is based on mutual agreement and understanding among the member 
States. According to the spirit and letter of the treaty, the NNWS on the one hand, 
agreed never to possess nuclear weapons and on the other hand, the NWS mutually 
agreed to share the benefits of peaceful nuclear technology and to pursue nuclear 
disarmament targeted at the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. 
 
The NPT is the only internationally binding agreement that provide a global barrier to 
the spread of nuclear weapons. The norm of non-proliferation, which the treaty 
embodies, and the wider non-proliferation regime underpins its efficacy by proving 
wrong the prediction that by the end of 20th century, 20 to 30 States would have 
acquired nuclear weapons.1015 
  
Significantly, the treaty is reviewed every five years in a forum known as Review 
Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 
conformity with the envision and provision of Article VIII paragraph 31016. Originally, 
the treaty was conceived with a limited time frame of 25 years, but by consensus, the 
member parties on 11 May 1995 during the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and 
Extension Conference (NPTREC) agreed to extend the treaty indefinitely and 
unconditionally.1017  
 
The indefinite and the unconditional extension of the treaty is inseparably and mutually 
reinforcing on the three pillars of non-proliferation, disarmament and the peaceful use 
of nuclear energy. 
 
1) Non-proliferation: In Article I of the NPT, the NWS pledge not to transfer nuclear 
weapons or other nuclear explosives to any recipient or in any way assist, 
encourage or induce any NNWS in the manufacturing or acquisition of a nuclear 
weapon.1018 The NNWS agreed under Article II not to import, build or otherwise 
acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and not to seek or 
receive assistance in the manufacturing of such devices.1019 Also, in Article III, the 
NNWS voluntarily accept that the International Atomic Energy Agency IAEA would 
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verify they are not diverting nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons 
or other nuclear explosive devices.1020  
 
The five NWS solely recognised by the NPT have undertaken not to use their nuclear 
weapons against any NNWS who is a signatory to the treaty unless in the case of 
extreme necessity such as response to a nuclear attack, or a conventional attack in 
alliance with a NWS. Officially, this undertaking and understanding have not been 
incorporated into the treaty, as the real details are still conceptually sketchy.1021 
 
2) Disarmament: The language of the preamble of the NPT testify to the fact that the 
signatories of the treaty desire to ease international tension and strengthen 
international trust so as to create the conditions to stop the production of nuclear 
weapons, and total liquidation and disarmament, particularly nuclear weapons and 
their delivery vehicles from all nations arsenals. Under Article VI, the NPT obliges 
all parties to the treaty to undertake:  
 
“to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective measure relating to cessation of nuclear arms 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a Treaty on general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control.”1022 
 
This provision is the only legally binding obligation on NWS to reduce or ultimately 
destroy their nuclear weaponry.  At the 2000 Non-Proliferation Treaty Review and 
Extension Conference (NPTREC), the States parties of the Treaty unanimously 
agreed upon “13 practical steps” to actualise their commitments towards nuclear 
disarmament.1023 These 13 practical steps are highlighted and explained in Chapter 
1, Section 1.6.2. 
  
3) Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy:  
The NPT allows the transfer of nuclear technology and materials to State parties for 
the peaceful development of civilian nuclear energy programmes among signatories’ 
nations, in as much such nation(s) can prove beyond all reasonable doubt that their 
nuclear weapons are not meant for developing nuclear weapons. Article IV of the NPT 
stipulates that all the parties have the right to fully participate in the best possible 
exchange of equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy.1024  
 
The NPT acknowledges the inalienable right of every nation State that is a signatory 
to the treaty to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes with the limitation that this 
right must be expressed in conformity with Articles I and II which are the bedrock for 
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non-proliferation of nuclear materials.1025 The availability of fissile material has over 
time been considered the major obstacle to any country’s disarmament effort. 
Countries possessing uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing (ENR) 
technology have the option of using these capabilities to produce fissile material for 
nuclear weapons.  
 
This possibility is known as “virtual” nuclear weapon programme. The extent to which 
member States of the NPT have right to the uranium enrichment and plutonium 
reprocessing (ENR) technology has grave potential implication and interpretation of 
legal controversies revolving around the meaning of Article IV and its interrelatedness 
to Articles I, II, and III.1026 
 
The NNWS that signed the treaty have maintained the track record of not building 
nuclear weapons. Meanwhile, Iraq was indicted on 27 April 2004 by the IAEA with 
punitive sanctions enacted by the UNSC for violating its NPT obligations. In the same 
vein, Iran was culpable of non-compliance with its safeguard obligations of the Non-
proliferation Treaty because of its failure in various instances over an extended period 
to report aspect of its enrichment programme.1027 In addition, Libyan clandestinely 
pursued nuclear weapons programme and latter jettison it in 2003. In 1991, Romania 
non-compliance was reported to the UNSC by the IAEA for its previously undeclared 
nuclear activities by its government.1028 
 
In many regions such as all Africa sub-regions, it is understood that all neighbouring 
States are verifiably free of nuclear weapons because it reduces any pressure 
individual States might feel to build those weapons themselves, regardless of the fact 
that neighbours might be known for peaceful nuclear energy programmes that might 
otherwise be suspicious.1029  
 
Regardless of its landmark significance of the NPT and its Review Conferences that 
led to the 13 Practical Steps to meet disarmament commitments, the NPT is fraught 
with vague obligation on all party signatories to advance to the common front of total 
nuclear disarmament. Article VI of the NPT, which says: 
  
“Each of the Parties to the treaty undertakes to pursue negotiation in good faith on effective 
measures relating to cessation of nuclear arms at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, 
and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international 
control.”1030 
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The above article does not impose or strictly requires all signatories of the treaty to 
embark on immediate disarmament. Rather, it is a concession on all State parties “to 
negotiate in good faith” which is inherently laden with interpretations and often 
construed as vague. This Article constitutes the basis of the criticism that the NWS 
have failed to meet their formal and specific obligation on disarmament. The criticism 
is so strong, so much so that, the failure of the NWS to eliminate their nuclear 
armaments, most especially in the era after the Cold War has forced some NNWS to 
justify their withdrawal from the Non-proliferation Treaty and acquire their own nuclear 
weapon armaments. 
 
However, many developing nations over the years have viewed the NPT as an 
instrument of continuous hegemony of the nuclear ‘haves’ over the nuclear ‘have-not’. 
This assertion is predicated on the disappointment with the insignificant progress on 
nuclear disarmament, where the Nuclear Weapon States NWS still possess up to 
22,000 warheads and among themselves with the reluctance to eliminate them without 
any proscriptive sanction contained in the NPT. 
 
A major gap on the effectiveness and fairness of the Treaty NPT is the provision of 
article IV, which encourages State parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful 
purposes. Factually, the technology for producing nuclear energy is the same as the 
technology for producing nuclear weapons. The conversion from peaceful to non-
peaceful use only entails enriching the Uranium or simply reprocessing the fuel rods 
into plutonium.  
 
With the awareness of this technological capability, the NPT negotiators relied on the 
requirement of the recipients of nuclear technology to allow international inspectors 
such as the IAEA to monitor nuclear facilities to ensure compliance.  However, this 
has been under strain after the 1991 Gulf War, when the UN mandated inspector team 
discovered that Iraq had clandestinely worked on the development of nuclear weapons 
in undeclared facilities, located adjacent to the facilities that have been declared to the 
IAEA under the Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (CSA).1031   
 
Beyond its criticism, it is an indisputable fact that the NPT is the cornerstone of the 
global non-proliferation policy. As a normative legal framework on nuclear 
disarmament, its universalization directly requires State actors to conclude all 
protocols as a condition for gaining nuclear co-operation. Legal possibilities in terms 
of ensuring compliance on the framework on nuclear disarmament and limitations 
associated with such provisions are examined both directly and indirectly in ensuring 
absolute non-proliferation of nuclear materials for attaining total nuclear 
disarmament.1032 The possibility of total nuclear disarmament is not solely on its legal 
framework but extensively on the political and diplomatic will of all States especially 
the NWS. 
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4.11 Strategies for Nuclear Disarmament and Enforcement of Nuclear Non-
Proliferation 
There is an axiomatic universal belief that if the whole world were able to get rid of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear holocaust would be avoided. This is achieable bearing in 
mind that nuclear weapons can be out rightly outlawed in the same way and manner 
biological and chemical weapons are prohibited.1033 Nuclear disarmament procedure 
is essentially intertwined with international peace1034 in alignment with the principle of 
undiminished security for all.1035  
Obviously, clear-cut prohibition of nuclear weapons will permanently legitimise global 
consensual efforts to initiate international actions and sanctions against “rogue 
states”1036 or “axis of evil”1037 and other States that want to acquire nuclear weapons. 
The credibility of the prohibition of nuclear weapons requires the synchronization of 
their destructions.1038 Necessarily, the prohibition of nuclear weapons presupposes a 
geo-political landscape predicated on mutual interests and reciprocity of trusts 
amongst States.1039 A world devoid of nuclear weapons implies a system whereby the 
process of how to manufacture nuclear weapon disappears. 
Granted that it is extremely difficult if not factually impossible to permanently obliterate 
the knowledge of the production of nuclear weapons across the globe, it then 
necessarily follows that nuclear weapons will always remain in the world regardless of 
any kind of draconian measure adopted by the international community to enforce their 
prohibition.1040 Consequently, since disarmament and out right prohibition of nuclear 
weapons is presently out of reach, possibly not reachable in the nearest future, nuclear 
non-proliferation has been a laudable alternative, and should be continuously 
enforceable. 
Conscious reduction and de-legitimisation of nuclear weapons imply de-escalation of 
the nuclear arms race. However, actual disclosure of the nature, quantities and the 
enormous cost of maintaining nuclear weapons will elicit spontaneous public outcry 
against lack of universal transparency and nuclear deterrence theory. The nuclear 
arms control and the NPT are not designed to divulge Research and Development 
(R&D) of nuclear facilities and clandestine nuclear programmes.1041  
This is purely because of the National Technical Means of Verification (NTMs): 
satellites monitoring techniques used to verify compliance of international arms 
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treaties are expected to have the capacity to detect hidden warheads.1042 This is a 
sophisticated way of counting and decoding nuclear warheads without their vehicular 
delivery systems such as the ICBMs (inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles); MIRVs 
(Multiple Independently Targable Re-entry Vehicles); and the SLCM (Sea Launched 
Cruise Missiles).1043 
Nuclear weapons prohibition and non-proliferation will be an exercise in futility unless 
States consensually adopt measures for immediate disarmament and reduction 
towards complete disarmament as stipulated in Article VI of the NPT. More 
realistically, the credibility of multilateral enforcement mechanisms to procedurally and 
gradually reduce the nuclear warheads of the NWS to zero is factually controvertible. 
This is because States may uncommitally agree with the provisions of multilateral 
prohibition while at the same time embark on clandestine nuclear weapons 
programmes as they have mastered the front-end and back-end of nuclear fuel cycle 
in building even more sophisticated nuclear weapons.1044 The deliberate non-
particaption on the negotiation process and the non-support of the Treaty Prohibiting 
Nuclear Weapons by the nine States known to posess nuclear weapons indicate that 
NWS are seemingly not fully commited to nuclear disarmament in the nearest future. 
4.12 The Achievements of the Legal Framework and Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament  
The campaign for nuclear disarmament resonate in the legal framework (the various 
arms control treaties, including nuclear weapons) and the United Nations resolutions, 
as well as the historic 1996 adjudicatory Advisory Opinion of the ICJ on the Legality of 
the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons. The legal significance of the interpretation of 
the ICJ of Article VI of the NPT is to ensure that all State parties conclude negotiations 
based on strong political will on nuclear disarmament. 
This means that the Court delinked the obligation to achieve nuclear disarmament 
from the objective of comprehensive de-militarisation, binding and applicable to all 
States irrespective of their membership of the NPT.1045 As a follow-up to the ICJ 
Advisory Opinion, the UNGA adopted Resolution A/RES/60/76 in 2005.1046 This 
resolution serve as multilateral consolidation and approval of the ICJ call for immediate 
fulfilment of the obligation to commence negotiation leading to an early conclusion of 
a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, 
deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons. It can be rightly 
said that this resolution and the ICJ call are precursor to the emergence of the Treaty 
Prohibition Nuclear Weapons (TPWN) adopted by the UNGA on 7 July 2017 in 
Resolution 71/258.  
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In 1996, the same year that the ICJ delivered its Advisory Opinion on nuclear weapons, 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) negotiations were completed,1047 but up 
to the time of writing-up this thesis (2017), the CBTB has not yet attained sufficient 
ratification to enter into force. Based on this, the need to begin the Conference on 
Disarmament with a non-discriminatory multilateral mandate on nuclear weapons 
prohibition is rekindled. 
As sources of achievements and contributions to confidence-building and consensus 
in their respective regions, the various NWFZs in Latin America and the Caribbean 
(Treaty of Tlatelolco), the South Pacific (Treaty of Raratonga), the South-east Asia 
(Treaty of Bangkok), the African NWFZ (Treaty of Pelindaba), and the Central Asia 
NWFZ (Treaty of Semipalatinsk), stand as reinforcements to the NPT in entrenching 
the norms of non-possession of nuclear weapons. These include general prohibition, 
manufacture, production, testing and deployment of nuclear weapons by the NWS.   
A paramount achievement towards nuclear disarmament is the UNGA Resolution 
A/RES/55/33C entitled “Towards a Nuclear Weapon Free World”: The Need for a New 
Agenda”. This resolution reaffirms the practical steps required for nuclear 
disarmament adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference “that a nuclear weapon 
free world will ultimately require the underpinnings of a universal and multilaterally 
negotiated legally binding instrument or a framework encompassing a mutually 
reinforcing set of instruments.”1048 
Arising from the aforementioned developmental legal framework and achievements 
on nuclear disarmament, there were considerable bilateral agreements between the 
United States of America (USA) and the defunct Union of Soviet Socialist Republic 
(USSR). These agreements served as indices for the present multilateral treaties on 
nuclear weapons. Some of such agreements are still subsisting between the United 
States and the present day Russia.  
In November 4 1969, the USA and the USSR began negotiations on the Anti-Ballistic 
Missile (ABM) defences and strategic nuclear offensive systems, which were 
concluded in May 26 1972 and became the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty that limited 
strategic intercontinental offensive arms and restricted missile defence systems. The 
enforcement of the ABM Treaty was under the supervision of the Standing 
Consultative Commission established under the Treaty.1049 
The ABM Treaty was a prelude to the successive Strategic Arms Limitation Talks 
(SALT I), and SALT II and the subsequent Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START 
I), START II, and START III. Concomitantly, the USA and the USSR in 1985 pursued 
separate but parallel negotiations on Ground Launched Cruise Missiles (GLCM) that 
eventually led to the emergence of the Intermediate Range Nuclear Force (INF) Treaty 
in 1987. The INF Treaty has provisions for right of States to conduct onsite inspections 
and right to establish a permanent continuous monitoring system. Consequentially, 
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the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centre (NRRC), an established agreement in 1987 
between the United States and Russia which also allows continuous communications 
between the two States for the prevention of nuclear war.1050 These aforementioned 
arms control treaties have now been superseded by the emergence of the Treaty 
Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons (TPNW). 
4.13 Conclusion 
The posture in States public policy statements in various multilateral forums tends to 
indicate a consensual opinion about the objective of nuclear disarmament and possibly 
a world without nuclear weapons. However, in reality, there is a dichotomous 
disconnect between NWS and the NNWS on the progressive measures on nuclear 
disarmament discourse. 
The NWS diplomatic declarations on disarmament are politically focused on nuclear 
weapons reductions via bilateralism such as between the United States and Russia or 
through unilateral moratorium. All these are technically couched in constructive 
ambiguities that posit, purport and support nuclear deterrence and the justification of 
nuclear weapons as guarantors for internal states security. Consequently, the NWS 
consider the achievement of nuclear disarmament as a long-term aspiration while the 
perspectives of the NNWS are perceived global pre-conditions regarding the urgency 
for nuclear disarmament.  
Obviously, many NNWS have no dealings with the “Nuclear Sharing 
Arrangements”1051 or the “Nuclear Umbrella”.1052 The continuous reliance on nuclear 
weapons by the NWS is a collective departure by the NNWS as they view retention of 
reliance on nuclear weapons as an existential threat to humanity handled by few 
States as a national security interests. These divergent views make the legitimate 
quest for nuclear disarmament suffer from fundamental contradiction1053 and credibility 
deficit.1054 
Multilaterally, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which has not entered into 
force1055 and the Conference for Disarmament (CD), which has been dysfunctional1056 
on nuclear disarmament for decades are a disservice to the achievement on nuclear 
disarmament. Remarkably, the increase in   focus on the humanitarian consequences 
of nuclear weapons and the establishment of an open-ended working group for the 
achievement and maintenance of a world without nuclear weapons; and the 
consequent adoption of the Treaty Prohibiting Nuclear Weapons on July 7 2017 by the 
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UNGA1057 are significant manifestations of a shared wish of the international 
community to prioritise the principle of undiminished security for all.1058 The focus is 
mainly on the unthinkable humanitarian emergencies and the catastrophic global 
consequences posed by the destructive capability of nuclear weapons. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
THE RESEARCH FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction  
 A wide spectrum of approaches for promoting and ensuring nuclear disarmament has 
been examined in the preceding chapters of this thesis.These approaches are 
underpinned by the legal framework on nuclear disarmament and they are mutually 
inclusive. Consequently, the research findings are largely influenced by the indirect 
contributions of the five existing Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZs) and the 
Single-State Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (SS-NWFZs) of Mogolia and New Zealand 
in the context of disarmament. The Non-proliferation of Nuclear weapons Treaty 
(NPT), the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW), applicable 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) as well the 1996 International Court of Justice 
Advisory Opinions on the legality or otherwise use of nuclear weapons and the legality 
of the use of nuclear weapons by a State in armed conflict, are also legal standpoints 
that elicit the research findings and influence the research recommendations. 
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the research findings and research 
recommendations with the inclusion of a table mapping the original research 
contributions.This research on nuclear weapons disarmament in international law 
recognises the global diplomacy and political considerations surrounding the debate 
on nuclear disarmament within the legal framework and this invariably led to the 
identification of its findings.  
Arising from the research findings are the research recommendations in line with the 
obligations of all States at all times to comply with the provisons of applicable 
international law in their commitments to nuclear disarmament. Besides the identifiable 
gaps in the Literature Review of this research in Chapter 2, highlighted in section 
2.8.3, which include the obvious absence of synergy between legal obligations and 
political will on nuclear disarmament.The following are the research findings factually 
and objectively discussed. 
5.2 Research Findings  
 
1) Nuclear Weapons have been Controversial from their Inception 
Prior to the development and manufacturing of the very first nuclear weapons, 
scientists involved with the Manhattan Project were sharply divided over the use of the 
weapon.1059 The nuclear weapon debate has grew from scientific to ethical/moral, 
military, political, diplomatic to legal after the horrific atomic bombings of Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki in Japan.  
The Manhattan Project scientists and the scientists on the Interim Advisory Committee 
were divided on two issues: (i) should the U. S. drop the bombs on Japan and (ii) 
should the aim of America’s ambitious nuclear policy be to eliminate nuclear weapons 
or to use the threat of nuclear weapons to eliminate nuclear war? While the first 
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question has become an issue of historical debate, analysis and exegesis, the second 
question is still intensely and contemporaneously controversial.1060  
2) The Provisions of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) Prohibit the use of 
Nuclear Weapons  
A fundamental principle of International Humanitarian Law (IHL) states that parties to 
armed conflicts must direct attacks only against designated military objectives. This 
include both military personnel and objects of military value. The rule of distinction in 
attacks is a norm of customary sinternational law applicable both in international and 
non-international armed conflicts. Consequently, any weapon that is incapable of 
distinguishing between civilians and civilian objects as well as military targets is ipso 
facto considered inherently indiscriminate and its use is prohibitive. The provisions for 
Prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons in warfare under International Law are 
elucidated in Chapter Four, section 3.4 – “The Use of Nuclear in Warfare and the 
Principles of International Humanitarian Law”.  However, the United Nations Charter 
and the Geneva Conventions require that the use of any weapons: 
Must be proportional to the initial attacks; 
Must be necessary for effective self-defence; 
Must not be directed at civilian or civilian objects; 
Must be used in a manner that makes it possible to discriminate between military target 
and civilian targets; 
Must not cause unnecessary or aggravated suffering to combatants; 
Must not affect State that are not parties to conflict; and 
Such weapon must not cause severe widespread or long-term damage to the 
environment.1061 
Indisputably, nuclear weapons violate all the aforementioned rules. Also, potential use 
of nuclear weapons according to Articles 6, 7 and 8 of 2002 Rome Statute of 
International Criminal Court would amout to genocide (Article 6), crime against 
humanity, (Article 7) and war crime (Article 8).1062 This is as a result of the 
indecriminate and catastrophic concequences nuclear weapons would cause to the 
civilian populations and the environment. 
In the same vein, the two separate ICJ Advisory Opinions: (i) on the Legality of the 
Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons and (ii) on the Legality of the use by a State of 
Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, that were judicially declared on the same day, 
July 8 1996 affirm the above IHL provisions. 
                                                          
1060 Robert Gilpin, American Scientists and Nuclear Weapons Policy (Princeton University Press, 1962) 49 
1061  Christian J Tams and James Sloan, The Development of International Law by the International Court of 
Justice (Oxford University Press, 2013) 274 
1062 Rome Status of the International Criminal Court, 2002, arts 6, 7, &8 
196 
 
The World Court opined that nuclear weapons are subject to International 
Humanitarian Law and expresses its deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences of any use of nuclear weapons and at the same time reaffirmed the 
need for all states at all times to comply with applicable international law, including 
international humanitarian law. On the legality or illegality of the use of nuclear 
weapons by a State in an extreme circumstances of self-defence, in which its very 
survival would be at stake, the ICJ critically and definitively conclude that the threat or 
use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian 
law.1063 
Conspicuously, the emphasis of the ICJ is on International Humanitarian Law. This 
implies that if the court has not given these two legal opinions, there is no existing 
vacuum in international law concerning the prohibition of the use of nuclear weapons. 
The ICJ made references to earliest legal instruments and law of armed conflict which 
all suggest the prohibition of nuclear weapons in warfare. This Advisory Opinion was 
given by the ICJ in 1996 before the enactment of the 2002 Rome Statute of the ICC, 
hence, the ICJ would have made specific references to the ICC provisions in Articles 
6, 7, and 8 on genocide, crime against humanity and world crime which are suggestive 
against the use of nuclear weapons.  
3) The Ambivalence of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
The NPT as the cornerstone nuclear weapons legal framework has undoubtedly 
yielded successful security results by making many States to abandon their nuclear 
weapons ambitions and at the same time making it difficult for other States to acquire 
nuclear materials and technology needed to build nuclear weapons.1064 For example, 
the Republic of South Africa gave up its nuclear weapons on 24 March 1993 by the 
declaration of President F.W. de Klerk in a Special Joint Session of the South African 
Parliament1065. This consequently made South Africa to remain a Nuclear Weapon 
Free State.  
Similarly, on 5 December 1994 Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine signed the 
Budapest Memorandum on Security Assurances (commonly referred to as: Three 
Political Agreements) in their accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty as Non-nuclear 
Weapons States by relinquishing their nuclear weapons to Russia.1066 Also, as result 
of the non-proliferation regime of the NPT, on 19 December 2003 Libya renounced its 
clandestine decades old nuclear programme.1067 
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Irrespective of its laudable contributory achievements, the NPT is fraught with some 
observable deficiencies and excesses which constitute its criticism. These include: 
I) It seems to be a discriminatory treaty, which upholds the perpetuity and 
superiority of the World Power position as NWS and the rest of the world as 
NNWS by unduly legitimizing their nuclear status. 
 
II) The NPT has no provisions for disarmament. Article VI which calls for 
negotiation in good faith and for a treaty on complete disarmament is 
ambiguous and unspecific thereby causing interpretative summersault.1068 As 
the time of writing this thesis, the NPT has been 49 years in existence (1968 – 
2017), despite its various Review Conferences schedule for every five years, 
it was only in July 2017 that the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
(TPWN) came into existence. The treaty has so far had 53 signatories and only 
3 ratifications. The TPWN would come into force 90 days after at least 50 
States have ratified it. 
 
III) The NPT failed to check and proscribed the nuclear programmes of France 
and China in their continuous nuclear testing in gross violation of the Partial 
Test Ban Treaty of August 5 1963. France and China were not signatories to 
the PTBT. France established the Centre d’experimentation du Pacifique 
(CEP) at Moruroa (Aopuni) in 1964,1069 conducted its last atmospheric test on 
19 July 1974 and continued detonating nuclear weapons till 1996. China 
detonated its last atmospheric on 16 October 1980 and also continued its 
nuclear programme till 1996,1070 whereas the NPT entered into force on 5 
March 1970. Thus, making the NPT as a toothless backing bull dog incapable 
of keeping watch over effective implementation of relevant treaty obligations. 
 
IV) The NPT only appears to check the risks of horizontal proliferation1071 of 
“nuclear club”1072 either by the development of nuclear weapons by NNWS or 
the transfer of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons by NWS to the NNWS 
as enshrined in Article I.1073 It does not cover the check of vertical 
expansion1074 of nuclear technology and nuclear weapons. That is, the NWS 
increasing the stockpiles of their nuclear armaments. It is on record that Russia 
violated the horizontal non-proliferation provisions when it aided and abated 
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Iran with the supply of nuclear materials to develop nuclear reactors and 
nuclear bomb.1075 
 
V) The NPT seems to be more of political instrument than legal yardstick as it 
polarises the world into nuclear have and nuclear have not.  
The continuity of the indefinite extension of the NPT Review Conference after every 
five years without amending its discriminatory character is a conscious decision of the 
P-5 States to maintain their hegemony as NWS. Based on the foregoing, the NPT has 
not been able to adequately address the core issues associated with nuclear weapons 
disarmament. Upon these factors, States like India, Israel, and Pakistan who were 
never members of the NPT and North Korea which withdrew its membership from the 
NPT on 10 January 2003 based their justification of non-membership on the 
shortcomings of the NPT in order to pursue their nuclear programmes and ambitions.   
4) The Importance of the Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) Treaties and the 
Significance of the Single State Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (SS-NWFZs) 
Status of New Zealand and Mongolia as Exemplary for Other States 
As explained in Chapter 3, Section 3.9; the overriding notion underlying the 
respective Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone (NWFZ) Treaties is the committed alliance of 
States to establish the abolision of nuclear weapons from the entirety of their 
territories: land, waters and air. Presently, (at the time of writing this thesis), 112 States 
are party to the five NWFZ Treaties covering the entire southern hemisphere and a 
larger part of the northern hemisphere.1076 
All the NWFZ Treaties are full-fledged international legal instruments relied upon by 
the party States to realise nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament objectives in 
conformity with United Nations Disarmament Commission (UNDC) commitment: 
“Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones are an important disarmament tool which contributes to 
the primary objective of strengthening regional peace and security, and by extension, 
international peace and security. They are also considered to be important regional 
confident building measures.”1077 
There is the existence of essential mutual complementarity amongst the Nuclear-
Weapon-Free-Zone State parties in the light of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
However, despite the initial absence of global legally defined concept of Single States 
Nuclear Weapon Free Zones (SS – NWFZs), the political will of the governments of 
New Zealand and Mongolia to declare their countries as nuclear weapon free States 
have made the international scommunity to institutionalise their Single State Status as 
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internationally recognised. This is good example for other States to emulate, especially 
the States that have reservations against the NPT for recognising the five permanent 
UNSC members as NWS.  
5) Nuclear Disarmament: A Major Global and United Nations Concern  
The United Nations and the Nuclear Age emerged almost simultaneously. The horrors 
of the use of nuclear weapons in Hiroshima and Nagasaki spurred the need to urgently 
address the devastating danger nuclear weapons pose. Consequently, the first UNGA 
Resolution established the United Nations Atomic Energy Commission to deal with the 
problems raised by the discovery of atomic energy.1078 The 24th October 1953 
landmark address by the U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower entitled “Atomic for 
Peace” facilitated the establishment of the IAEA in 1957.1079 
Under the NPT of 1968, the IAEA is saddled with the responsibility to conduct on-
site inspections to ensure that nuclear materials are used only for peaceful 
purposes. As a result of the growing global concern on nuclear disarmament, the 
United Nations Conference on Disarmament – the sole multilateral negotiating 
forum on disarmament, produced the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty 
adopted in 1996 but not yet entered into force (at the time of writing up this thesis). 
As explained in Chapter 4, Section 4.5 – United Nations Disarmament Structure 
and Resolutions on Nuclear Disarmament; the UN Office for Disarmament Affairs 
promote nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.   
 
6) Global Efforts on the Humanitarian Impacts and Consequences Surrounding 
the Danger of Nuclear Weapons 
From the 2010 NPT Review Conference, States government officially began to 
express “deep concern at the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of 
nuclear weapons” and as well as reaffirm “the need for all States at all times to comply 
with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.”1080 Also, at 
the 2013 Session of the UNGA First Committee on Disarmament and International 
Security, a total of 125 Countries jointly delivered a statement highlighting the 
catastrophic humanitarian consequences of nuclear weapons and calling on all States 
to intensify their efforts to ensure the outright prohibition of nuclear weapons.  
In consolidation of the concerted global efforts to outlaw nuclear weapons, both State 
and non-State actors actively participated in the “Humanitarian Impact” of Nuclear 
Weapons Conferences in Oslo, 2013; Nayarit, Mexico February 2014; and Vienna, 
Austria December 2014.1081 These conferences were succeeded by the UNGA 
December 2015 re-establishment of the Open-Ended Working Group (OEWG); 
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mandated to develop legal measures and provisions to achieve a nuclear-weapon-
free world1082 and the United Nations 7 December 2015 General Assembly Resolution 
70/47 which adopted the Humanitarian Pledge. The Humanitarian Pledge explicitly 
seeks to prohibit nuclear weapon in its entirety.1083 
7) The Challenges Associated with Compliance and Verification of Nuclear 
Weapons, Materials and Facilities 
Effective verification and compliance is necessary to achieve disarmament and for the 
world to be denuclearised. Pursuant to Article XII of the NPT the IAEA has a 
comprehensive multilateral verification system and responsibility. However, there are 
enormous challenges albeit some recorded successes. The most serious of the 
challenges associated with compliance and verification pertaining to nuclear materials 
and facilities is the ensuring capability to detect undeclared nuclear activities. 
As indicated in Chapter 3, Section 3.7, the IAEA rely on the cooperation and 
compliance of states in verifying nuclear facilities. After the Gulf war in 1991, the IAEA 
discovered Iraq’s clandestine undeclared nuclear facilities, located adjacent to the 
facilities that were declared.1084 Other challenges include potential spread of 
proliferation of enrichment and reprocessing technologies and the implications of new 
fuel cycle technologies.  
Also shown in Section 3.7 as challenges associated with verification and compliance, 
is the IAEA discovering of South Africa, Iraq, and North Korea clandestinely producing 
nuclear weapons after over two decades; as well as the sole reliance of the IAEA on 
the European Atomic Community (EAEC or Euratom) raising questions regarding the 
objectivity the of EAEC’s role in safeguarding Europe.  
As explained in Section 3.11 – The Global Threats and Challenges of Nuclear 
Terrorism, there is no mechanism in place addressing the possibility of illicit transfer 
of nuclear materials by staff working at nuclear facilities. Corrupt staff who are 
sympathetic to terrorist groups can facilitate an unauthorised transfer of weapon-
usage-nuclear material into the wrong hands. By and large, in addressing the issues 
of verification and compliance, inspection arrangement, decision-making process, 
availability of verification information, transparency and confidence building 
mechanisms are necessary conditions needed by the IAEA. 
8) The Exorbitant Cost of Maintaining Nuclear Weapons 
No doubt, manufacturing, maintaining and the modernisation of nuclear armaments 
immensely affect public resources accruable to education, public health care, disaster 
relief services, and other essential public services. Globally, the annual expenditure 
on nuclear weapons is estimated at US$105 billion – amounting to $12 million per 
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hour.1085 According to the 2002 World Bank forecast, a yearly investment of just US$40 
- 60 billion, that is, half of the amount of money presently spent on nuclear weapons 
across the world would have exceedingly met the universal agreement on the 
Millennium Development Goals (MDG) on poverty alleviation targeted at 2015.1086 
The global nuclear weapons expenditure in 2010 was twice above the official monetary 
developmental aid given to the whole of Africa and equal to Bangladesh’s Gross 
Domestic Product (GDP) as a country of over 160 million inhabitants. As a further 
comparison, the United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), a principal 
UN organ saddled with the responsibility of advancing a nuclear-weapons-free world 
has an annually budget of US$10 million which is far lesser than amount of money 
spent on nuclear weapons every hour.1087 
The table below is the 2010 and 2011 expenditure in U.S. dollars of the nine Nuclear Weapons States 
(NWS): the five de jure States officially recognised by the NPT and the four de facto States not party to 
the NPT. 
Country 2010 spending 2011 spending 
United States $55.6bn $61.3bn 
Russia $9.7bn $14.8bn 
China $6.8bn $7.6bn 
France $5.9bn $6.0bn 
United Kingdom $4.5bn $5.5bn 
India $4.1bn $4.9bn 
Israel $1.9bn $1.9bn 
Pakistan $1.8bn $2.2bn 
North Korea $0.7bn $0.7bn 
Total $91.0bn $104.9bn1088 
   
   
In this thesis, there is no specific section on global nuclear weapons spending. 
However, in Chapter, Section 5.2, it has been pinpointed that NWS expend huge 
amounts of money in maintaining their nuclear arsenals. For example, Russia has 
budgeted $70 billion from between 2011 and 2020 for strategic nuclear force. In the 
same way, the United Kingdom has budgeted GBP 15 – 20 billion in replacing its 
Trident nuclear weapon system by 2024. 
The expenditure of the United States of America on nuclear weapons is equally 
significant. From 1940 – 2005, America spent not less than $7.5 trillion on cost and 
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consequences on its nuclear programmes.1089 According to the 2015 Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO), the United States government will spend an estimated budget 
of $348 billion over the next decade to maintain, upgrade and operate its nuclear 
weaponry. This estimate represent $35 billion per annum.1090 
Over the next decade, the NWS governments will spend $1 trillion on their nuclear 
weapons at the expense of the cuts to education, health care, and other essential 
services and at a critical time where there is global economic recession on the rise. 
The prioritised exorbitant global nuclear funding lends credence to the view of Ban Ki-
Moon, the former United Nations Secretary General:  
“The world is over-armed and peace is under-funded … The end of the Cold war has led the 
world to expect a massive peace dividend. Yet, there are over 20,000 nuclear weapons around 
the world. Many of them are still on hair-trigger alert, threating our own survival.”1091 
The total UN Peacekeeping annual budget amounts to about $10 billion. This is below 
one-tenth of the expenditure of the Nine NWS for modernising and maintaining their 
nuclear armoury. Antithetically, nuclear weapons – instruments of annihilation, have 
more funding than the UN Millennium Development Goals of eradicating extreme 
poverty and hunger; achieving universal primary education; reducing child mortality 
rate; improving health care and ensuring global climate and environmental stability.1092 
The concern on the exorbitant cost of maintaining and producing nuclear weapons 
raised here are from the perspectives of the developing world and global public. 
Regardless of the global perspective or public feelings on the huge amounts of money 
spend on nuclear weapons, States with nuclear capabilities especially the NWS are 
more concern about their defence and national security and they are always 
determined to spend much needed rescources to ensure their national security. 
9) Nuclear Deterrence Doctrine or Theory Not Known to Law 
It was argued in Chapter 4, Section 4.4 that nuclear deterrence has no lawful 
codification. As a matter of fact, both nuclear weapons and nuclear deterrence are 
arguably described as illegitimate instruments of State policy1093and they constitute 
instrumentalities of international lawlessness1094 and ambitious global political 
hegemony of the NWS.  
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Therefore, on no condition, not even retaliation justifies the use of nuclear weapons 
under international law. Nuclear deterrence is prominent because of the combination 
of the political and military elements embedded in its doctrine. Non retaliation of the 
use of nuclear weapons by a sovereign State under nuclear attacks seems naïve in 
the light of Article 51 of the UN Charter which recognises every State inherent right to 
self-defence. Any nuclear attack or ‘first strike’ as a result of the devastsating impacts 
of nuclear weapons would amount to gross violation of the 2002 Rome Statute of 
International Criminal Court resulting in genocide, crime against humanity and world 
crime. Consequently, retaliation on nuclear attacks would be too devastating and 
escalating into global nuclear war. The ultimate solution to avoid any nuclear attack or 
nuclear retaliation is nuclear disarmament. 
10) International Politics and Bureaucracy Affecting the Conference on 
Disarmament (CD) and the non-ratification of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-
Ban Treaty (CTBT) by some Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) 
International politics is the realm of struggle, power, hegemony and compromise. The 
fundamental question now is: how has international polticed influenced nuclear 
disarmament process. Nuclear weapons have produced revolutionary change in the 
international system and international system corresponds to the logical ways of 
reshaping a system of collective bargaining. Both in the past and in the present, 
international organisations and conferences have produced a variety of international 
law. Unfortunately, in spite of the reflection of global public sentiments and 
international practice, no agency has successfully enforced international law.1095  
Consequently, the NWS have not fulfilled their disarmament pledges despite the 
various NPT Review Conferences. NWS tends to support non-proliferation because 
many remote and immediate factors influence States decision making on the 
international plane.  
The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been unsuccessful and dysfunctional due 
to democratic deficit. The root cause affecting the CD as multilateral disarmament 
machinery is international political factors rather than the facets of the machinery itself. 
As discussed in Chapter Four, Section 4.6, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT) as pivotal as it is, has not be ratified by some NWS to make it enforceable, 
due to political division, suspicions and reservations.  
Essentially, the issue of democratic deficit raises the question of the right of entitlement 
to possess nuclear weapons. This further resonates in one of the research questions 
inspired by the doctrine of sovereign equality “what is the rationale behind the 
classification of the five permanent United Nations Security Council UNSC States as 
Nuclear Weapons States (NWS) in contradistinction to the rest of the world as Non-
Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS)”  
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11) The Republic of Marshall Island (RMI) Case in the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) Against the Five De Jure and the Four De Factor Nuclear 
Weapons States (NWS) and the Impacts of the ICJ Rulings on October 5 2016 
An insightful finding of this research highlighted in the Literature Review is the 24 
April 2014 legal case instituted by the Republic of Marshall Island (RMI) against the 
nine NWS in the ICJ. In the filed applications against the United States, United 
Kingdom, France, Russia, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea, RMI is 
claiming these States have violated their disarmament obligations under Article VI of 
the NPT and customary international law. Specifically, the RMI also filed a companion 
case against the United States in the U.S. Federal High Court.1096   
Besides its 1996 Advisory Opinion on the legality or otherwise of nuclear weapons, 
this RMI case is the first time the ICJ have received a case and been asked to 
adjudicate on nuclear disarmament, bordering on the violation of the nuclear weapons 
possessing States. Interestingly, this case will invariably serve to bring the legal 
obligations relating to nuclear disarmament back to action.  
Five of the defendants: China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and the United States 
of America are not only legitimately recognised by the NPT as NWS but are 
concomitantly the Five Permanent (P5) UNSC members. Three of the nine defendants 
States: United Kingdom, Indian and Pakistan have accepted the compulsory 
jurisdiction of the ICJ under Article 36 (2) of the ICJ Statute, at the time of writing this 
thesis. China declined the ICJ jurisdiction by official notification to the ICJ, while the 
RMI is urging all the defendant States to accept the jurisdiction of the World Court and 
explain their position regarding the obligations on nuclear disarmament.1097  
On Wednesday 5th of October 2016, the ICJ delivered its rulings on preliminary 
objections to jurisdiction in three separate cases brought by Republic of Marshal Island 
against India, Pakistan and the United Kingdom. By a vote of 8-8 and by the casting 
of vote of Ronny Abraham, the President of the World Court, the Court upheld the 
objection of the United Kingdom that there was no sufficient evidence of the existence 
of a dispute and therefore the ICJ does not have jurisdiction to hear the case on merits. 
Similarly, by a vote of 9-7, the Court upheld the objections of India and Pakistan that 
there was no sufficient evidence of the existence of a dispute and therefore the ICJ 
does not have jurisdiction to hear the case on merits. 
This unprecedented lawsuit ruling was very disappointing and particularly worrying 
that the World Court cannot be unanimous on what it takes to establish a dispute in 
the context of nuclear disarmament. Only the United Kingdom, India and Pakistan 
appeared before the ICJ since they are the only countries that accepted the 
compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The United States, China, Russia, France, Israel 
and North Korea chose to ignore this case ab initio (from the beginning). 
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5.3 Research Recommendations  
The only lasting solution and possible way out of the global threat nuclear weapons 
pose to international peace and security is complete nuclear disarmament. Elimination 
of nuclear weapons and realization of a nuclear-weapon-free world is possible. To 
achieve nuclear disarmament, the international community through the United Nations 
should first and foremost ensure the following tripartite measures: 
a) Establishment of a robust global security concept characterised by mutual trust 
and benefit based on equality and cooperation. Nuclear disarmament process 
is predicated on international security. Therefore, a peaceful, secure, and stable 
global practice of compliance obligations necessary requirements. 
 
b) Pre-conditional continuity of global strategic balance and stability in the nuclear 
weapon disarmament process. Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) should strictly 
adhere to their solemn commitment and obligations made in the various NPT 
Review conferences underpinning international strategic security and stability. 
This relatively implies the capabilities of all States to achieve the objective of 
disarmament. 
 
c) Nuclear disarmament measures and procedures should be in conformity with 
the principle of undiminished security for all States, regardless of their nuclear 
weapons status. All States especially the NWS and States with nuclear 
capabilities and ambition to desist from nuclear development, deployment and 
detonations.    
More pragmatically, the following recommendations arising from this research are 
crucial for the attainment and achievement of a nuclear-weapon free world: 
1) The NWS should assume special responsibility in the nuclear disarmament 
process. They are under the obligation of the NPT and its Review Conferences 
to eliminate their nuclear weapons bearing in mind the “principle of 
irreversibility.” The United States as the first nation that manufactured nuclear 
weapons and the only country that have used them, has the special task to lead 
in achieving its obligations for nuclear disarmament under international law.  
The “principle of irreversibility” was introduced into the NPT framework at the 
2000 NPT Review Conference as one of the “13 Practical Steps” towards 
nuclear disarmament. It has become a mainstream notion that has entered the 
lexicon of nuclear disarmament both as a practical measure applying to nuclear 
material no longer needed for military purposes and as arms control and 
general disarmament norm.  
 
2) Similarly, all NWS should make unconditional commitment not to use or 
threaten to use nuclear weapons against NNWS. 
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3) Both the NWS and NNWS involved should jettison the “Nuclear Umbrella” 
policy or “Nuclear Sharing Arrangement.” “Nuclear Sharing Arrangement” is a 
counterproductive to nuclear disarmament. 
 
4) All Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) should withdraw and destroy nuclear 
weapons deployed outside their territories. 
 
5) All Nuclear Weapon States (NWS) should support and comply with the 
obligations of the various Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone Treaties. 
 
6) The United Nations should encourage Israel, Egypt, Iran, Iraq and all States in 
the Middle East to quickly enact the long proposed Middle-East-Nuclear-Free-
Zone (MENWFZ) with applied terms and conditions similar to the five existing 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zones (NWFZ) in other regions. 
 
7) Multilateral negotiations on the long outstanding Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty 
(FMCT) should be given expediential priority and concluded. The FMCT will 
end the production of weapons-usable fissile material (highly enriched uranium 
and plutonium) 
 
8)  All States regarless of their nuclear weapons status should as a matter of 
global urgent concern ratifiy the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons 
to enable it come into force as a multilateral legal instrument on the complete 
prohibition and proscription of nuclear weapons. 
5.4 Table Mapping the Original Research Contribution to Knowledge 
In line with the standard of doctoral assessment guidelines, requiring original 
contribution to knowleged, the table below is arranged to provide a mapping of areas 
where original contribution to knowledge could be found in this thesis. 
The Research Contribution to 
Knowledge 
Chapters of Contribution 
1.  
a) The research intent and 
advocacy for nuclear 
disarmament through the 
framework of international 
treaties 
b) The importance of concept of 
multilateralism as an 
international approach to the 
growing concern on nuclear 
disarmament  
Chapter 1 
 1.5 (page 14) 
 
 
 
 
 1.6.4 (page 31) 
2.  
a) The relevance of natural law 
theory to the debate on 
nuclear disarmament 
Chapter 2 
2.4 (page 46) 
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b) The link between legal 
positivism and the legal 
framework on nuclear 
disarmament as a 
commendable objective 
2.5 (page 48) 
3. The identification of gaps in the 
literature review and attempt to 
fill such gaps from the 
perspective of philosophy of law 
in Chapter 2, as well as from the 
contextual examination of the 
framework on nuclear 
disarmament in chapters 4 and 5. 
Chapter 2, 2.8.3 (page 95) 
 
4.  
a) The significance of the 
NWFZs and the SS-NWFs as 
prelude from regional to 
global nuclear disarmament. 
b) The synergy of the legal and 
humanaitarian imperative for 
nuclear disarmament 
Chapter 3 
3.9, (page ) 3.10 (127) 
 
 
 
 
3.13 (page 149) 
5.  
a)  The exploration of the timely 
emergence of the TPNW in 
this research as the expected 
milestone legal instrument 
crucial to nuclear 
disarmament. 
b) The link between the legal 
framework and the global 
advocacy for nuclear 
disarmament 
Chapter 4 
4.9 (page 177) 
 
 
 
 
 
4.11(page 199)  
 
6. Recommendations arising from 
the research findings 
Chapter 5, 5.3 (Page 215) 
 
5.5 Conclusion 
The various aforementioned research findings together with the research 
recommendations in this chapter, revealed the numerous long lasting legal, political, 
and theoretical questions surrounding the dynamics of nuclear disarmament. These 
questions are hereby summed up in quadruple questions that are both deeply 
intertwined and interwoven and as a result, they cannot be viewed in isolation from 
one another. First, how do the nuclear weapon disarmament legal framework interface 
with international politics and shape international diplomatic efforts for the realisation 
of a nuclear free world? Second, why has the legal conditionality on nuclear 
disarmament have not held sway over political considerations affecting disarmament? 
Third, why do this nuclear disarmament legal research is embedded with international 
politics and policies? and Lastly, can this doctoral thesis and other similar research 
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that viably contribute to the steps needed for the implementations of nuclear 
disarmament be adopted by global policy makers? 
The obvious non-compliance of States especially the Nuclear Weapon States on their 
nuclear disarmament commitments grossly undermines the legal provisions on 
disarmament. Nothwithstanding, the aspiriational objective of the attainment of nuclear 
disarmament within applicable international law remain sacrosanct. It is on this basis, 
this research recommendations is predicated.The international politics and policies 
affecting disarmament process and aspiration both in the past and in the present 
reflect State sentiments and practice. The Conference on Disarmament (CD) has been 
dysfunctional and not be successful largely due to political factors rather than its legal 
multilateral disarmament machinery.  
The promince of the doctrine of nuclear deterrence is a consequence of the 
hegemonous political elements embedded in it. Factually, the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons and the doctrine of nuclear deterrence have no legal codification. They have 
been arguably described as illegitimate instruments of State practice and they 
constitute instrumentalities of international lawlessness. Nuclear weapons due to their 
potential colossal destructiveness and the enomous humanitarian consequences 
associated with any of their use have been controversial from their 
inception.Consequently, nuclear disarmament has been a global and United Nations 
concern as the need to address the devastating danger nuclear weapons pose is more 
urgent now than ever before. 
However, effective verification and substantial compliance are nececessary to achieve 
nuclear disarmament. Pursuant to Article XII of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear 
Weapons Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency has a comprenhensive 
multilateral verification system and responsibility. To ensure nuclear disarmament, 
States and non-State actors are obliged to comply with legal stipulations on efeective 
verification and compliance. As part of a concerted global efforts to outlaw nuclear 
weapons, the United Nations General Assembly on 7 December 2015, adopted 
Resolution 70/47 on Humanitarian Pledge. The Humanitarian Pledge explicitly seeks 
to prohibit nuclear weapons in their entirety. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
THE RESEARCH SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
6.1 Introduction 
The legal challenges and political considerations associated with nuclear weapons 
disarmament, which this thesis examines have strongly polarised the debate over the 
legality of nuclear weapons acquisions, posessions and their use. While various 
international legal instruments place substantial restrictions on nuclear weapons, the 
Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) outrighly out law nuclear 
weapons in their entirety. The core considerations on the discourse subsumed under 
international polltics and the Humanitarian Pledge are still enmeshed in discrepancies 
and diplomatic intricacies. Considerations such as the doctrine of nuclear deterrence, 
humanitarian imperatives for nuclear disarmament, nuclear arms limitation, control, 
and non-proliferation; and Nuclear Weapons States moratorium on nuclear 
programmes still have indices of credibity deficits as a result of non-compliance and 
enforcement.  
The preceding last two chapters underscore the reality that nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferations are fundamental elements of global international legal frameworks. 
The overwhelming dangers nuclear weapons pose to human lives, global health, 
development, climate, social structures and human rights are enormous enough for a 
coherent multilateral approach to address the prevailing problems of nuclear 
disarmament. On the one hand, the nuclear arms race and its historical antecedents 
paved the way for the legal arguments and the humanitarian imperatives for 
disarmament.in this reseach. On the other, the political implications and diplomatic 
influences interface with the legal framework for nuclear disarmament. 
This concluding chapter of this thesis comprises a precise summary on the reality on 
nuclear disarmament arsing from the research, embedded with nuclear disarmament: 
natural law theory as ethical legitimacy and legal positivism as legal determinacy as 
well as the researcher’s reflective argument arsing from these jurisprudential theories. 
This chapter also contain a section on a brief description on the research limitations, 
together with the conclusion section on the entire research. In clarifying and 
streamingling the discusions on nuclear disarmament, it is important to emphasise that 
nuclear disarmament has been in the forefront of international law since the inception 
of the United Nations in its very first General Assembly Resolution. 
In promoting the the need for nuclear disarmament, the conclusion of this research 
therefore reinforces and re-emphasises the need for all States at all time to comply 
with all applicable international law to strengthen the legal regime for nuclear 
disarmament. In the absence of the coming into force of the TPNW, the Humanitarian 
Pledge, the call for States to identify and pursue effective measures to fill the legal gap 
for total elimination of nuclear weapons is a conceptual humanitarian framework 
complementing the legal imperative for disarmament.  
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6.2 Summary (Synopsis)  
Statistics shows that there are about 22,000 nuclear weapons presently remaining in 
our world today and more than 2,000 nuclear tests have been conducted to date.1098 
Consequently, so long as nuclear weapons exist in the world, the potential risk of their 
use by articulation, miscalculation or megalomania meanness is real. Inevitably, any 
use of nuclear weapons would cause unthinkable humanitarian emergencies and  
catastrophic global consequences on the environment, climate, health, social order, 
human development and economic impact. The more the world realises the global 
humanitarian consequences associated with nuclear weapons, the stronger the case 
and urgent step needed against them. 
Against this background, nuclear weapons are at loggerhead with the 
contemporaneous 21st –century corpus of international law, specifically, international 
humanitarian law. In this era of globalization vis a’ vis the unimaginable destructive 
capability of nuclear weapons, the humanitarian dimension is central to the 
international community’s non-proliferation of nuclear weapons and nuclear 
disarmament. However, in as much as NWS and their allies rely on nuclear weapons 
as legitimate security and protective hedge for self-defence, efforts to counter nuclear 
proliferation will always suffer from a fundamental contradiction and credibility deficit. 
Invariably, both the possession of nuclear weapons and reliance on nuclear 
deterrence are evidence of nuclear proliferation. 
Based on this reality, the multilateral nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation regime is fraught with non-compliance. Essential parameters of the 
nuclear age, the belief that only few States actually possess nuclear weapons and 
have the required technological capabilities and knowledge to produce nuclear 
weapons is ironical. The nuclear technological threshold is growing high. This is 
apparently for political rather than technological consideration. It is a general believe 
that more “Rogue States” and “Axis of Evil” have acquired the knowledge of 
technological nuclear weapons capability to produce nuclear weapons.    
The non-compliance by States on nuclear disarmament principles undermines the 
foundation of trust and safety upon which the mutual benefits of global nuclear 
cooperation are significantly predicated. Devoid of assurances, the transfer of nuclear 
technology within the framework of applicable safeguard for exclusive peaceful 
purposes as enshrined in Article IV (2) of the NPT will be extremely difficult if not 
impossible. Argubly, the existential non-compliance weakens the aspiration of the 
international community to general and total nuclear disarmament. As contained in the 
NPT Preamble and in Article VI, if the emergence of States possessing nuclear 
weapons cannot be stopped, new regional and global nuclear arm races are most 
likely to spring up and become entrenched. It is imperative therefore, that the NPT 
State parties should prioritise the development and implementation of vigorous and 
sustained efforts to detect violations of the NPT obligations and commitments.  
The views of the NWS and the NNWS are parallel. The NWS perceive nuclear 
disarmament and the attainment of a nuclear-free-world as long-term aspirational 
                                                          
1098 United Nations Office for Disarmament Affairs (UNODA), https://www.un.org/disarmament/wnd/nuclear 
accessed 05/09/2016 
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objective, while the NNWS consider nuclear disarmament as urgent and nuclear 
deterrence as a high global risk to both national and international security. The NNWS 
which do not belong to the Nuclear Umbrellas or that are not part of the “Nuclear 
Sharing Arrangement” consider nuclear weapons as highly destructive and retention 
and reliance on them is anachronistic. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) which are 
mainly Non-Nuclear Weapon States support the negotiation of a nuclear weapons 
treaty to delegitimize nuclear weapons and actualise disarmament within a specified 
time frame. The emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is a 
delight to the NAM. 
Fundamentally, the divergent views between the NWS and the NNWS revolve around 
the NPT, obligations and commitments to nuclear disarmament and the achievement 
and maintenance of a world devoid of nuclear weapon. The NPT Article VI stands as 
the only legally binding multilateral nuclear disarmament obligation.  
The phrase in this Article: “pursue negotiation in good faith” is so vague, so much so 
that, is largely left open to diverse interpretations and implemented loosely as the 
article does not specify a time frame or verification mechanism for nuclear 
disarmament. Primarily, NWS view their nuclear weapons from the perspective of 
national security and the various nuclear disarmament commitments of the NPT 
Review Conferences agreed upon by consensus as political with no binding effects.  
The successful outcomes of the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences were not 
repeated in 2005 due to the failure of State parties to adopt extensive substantial 
measures. It was the 2000 NPT Review conference that produced the 13 practical 
steps towards nuclear disarmament, with an “unequivocal undertaking by the Nuclear 
Weapon States (NWS) to accomplish the total eliminations of their nuclear arsenals.” 
This unequivocal undertaking is in conformity with the obligations of the Article VI and 
the very first time in the history of the NPT the NWS agreed to the total eliminations of 
their nuclear armaments. The 2010 NPT Review Conference final document produced 
a 64-item action plan covering the three pillars of the NPT which are: disarmament, 
nuclear non-proliferation and the usage of nuclear technology for peaceful purposes. 
However, the 2015 NPT Review Conference was not successful in producing an 
outcome final document. The contentious issues were nuclear disarmament and the 
deliberations on Middle East WMD-Free Zone. The Conference experienced deep 
division between the NWS and the NNWS on the humanitarian approach to nuclear 
disarmament. Besides the sharp disagreement on the disarmament discourse, 
convening a conference on a Middle East WMD-Free zone resulted in the 2015 NPT 
Review Conference not adopting a final document.1099 
Furthermore, nuclear disarmament and the emergence of the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) are multilateral or global reality. Several attempts at 
negotiating legally binding multilateral nuclear disarmament treaties have proven 
abortive. The United Nations established the Conference on Disarmament (CD) as a 
mono multilateral disarmament forum in 1979. Since its establishment, the CD has 
                                                          
1099 M. Patrick Cottrell, The Evolution and Legitimacy of International Security Institutions (Cambridge 
University Press, 2016) 155 
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negotiated the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in  1996, which was 
the only nuclear weapons legal instrument acceptably considered as a milestone 
towards nuclear disarmament but yet to enter into force. Expectedly, the coming into 
force of the TPNW 90 after the threshold of at least 50 States ratification would 
supersede all hitherto existing nuclear weapons treaties. 
Nuclear Disarmament: Natural Law Theory as Ethical Legitimacy and Legal 
Positivism as Legal Determinacy  
The challenges of the international circumstances surrounding nuclear disarmament 
in the midst of the international legal regime1100 on nuclear disarmament is enormous. 
Nuclear disarmament, which implies procedural reductions of nuclear weapons to total 
eliminations toward a state of a nuclear-free-world, has been a tremendously difficult 
global concern in terms of achievement as acknowledged by the United Nations.   
As elucidated in Chapter  2, Section 2.4, ‘Natural Law Theory,’ natural law has three 
schools of thought which are: divine natural law, secular natural law, and historical 
natural law. Consequent upon the divisions and the interwoven views of these schools 
of thought, natural law is therefore consolidated into two major categories, namely: 
natural law of morality and natural law of legality (natural law theory of law).  In its 
entirety, natural law theory serves as ethical legitimacy to nuclear disarmament 
discourse. The concepts of natural law of morality and natural law of legality imply that 
the universe has a divine order translated into a legal ethical framework. An ethical 
framework for the ultimate good of mankind and the society to live. In the view of 
Thomas Aquinas, natural law naturally promotes the common good of the society and 
negates the consequences of manmade, corrupt or bad law. Irrefutably, when divine 
code comes into conflict with manmade or bad law, natural law takes precedence. 
As it pertains to nuclear weapons and nuclear disarmament, the humanitarian impacts 
and consequences surrounding the dangers of nuclear weapons, public conscience 
and global concerns as well as the concerted efforts of the international community 
through the United Nations in international conferences and multilateral fora on the 
possibility of achieving a nuclear-free-world for the good of mankind is an eloquent 
manifestation of natural law as ethical legitimacy for nuclear disarmament.  
Humanity has ethical and moral norms predicated on wisdom, conscience and 
pragmatism. Many ethical norms have universally withstood the test of human 
existence and experience from time immemorial. The Principle of Reciprocity generally 
known as the Golden Rule characterised by the underlying factor of treat others as 
you which to be treated is an ethical foundational value. The responsibility and the 
recognition of duty of States and individuals to protect and uphold the intrinsic 
sacredness of life has been a fundamental characteristic of all civilised human values.   
Contextually, it is inconsistent with ethical wisdom and moral norms for few States not 
only to possess nuclear weapons which are catastrophically destructive instruments 
of annihilation but also their failure to eliminate their nuclear armaments. The NWS 
have solemnly promised the international community to negotiate in good faith to 
                                                          
1100 Wade L. Huntley et al, Nuclear Disarmament in the Twenty-first Century (Hiroshima Peace Institute, 2004) 
373 
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achieve nuclear disarmament by signing the NPT. Furthermore, they extended their 
obligations to abolish their nuclear weapons at the 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010 and 2015 
NPT Review and Extension Conferences.1101 
Similarly, in the same Chapter  2, section 2.5 – “Legal Positivism,” Legal positivism 
has been explicitly explained as a jurisprudential theory antithetical to natural law 
theory and deeply depicted as a theory influenced by sovereignty and the rule of law 
devoid of ethical or moral values. Legal positivism upholds that laws and judicial 
systems are made by man for man and there is no necessary connection between the 
law and morality or ethics, and the formation of legal precepts. Based on this stand 
point of legal positivism, it is therefore consequential and stands as legal determinacy 
to nuclear disarmament.  
Nuclear disarmament has codifications in the various international weapon treaties. 
Raging from the NPT to the five Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Zone NWFZ Treaties, as well 
as the hitherto and abrogated bilateral and trilateral treaties such as the ABM Treaty, 
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) and the and Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks (SALT), between the United States of America and Russia and 
between both States and the United Kingdom. These treaties prescribed the limitations 
and abolishment of nuclear weapons. Fundamentally, legal positivism is a legal 
determinacy to nuclear disarmament because it has the elements of command and 
compliance. Command in terms of the letter of the law and compliance on the side of 
the responsibility of the States. 
From the foregoing, the both jurisprudential theories of Natural Law and Legal 
Positivism can be appropriated, interpreted and implemented in diverse ways for 
consequential retrospect and prospect advantages on nuclear disarmament. For 
example, in natural law theory it is glaring that the sovereignty primarily needs the 
legitimate ethical support and authority of the people. While in legal positivism, the 
sovereignty enforces the compliance irrespective of the merit or otherwise of the law, 
and in context, the international law on nuclear disarmament should not be burdened 
by any considerations based on morality or ethical values. 
In the light of the above, it is necessary to hereby state the views of Judges Ranjeva 
and Weeramantry on the ethical and legal framework for addressing the issue of 
nuclear weapons in the Opinion of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued in 
July 8 1996.  
In Judge Ranjeva’s view: “On the great issues of mankind the requirements of positive 
law and of ethics make common cause, and nuclear weapons because of their 
destructive effects, are one such issue.”1102 
While the view of Judge Weeramantry goes thus: “(E)quality of all those who are 
subject to a legal system is central to its integrity and legitimacy. So, it is within the 
body of principles constituting the Corpus of international law. Least of all can there 
                                                          
1101 2005 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty of Non-proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) 1968, 
(2-27 May 2005, New York)   
1102 International Court of Justice (ICJ) Advisory Opinion on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear 
Weapons, 8 July 1996, Opinion of Judge Ranjeva, para 105 (2) E1  
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be one law for the powerful and another law for the rest. No domestic system would 
accept such a principle, nor can any international system which premised on a concept 
of equality.”1103 
On the one hand, Judge Ranjeva’s view purports and supports Natural Law theory as 
ethical legitimacy for nuclear disarmament and on the other hand, Judge 
Weeramatry’s statement underscores the principles of Legal Positivism as legal 
determinacy for nuclear disarmament. The combinations of Natural Law theory and 
Legal Positivism is seen in the 1981 UNGA “Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear 
Catastrophe”, whereby the UNGA reaffirmed “that the universally accepted objective 
is to eliminate completely the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons through 
cessation of their production, followed by destruction of their stockpile…” and as a 
consequence, all the horrors of the past wars and calamities that have befallen people 
would pale in comparison with what is inherent in the uses of nuclear weapons, 
capable of destroying civilization on earth.1104  
The Researcher’s Reflective Arguments for Nuclear Disarmament 
The researcher’s reflective arguments for the disarmament of nuclear weapons are 
deducible from the aforementioned Natural Law theory and Legal Positivism theory. 
For the purposes of ostensible precision and specificity, the following are the 
arguments put forward by the researcher for nuclear weapons disarmament: 
1. The destructiveness of nuclear weapons, their continuous existence, possessions, 
and detonations by the NWS, as well as the unbridled ambitions of some States 
to acquire them; is not only unethical but also a paradox of excluded middle. It is 
paradoxical for us humans who are rational beings and respond to sound reasons 
to have nuclear weapons in our world, because they are not war-winning epochal 
instruments. Nuclear weapons are instruments of doom, annihilation and self-
destruction. Natural law which is principally the theory of the nature and need of 
ethical reasoning in which law is expressed as a model purport and support 
nuclear disarmament. 
 
2. The various multilateral fora and efforts that culminate in international treaties on 
nuclear weapons and the provisions of legal instruments such as the TPNW and 
Article VI of the NPT is a pointer to the theory of Legal Positivism that upholds 
legal validity as command of the sovereign and the rule of recognition. This implies 
that all the legal provisions and the commendable objectives of the law in light of 
nuclear disarmament are indication that disramment is a collective global 
aspiration and should be complied with by all States to ensure a nuclear free world. 
 
                                                          
1103 Ibid, Opinion of Judge Weeramantry V4  
1104 United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) Declaration on the Prevention of Nuclear Catastrophe, 
A/36/100, December 9 1981 
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6.3 Reseach Limitations  
This research which seeks to analyse the legal challenges and the political 
considerations associated with nuclear disarmament in international law has both 
theoretical and methodological limitations. Theoretically, this research does not cover 
any analysis on the mode of implementation, and enforcement of the provisions on 
nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Although, realising the significance of the 
Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty as a majoy aspect of nuclear disarmament and 
non-proliferation regime, this thesis does not also cover any specific section analysing 
the Comprehensive Nuclear Ban Treaty on the basis that it has not entered into force. 
Based on the doctrinal legal research method and the Black Letter Law approach 
under qualitative methodology adopted in this research, this thesis is limited to critical 
analysis, sythensis and the crique of legal issues involved with nuclear disarmament. 
As such, it does not apply the approach of the use of surveys and quantification in the 
collection and analysis of legal data pertaining to nuclear weapons. This research is 
purely qualitative in its enrirety. It desists from the combination of socio-legal or 
empirical legal methodology and presents law as self-contained entity.  
6.4 Conclusion  
The seemingly slow pace on nuclear disarmament and the continouous reliance on 
nuclear weapons through the doctrine of nuclear deterrence and policies of national 
security by the NWS and other nuclear possessing States constitute a challenge for 
the entire discourse on nuclear disarmament. The legal rationale behind this doctoral 
research is predicated on the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable 
international law, bearing in mind that any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary 
to the rules of armed conflict. Specifically,the principles and rules of international 
humanitarian law and the gross  violation of the 2002 Rome Statute of International 
Criminal Court. 
The emergence of the Treaty on the prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) is a 
potential implementation of the NPT, which stands as the cornerstone of the 
disarmament and non-proliferation regime, crucial for the interest of public conscience. 
The TPNW as the sole legally binding instrument prohibiting nuclear weapons should 
be ratified by all States towards the achievement and maintenance of a world free of 
nuclear weapons.  
The aim of international law is the achievement of a public order of human dignity 
encapsulated in qualities cherish by man: power, wealth, entitlement, skill, well-being, 
affection, respect and rectitude.1105 No matter how strong the argument made for the 
precautionary retention or possession of nuclear weapons by the NWS and their 
proponents, such argument do not suffice for an ideal global order. The world is 
entitled to be deeply concern about the creation of a global order in which action is 
based on the judgement of few individual states without the input of multilateral 
mechanism to ascertain more objectively the claims of lawfulness. Therefore, 
international law which is mostly embodied in international treaties regulates the 
                                                          
1105 Elli Louka, Nuclear Weapons, Justice and the Law (Edward Elgar Publishing, Inc., 2011) 411 
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conduct of the international community in all aspects and facets including nuclear 
weapons in their entirety. 
A world free of nuclear weapons requires a global legal regime with an agreed legally 
binding instrument such the TPNW. This will give all States especially the Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States the confidence that nuclear disarmament is durably and effectively 
realiable. The vision of a world devoid of nuclear weapons is seemly becoming blurred 
as a result of political influences on the legal framework on nuclear disarmament and 
this needs to be refocussed. It is a common global interest for all States to strive to 
improve international security in ensuring a world without nuclear weapons in line with 
Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
The vulnerabilities of risks associated with any potential use of nuclear weapons, their 
reliance by the Nuclear Weapon States and other nuclear posessing States for their 
protective and national security interests as well as their continuous existence in our 
world need to be taken into serious considerations. Response to the humanitarian 
nuclear emergencies should be included in international mitigation processes. The 
Conference on Disarmament and the United Nations General Assembly should 
expand the scope of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts to reflect the 
legal imperatives as well substantial compliance. 
However, the possibility of the use of nuclear weapons seems rare, but no nation can 
consider itself free from the potential consequences of nuclear weapons detonations 
and their impact on human development. Providentially, the Treaty on the Prohibition 
of Nuclear Weapons (TPNW) has addressed the existential gap in the treaty law for 
total and complete prohibition of nuclear weapons. Progress on nuclear disarmament 
should be made by all States, especially the States known for possessing nuclear 
weapons by signing and ratifying the TPNW.  
In the light of the unacceptable humanitarian consequences and the associated risks 
of nuclear weapons, the Humanitarian Pledge stimulating the fact-based humanitarian 
and legal analyses as imperatives for nuclear disarmament, would ensure global 
human security and promote the protection of the natural environment against the 
calamitious destructions stemming from nuclear weapons. Leaving nuclear 
disarmament obligations unfulfilled, would have serious implications on the 
implementation of international law. Nuclear weapons disarmament legal frameworks 
are fundamentally intertwined with multilateralism that require States full cooprations.  
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